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PSYCHEDELICS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM*
By JoEL JAY FnE**
The initial segment of Professor Finer's contribution appeared as
point one (of nine) in the brief for appellant filed by the author in
November 1966 in the case of Timothy Leary v. United States, before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Editors
feel that publication of this work of advocacy is well justified by
its thorough and informative scholarship on this question of con-
temporary constitutional significance. The author favored this format
in order to make manifest his role as advocate-scholar, and thus avoid
any suggestion of lack of full disclosure.t
In part I of the article which follows the brief, the author examines
the claim that users of psychedelics do not deserve the status of
religious claimants under the first amendment, explores the consti-
tutional meaning of religious exercise, and describes the religious sig-
nificance of psychedelic drugs in the lives of some users. In part II,
he considers the standards for determining when legislative infringe-
ment is justified, analyzes the requirements of compelling state in-
terest and lack of less-restrictive alternatives, formulates guidelines
for judicial application of the relevant criteria, and briefly evaluates
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Leary v. United States.
The author and the Journal invite and encourage critical and disin-
terested response to the thesis presented herein.
I.
LEARY v. UNITED STATES: BRIEF FOR
DR. TIMOTHY LEARY
Statement of the Case
General
On March 11, 1966, following a trial by jury in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division,
appellant was found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 176 (a) (unlaw-
fully and knowingly transporting illegally imported marihuana, with
intent to defraud, with knowledge of illegal importation (Count
Two) ) and 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (2) (unlawfully and knowingly trans-
porting marihuana, as a transferee required to pay the transfer tax,
without having paid such tax (Count Three)) (Tr).$ Count One,
* Copyright 1968, Joel Jay Finer.
** B.B.A., 1959, City College of New York; LL.B., 1963, Yale University;
M.A., 1963 Yale University; Associate Professor of Law, University of Texas;
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, 1967-1968, Stanford University.
t See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227
(1965).
$ References in the original brief to pages of the trial record are in-
dicated here by (Tr.).
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charging smuggling under 21 U.S.C. § 176 (a), was not submitted to
the jury, over objection of government counsel (Tr.) 1
Witnesses for the prosecution testified to the following:
(a) On December 22, 1965, appellant drove an automobile, with
four passengers, up to the United States Customs Station at the
International Bridge in Laredo, Texas, having crossed the bridge
south to north, from Mexico into the United States (Tr.).
(b) Because the automobile contained considerable baggage and
one of the passengers was bearded (Tr.), the occupants were or-
dered out of the car. A preliminary search revealed what appeared
to be a marihuana seed (Tr.).
(c) The occupants did not declare anything from Mexico (Tr.).
(d) A personal search of the occupants revealed marihuana con-
cealed on the person of Susan Leary, appellant's 18-year-old daughter
(Tr.). Additional marihuana sweepings were found in the glove com-
partment and the floor of the automobile (Tr.). The total quantity of
marihuana was less than one-half ounce (Tr.).
(e) Prior to the search appellant told the customs inspector
that he had not been into Mexico, but that after crossing the bridge
from north to south had been advised by the Mexican officials to re-
turn to the Mexican Customs Station the next day (Tr.).
(f) Mr. Hatch, a customs agent, testified that appellant told
him he had given the marihuana to his daughter on the way back
across the bridge and told her to get rid of it (Tr.). He also testified
that appellant said that at some point on the bridge, Susan "told her
father that she still had it." (Tr.)
Appellant's principal defense was based on the first amendment's
guarantee of the free exercise of religion. The facts specifically bear-
ing on this issue and the other points on this appeal will be pre-
sented in order of argument below.
Appellant introduced evidence to the effect that he began the trip
from New York with marihuana in the automobile (Tr.); drove from
New York through Laredo, Texas, across the International Bridge, to
the Mexican Customs Station (Tr.). Upon being recognized by a
Mexican official, and fearing a strict search, appellant told the mem-
bers of his party to get rid of the marihuana; it appearing that they
had carried out his suggestion, appellant honestly believed that there
was no marihuana in his automobile (Tr.). Appellant was told by
Mexican immigration officials that he would not be given entry papers
at that time (the evening of December 22, 1965), but that he would
1 Appellant's daughter, Susan Leary, was tried by the court under the
same indictment and convicted under count three, following the government's
motion, at the court's behest, to dismiss the other counts against her.
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have to come back early the next morning (Tr.).2 Appellant con-
cluded that he had to return to Laredo for the night (Tr.), and
started back across the bridge, under the assumption that there was
no marihuana in the automobile (Tr.). Just prior to reaching the
United States Customs Station (about three-quarters of the distance
between the international boundary and the American station), appel-
lant realized that they would "have to go through customs on the
American side" and asked, "Is all of the marihuana out of the car?"
His daughter Susan replied "'No,' that the marihuana had just been
found and that she had it." (Tr.) Appellant testified that he did
not give marihuana to his daughter nor did he tell Mr. Hatch that he
had (Tr.); nor did he tell his daughter to secrete the marihuana (Tr.).
Following the jury's verdict, appellant was sentenced to the maxi-
mum confinement and fine under each Count (total of 30 years and
$30,000) and ordered committed for examination under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4208 (B) in contemplation of subsequent reconsideration of the
sentence (Tr.).
Questions Presented and Related Statement of Case
1. Where testimony indicates that marihuana plays an integral
role in the religious life of a defendant belonging to a Hindu
sect, facilitating a spiritual, transcendental experience at the
core of religion, and that marihuana is relatively harmless, is
defendant, on trial for offenses based on possession of mari-
huana, entitled to an instruction directing acquittal if the
jury finds him honest and sincere in his religious beliefs?
Facts
The record suggests that appellant has had two consuming inter-
ests in his life-understanding and treating the mentally ill, and at-
taining and comprehending a profound religious experience through
the use of psychedelic drugs, including marihuana.
Dr. Leary, who earned a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the
University of California (Tr.), devoted the years from 1944-1960 to
treating the mentally ill and contributing substantially through schol-
arly publications, to our knowledge of the nature of mental illness
(Tr.). In 1950 he helped found the Kaiser Psychiatric Clinic in Oak-
land, California (Tr.). During the next 8 years at the Kaiser Clinic
he received close to one-half million dollars in federal grants for
work on mental illness (Tr.). He published 13 scientific articles,
two books and four diagnostic tests dealing with mental illness, prior
2 This testimony was corroborated by that of a Mexican federal employee
(Tr.).
to 1960 (Tr.). These tests are employed in diagnosing and treating
the mentally ill in over 750 clinics and hospitals in the United States,
and have been translated into several foreign languages (Tr.).
Dr. Leary served on the University of California medical faculty
from 1953-1956 (Tr.) and, in 1959, accepted an invitation to join the
Harvard University faculty (to teach and explore new methods of
treating mental illness) (Tr.).
In 1960, while on a trip to Mexico, Dr. Leary had an experience
that profoundly changed his life. He ingested a number of the
"sacred mushrooms" of Mexico (Tr.) and had "the most intense re-
ligious experience I have ever had in my life." (Tr.) Since then,
appellant testified, "I have done practically nothing in my waking
hours . .. except to try and understand the meaning of this experi-
ence, how it can be applied to help a man... find out who he is and
what the religious nature of himself is." (Tr.) The experience was
one which men have "been having ... for thousands of years and
trying to write about .... " (Tr.)
Returning to Harvard, appellant read all he could about the
mystical, transcendental experience, formed a religious research group,
and, with the help of Aldous Huxley and the approval of Harvard,
designed experiments to explore the religious, psychedelic experi-
ence as produced by certain drugs (Tr.).
In 1962 Dr. Leary became interested in Hinduism, and, after about
a year of study, was initiated into a Hindu sect which operates an
Ashram (religious center) 20 miles south of Boston (Tr.). Dr. Leary
left Harvard in 1963 (Tr.), and after some experimental work in
Mexico (Tr.), established a center for religious and scientific research
in Millbrook, New York (Tr.).
Pursuing religious learning, appellant journeyed to Japan and
India in the winter and spring of 1964-1965. While in India studying
with Sri Asoke Fukir, a well known religious leader, appellant partici-
pated in religious rituals in which ganja (a specially cultivated hemp
derivative more potent than marihuana) played an important role;
and, becoming a member of Sri Asoke's Hindu sect, Dr. Leary first
began using marihuana for religious purposes (Tr.). Appellant then
visited Banaras, a holy city, and New Delhi, but, having no religious
teachers, did not smoke ganja (Tr.). Thereafter appellant studied for
3 months with Lama Anaganka Govinda, a leading authority on Ti-
betan Buddhism, and used ganja during this period (Tr.). Subse-
quently he stayed at monasteries in two other Indian cities for brief
periods (Tr.). Appellant's sole purpose during his trip was to study
and practice religion (Tr.).
Among appellant's religious and scientific publications on psyche-
delic drugs since 1960 (five books and 38 articles (Tr.) ) are included
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(a) a book of Psychedelic Prayers (involving prayers for each level of
consciousness attained through each of the psychedelic drugs, includ-
ing marihuana) (Tr.); (b) a modem translation of the holiest text
in Tibetan religion-The Tibetan Book of the Dead, retitled The Psy-
chedelic Experience, a guide for religious interpretation of each stage
of the journey triggered by psychedelic drugs (Tr.); (c) an article
(published, inter alia in the magazine of the Lutheran Church) called
The Religious Experience, Its Production and Interpretation, deal-
ing with the religious use and meaning of psychedelic drugs (Tr.);
and (d) an article in the Journal of Religious Education, with Pro-
fessor Walter Houston Clark of the Andover Newton Theological
School, Religious Implications of Consciousness Expanding Drugs
(Tr.). Dr. Leary has also given many lectures on the use of
psychedelic drugs in religion (Tr.).
At his home in Millbrook, New York, where he pursues his re-
ligious and scientific studies, there is a meditation house which serves
as a spiritual retreat; and many rooms in the main house contain
"shrines devoted to different Hindu and Buddhist and Christian and
other ways of finding God." "Almost every room in the house has a
religious picture or a religious statue." Dr. Leary's testimony re-
garding his religious studies at Harvard, his conversion to Hinduism,
his religious activities in India, and his home in Millbrook, was
substantially corroborated by the testimony of Sri Kalidas (Fred
Swain), an American Hindu Monk, and Dr. Ralph Metzner, a psy-
chopharmacologist (Tr.).
Regarding the significance of marihuana to appellant's religion,
Dr. Leary testified that it plays an integral part in his religious
practices (Tr.); that it is a sacramental aid which substantially
facilitates his religious beliefs (Tr.); that while other more potent
drugs play a major role in his religion and bring him to different
levels of consciousness, without marijuana he could not attain certain
levels of religious experience (Tr.). Appellant pointed out that while
his religious values would not be jeopardized were he deprived of ma-
rihuana (comparing this possibility to depriving a Catholic of Mass),
the practice of his religion would be impeded and his religious beliefs
violated (Tr.). The testimony of Sri Kalidas corroborated the fact
that marihuana is used in the religious practices of certain Hindu
sects (Tr.); that it plays a very important part in the sect to which
appellant belongs (Tr.); and that appellant uses marihuana in this
country in pursuit of his religious beliefs (Tr.).
Testimony Relating to the Relative Harmlessness of Marihuana
Appellant called two experts to the stand: Dr. Ralph Metzner, a
psychopharmacologist, and Editor of the Psychedelic Review, holding
degrees in pharmacy from Oxford University, a doctorate in Clinical
Psychology from Harvard, and having had a year's post doctorate
work at the Harvard Medical School (Tr.); and Dr. Joel Fort, a spe-
cialist in psychiatry and drug addiction, Director of the Center for
Special Problems of the San Francisco Department of Public Health,
Chairman of a California Medical Society's Committee on Alcoholism
and Drug Addiction, who twice served as Consultant on Drug Abuse
to the World Health Organization, once as Advisor to the United Na-
tions Division on Narcotic Drugs, and has received federal and state
authority to experiment with marihuana (Tr.). They agreed that (1)
marihuana is not addicting, in the sense of producing either with-
drawal symptoms or increasing tolerance (Tr.); (2) marihuana does
not lead either to crimes or sexual misconduct, indeed it tends to
produce quiescence and passivity (Tr.); (3) marihuana does not lead
to heroin, or other hard-core narcotics (Tr.); and (4) it does not lead
to physiological or psychological illness (Tr.). Dr. Metzner testified
that alcohol was more harmful than marihuana (Tr.) and Dr. Fort
testified that alcohol is more likely to lead to criminal behavior (Tr.).
The Court's Ruling
Appellant requested the court to instruct the jury that, with
regard to the defense of religious exercise, "the only question for
you to decide is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely be-
lieved that marihuana facilitated the practice of his religious beliefs.
If you find that he was honest and sincere in these beliefs, you
must acquit him on all counts of the indictment. On the other hand,
if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt these representation of be-
lief in religion is [sic] a mere pretense, without honest belief, made
for the purpose of smoking or using marihuana with impunity, then
you will find the defendant guilty." (Tr.)
Rejecting appellant's religious defense, the court made the follow-
ing findings:
I do not consider the testimony that the defendant has given in
any sense raises any question of religious freedom. There are a
number of reasons for that.
It appears that by his own statement this is not a necessary or
essential part of his religious belief; it's simply, I think, as he put it,
very accurately, an outward manifestation.
He has told us further that there are many other substances that
might be used and that this is only one of a number.
Further, assuming his entire good faith, as I am for present pur-
poses, the law does not permit a person's conduct to go completely
unrestrained simply because it may be in a good-faith effort to prac-
tice one of the teachings or tenets of his religion. (Tr.)
The court found that People v. Woody3 was inapplicable because
3 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (upholding the
constitutional right of members of an American Indian religion to use peyote
in religious service).
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(1) these American Indians "followed this same rite for perhaps
hundreds of years"; (2) peyote was the very crux of their religious
beliefs; (3) its use was always at a gathering attendant with the
trappings of religious ceremony; and (4) peyote was a sacramental
symbol, while
By Dr. Leary's testimony he uses marihuana and other drugs, as
I understand it, to more effectively put him in a mood to contemplate
and reflect, to aid or assist in contemplation and reflection.
Apparently he does it alone or with a few friends from time to
time, [at] different hours of the day or night, which to me is a far
different thing than the situation covered by the California case. (Tr.)
Argument
I(A).
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY TO ACQUIT APPELLANT IF IT FOUND HIS RELIGIOUS
CLAIMS TO BE HONEST AND IN GOOD FAITH, IN LIGHT OF
TESTIMONY TENDING TO ESTABLISH THAT (a) MARIHUANA
PLAYS AN INTEGRAL ROLE IN APPELLANT'S EXERCISE OF
HIS RELIGION, (b) THE APPLICATION OF THE TRANSPORTA-
TION AND TAX STATUTES SUBSTANTIALLY INFRINGES AP-
PELLANT'S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND (c) THE INGESTION
OF MARIHUANA DOES NOT PRESENT A GRAVE ABUSE EN-
DANGERING PARAMOUNT INTERESTS AND IS THUS FULLY
PROTECTED BY THE "FREE EXERCISE" CLAUSE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.
A. Religious Exercise May Not Be Infringed by Generally Applica-
ble Statutes Unless It Amounts to a Grave Abuse Endangering Para-
mount Interests or There Is a Compelling Governmental Interest in
Denying a Religious Exemption.
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exer-
cise it as these may dictate .... Before any man can be considered
as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of
the Universe... .4
1. The Measure of Constitutional Protection Afforded Religious
Freedom
Within our constitutional system, religious exercise, like speech,
receives special protection against legislative infringement. For these
freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment, unlike the general
"liberties" assured by the fifth amendment, may not be infringed by
4 Memorial and Remonstrance, in 6 PAP its oF JAMs MADisox (W.
Hutchinson & W. Rachal ed. 1962).
legislation supported merely by "minimum rationality." The singular
importance of religious exercise and speech in our constitutional
jurisprudence imposes on the Government the burden of demonstrat-
ing a compelling, not merely a reasonable, interest in their abridg-
ment. 5
In its most recent articulation of this principle, the Supreme
Court held that a state could not constitutionally deny unemploy-
ment compensation to one whose "unavailability" for Saturday em-
ployment was religiously motivated.6 The Court reasserted that where
religious freedoms are jeopardized,
it is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitu-
tional area "Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount inter-
ests, give occasion for permissible limitation."7
In a subsequent decision, In re Jenison,8 the Court, citing Sherbert v.
Verner,sa remanded the criminal contempt conviction of a woman who
based her refusal to render jury service on religious grounds.0
In Sherbert, the Court reaffirmed its understanding of the free
exercise clause expressed 20 years earlier in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.10 Religious liberties, wrote Mr. Justice
Jackson for the Court, "are susceptible to restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate dangers to interests the state may lawfully pro-
tect."'1 The numerous decisions affording this special constitutional
5 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 (1945); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946).
6 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7 Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
8 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
8a 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9 On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
stating, "[u]ntil and unless further experience indicates that the indiscrimi-
nate invoking of the First Amendment poses a serious threat to the effective
functioning of our jury system, any person whose religious convictions pro-
hibit compulsory jury duty shall henceforth be exempt." In re Jenison, 267
Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963).
10 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a compulsory flag salute as applied
to Jehovah's Witnesses).
11 Id. at 640. Concurring in Barnette, Justices Black and Douglas ob-
served that religious exercise could be constitutionally inhibited by laws
"which are either imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from
grave and pressing imminent dangers or which, without any general prohibi-
tion, merely regulate the time, place or manner of religious activity." Id. at
643-44.
Earlier the Supreme Court, reversing a breach of peace conviction arising
out of religious solicitation had held that religious freedom must prevail in
the absence of a "clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the
State." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940). This test was
recently applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in upholding the right of an
adult to refuse a blood transfusion, on religious grounds. In re Brook's Es-
tate, 32 Ill. 2d 322, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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protection to religious exercise have invalidated general, nondiscrim-
inatory legislation which "neutrally" inhibited religious, as well as
nonreligious practices.12
In short, when religion and other constitutionally preferred val-
ues are at stake, there is small place for the considerable judicial
deference ordinarily paid to legislative judgments. 3 Upon the ju-
diciary devolves the responsibility of preserving these cherished free-
doms by closely scrutinizing the legislative rationale to determine
whether the prohibited activity creates a grave danger, and, if so,
whether the legislative objective could be substantially achieved with-
out invading the protected area.'
4
2. The Rationale of Religious Freedom
Religion, like speech, is afforded constitutional priority over all
but compelling state interests because of its vital significance to the
individual and to society. The Framers understood that the highest
value is man himself and that religious experience was a profound
means toward self-fulfillment. They knew that to forbid unorthodox
modes of religious experience and worship "is to make ... [religious]
beliefs an empty shell and religious life a hollow mockery."'15 In
preserving religious freedom the Framers preserved man's oppor-
tunity to know and experience the deepest, the highest, the ulti-
mate, the infinite, the good and the true by whatever means he
believed could most profoundly reveal it.
12 In addition to Sherbert, Jenison, Barnette and Cantwell, some cases
have held religious solicitation immune from general taxation. Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
Others have struck down convictions of religious solicitors for unlawful so-
licitation or trespass. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Others have upheld the right of Jehovah's
Witnesses to have religious meetings in public parks. Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
13 See note 5 supra. See generally Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for
Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1965); Karst,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuPmE CT. REV. 75; Mc-
Kay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182 (1959).
14 In Sherbert, the Court concluded that speculative fear of fraudulent
religious claims did not approach a compelling state interest, and that there
was no evidence to support the assertion that allowance of religious exemp-
tions would significantly impair statutory policies. 374 U.S. at 407-09.
The special protection of the "compelling interest" and "grave abuse" test
has extended to a limited number of values in addition to religion and speech.
E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (racial equality); Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp.
302 (D.D.C. 1963) (dissenting opinion of Fahy, J. (Circuit Judge)), rev'd, 377
U.S. 163 (1964) (citizenship).
15 Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV.
53, 69 (1946).
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Religious experience, in providing man with important insights
about the meaning and purpose of life and about man's obligations to
his fellow man, 6 not only facilitates personal fulfillment, but provides
society with a vital safety valve-a way or place for exploration of
matters of ultimate societal concern,17 for a profound view from an-
other dimension. Thus, like freedom of speech, religious freedom
keeps open the channels of investigation and exploration through
which the purposes and principles of man and society may be ever
tested and reconsidered.18  As William James observed, "Religion
... must necessarily play an eternal part in human history."'19
Throughout our constitutional history, the Supreme Court has
affirmed these values of religion.20 Appellant will demonstrate, by
comparing the testimony below with the writings of religious scholars
and opinions of the Supreme Court, that the experience he seeks and
finds through marihuana-the spiritual communion with God-is the
very essence of religious experience, and according to many authori-
ties, may be the core of religion itself.
3. The Polygamy Cases
The decisions upholding restrictions on polygamy, as applied to
Mormons whose church purportedly taught and required the practice,
although decided before the Court had determined the meaning of
any of the first amendment liberties, do not detract from the princi-
ple that only the gravest abuses justify infringement of religion, es-
pecially religious worship. Indeed, the 19th-century Court recog-
nized that the first amendment "was intended to allow everyone
under the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to exhibit his senti-
16 Burhoe,, Salvation in the Twentieth Century, in SCIMN c PONDERS R.-
LIGION 65 (H. Shapley ed. 1960).
17 See'A. MASLOW, RELIGIONS, VALUES AN PEAK-ExPEmrEcES xiv (1964);
P. TiLLICH, THE SHAKMG OF TH FOUNDATION (1948); Murray, Two Versions of
Man, in SCIENCE PoNDEs RELIGION 65 (H. Shapley ed. 1960).
18 See Emerson, A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 879, 881 (1963); Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom,
41 ILL. L. REv. 53, 69 (1946).
19 W. JAmES, VA= S OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 378 (1901).
20 "We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diver-
sities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccen-
tricity and abnormal attitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
"The essential characteristics of these liberties is that under their shield
many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and
unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our country
.... " Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
"I am convinced that no liberty is more essential to the continued vitality
of the free society which our constitution guarantees than is the religious
liberty protected by the Free Exercise clause ... ." Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.).
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ment in such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious
to the equal rights of others."2' The Court, however, unequivocally
manifested the deep abhorrence toward the practice of polygamy,
finding that it undermined the principles of democratic government,
22
"fetter [ed] the people in stationary despotism, '23 and amounted to a
"return to barbarism.124  Indeed the Court treated the Mormons'
claims that they practiced polygamy in pursuit of their religious be-
liefs, as a "pretense" and "altogether a sophistical plea."25
Appellant will establish below that no such damning condemna-
tions can be applied to ingestion of marihuana, a substance less harm-
ful than alcohol, and that no warrant exists for denying that his
religious commitment to marijuana is deeply held and was sincerely
claimed under oath at the trial.
4. The Sunday-Closing Law Cases
In Braunfeld v. Brown2 6 and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market,27 the Supreme Court found the free exercise clause not vio-
lated by the application of Sunday closing laws to businessmen whose
religious principles required them to close on Saturdays. The Court
emphasized that these laws were not a "direct" burden on religion;
they did not prohibit any religious practice or principle;2 8 but made
orthodox Judaism more expensive only for those "who believe it neces-
sary to work on Sunday." The majority further noted that allowance
of religious exemptions would directly undermine the legislative goal
of uniformity.2 9
In view of Sherbert v. Verner, it is likely that Braunfeld is now
a "derelict on the waters of the law."3 0 As we have observed, Sher-
21 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
22 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
23 Id.
24 Late Corp. of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. -1 (1890).
See also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 16 (1946). AUTHOR'S
NOTE: The reply brief argued that in these cases, "The Court independently
found polygamy intolerable; it did not automatically defer to a branch of
government not vested with final constitutional responsibility."
25 Late Corp. of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50
(1890). See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890).
20 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
27 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
28 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 606 (1961).
21) Id. at 608. The majority was also impressed by the fact that the re-
ligious exemptions would economically disadvantage competitors, who would
lose business to successful claimants. Neither competitive advantage, nor a
special legislative concern for uniformity, are factors in the instant case.
30 In Sherbert, three Justices expressed the view that Braunfeld had been
overruled, an opinion shared by many legal commentators. See, e.g., Note,
28 ALBANY L. REv. 133 (1964); Note, 43 ORE. L. REv. 177 (1964); Note, 38
TuLANE L. REv. 207 (1963); Note, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 423 (1964).
bert revitalized the "grave abuse" and "compelling state interest"
tests (which Braunfeld had temporarily abandoned), emphasizing
that even an incidental burden on religious freedom is invalid
where the government cannot meet these tests and that fear of
fraudulent religious claims cannot justify infringement.31 Appellant
will demonstrate that ingestion of marihuana cannot rationally be
characterized as a "grave abuse" such as would create a "compelling"
government interest in its prohibition. 32
Whatever the status of Braunfeld, the burden imposed on appel-
lant's exercise of his religion by the statutes here involved, is direct
and substantial. Both 21 U.S.C. § 176 (a) (Count Two) and 26 U.S.C.
§4042 (Count Three) virtually render the possession of marihuana
criminal per se.33 The former, prohibiting transportation of a sub-
stance appellant finds "integral" to his religion, obviously prevents
him from practicing his religion anywhere but at the precise spot he
acquires marihuana. Surely one cannot be constitutionally compelled
to abandon a religious practice whenever (and because) he exercises
31 See note 14 supra. Moreover, were it relevant, the proof of appellant's
religious dedication and commitment is so compelling and extraordinary that
reversal here would have little, if any, tendency to encourage fraudulent
religious claims.
32 Finally, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943), may be worthy
of mention. The Court there upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
for violating child labor laws by allowing her 9-year-old child to sell religious
magazines on a street corner at night. Although the majority emphasized
the state's interest in the welfare of children and the harmful consequences
of forcing a child to become a martyr, the Court did not expressly apply the
grave and immediate danger test required by West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), as Justice Murphy pointed out in dissent. Jus-
tice Jackson, dissenting from the grounds of the holding, asserted that "re-
ligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and ought to
be free-as nearly absolutely free as anything can be."
Of course, even if not undone by the Sherbert restoration of the Barnette
tests, Prince has little if any bearing on the instant case, for appellant was
not 'charged with violation of any laws relating to the welfare of children.
In any event, appellant's children merely observe the religious rituals of
their parent, they do not actually participate (Tr.). This is precisely the
extent of involvement in Peyotism of the American Indian children whose
parents follow the practices of the Native American Church, upheld by the
California Supreme Court. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); see text following note 38 infra.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitu-
tion protects the sanctity and privacy of familial relationships, and parental
rights to educate children, recognizing that these are among the most sacred
and intimate institutions of a free society. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Thus, the existence of a family relationship,
far from detracting from the force of appellant's position, may well place an
added burden on the government to establish that appellant's religious prac-
tices constitute a grave threat to society.
33 Barrett v. United- States, .322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
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his freedom of movement.
3 4
The imposition of a $100 tax per ounce of marihuana35 was in-
tended to be prohibitive-to prevent possession by nonauthorized
users.36 Even nonprohibitive, nondiscriminatory taxes may not con-
stitutionally be applied to religious activity: "freedom of religion
... [is] available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own
way.M7
5. The Religious Use of Drugs Has Been Accorded the Full Consti-
tutional Protection to Which It Is Entitled
By a six to one majority the Supreme Court of California has
held that the religious use of peyote (a psychedelic mind-expanding,
hallucinatory substance derived from the peyote cactus and consider-
ably more potent than marihuana) is constitutionally immune from
general prohibitory legislation. 38 In Woody, the court held a state
criminal statute unconstitutional as applied to possession of peyote
by members of the Native American Church. It found that peyote
was central to the religious beliefs and practices of this Church,
whose theology "combines certain Christian teachings with the belief
that peyote embodies the Holy Sprit and that those who partake of
peyote enter into direct contact with God," and "experience the
Diety. 13 9 Concluding that "the statutory prohibition of the use of
peyote results in the virtual inhibition of the practice of defendant's
religion," the court went on to consider whether "the state [had]
demonstrated that 'compelling state interest' which necessitates an
abridgement of defendants' first amendment right."
Contrary to the state's assertions, the court found that peyote
was not used in place of medical care and that Indian children
never, and Indian teenagers rarely, use peyote (although children did
participate in the peyote ritual by their presence). Furthermore, the
court observed, "'peyote works no permanent deleterious injury to
the Indian'" and "'there was no evidence to suggest that Indians
who use peyote are more liable to become addicted to other narcotics
34 It has been held that Congress may not condition the exercise of a
first amendment freedom on the sacrifice of one's freedom of travel. Ap-
theker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
35 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4741.
36 See generally Hearings on H.R. 6385 Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
37 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (striking down a
general solicitation tax as applied to religious solicitation). See also Follett
v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating a general "doing business"
tax as applied to a minister's business of selling religious books).
38 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964);
In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
39 61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74.
than non-peyote using Indians.' "40
Following the teachings of Sherbert v. Verner,41 the California
court rejected as unfounded the state's argument that spurious reli-
gious claims would undermine effective law enforcement, and con-
cluded its opinion with these noteworthy remarks:
[T]he right to free religious expression expresses a precious heritage
of our history. In a mass society, which presses at every point to-
ward conformity, the protection of a self-expression, however unique,
of the individual and the group becomes ever more important. The
varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of
our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater
value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of the
Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using peyote one
night at a meeting in a desert hogan near Needles, California.42
40 Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
41 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
42 61 Cal. 2d at 727-28, 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. In
In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1964),
the California Supreme Court unanimously held that a nonaffiliated self-
styled "peyote preacher" was entitled to a reversal of his conviction for
possession of peyote if his religious claims were made honestly and in good
faith.
The religious use of peyote has also received judicial protection against
state legislation in Arizona. State v. Attakai, Superior Court of Cocconino
County, Arizona, July 26, 1960.
Several states have made statutory exceptions. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-5-16 (1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-35-123 (1959).
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has granted exemp-
tions from regulatory legislation to religious users of peyote. See Hearings
on H.R. 2 Before Subcomm. on Consitutional Rights of the Senate, 89th Cong.,
lst Sess. 370 (1965); 21 C.F.R. § 166 (1966).
Although the courts of Montana and North Carolina have upheld peyote
convictions of religious users, State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067
(1926); State v. Bullard, 269 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), finding the legis-
lation to be not unreasonable, and supported by the general police power, we
have observed that the proper constitutional standard requires a showing of
grave abuse or compelling state interest in denying the exemption. Although
the North Carolina court thought it relevant that peyote produced hallucina-
tions similar to the symptoms of schizophrenia, this has been true of many
activities that produce religious experience, e.g., dancing, fasting. See W.
SARlGENT, BATTLE FOR THE MMD (1957).
In People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), it was held that one who
refused to answer questions concerning the use and possession of drugs at
Castalia Foundation, propounded in the course of a grand jury inquiry, was
punishable for contempt notwithstanding the lower court's finding that she
was in fact sincere in her religious belief which precluded her from giving
testimony against a coreligionist. The court applied a constitutionally im-
permissible test, merely "balancing" the interest of the individual right of
religious worship against the "interest of the state . . . ." Id. at 789. Of
course, the constitutionally compelled test requires reversal even if the state
interest "outweighs . . . the individual right," whenever the state interest is
not a compelling one and the religious practice is not a grave abuse.
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B. The Ingestion of Marihuana, a Relatively Harmless Substance,
Cannot Reasonably Be Deemed a "Grave Abuse Endangering Para-
mount Governmental Interests"
As observed above, where legislation inhibits religious freedom,
it becomes incumbent upon the courts to scrutinize the legislative
rationale to determine whether the prohibited practice can rationally
be deemed a "grave abuse" creating a compelling governmental in-
terest in its outlawry. Appellant submits that the prohibition of
marihuana barely meets a minimum rationality test, and under no
stretch of the imagination can its use rationally be found to create
the grave social evil necessary to justify suppression of religious
experiences. 43
Few myths have had such a tenacious hold on the uninformed
public as the notion that marihuana is a significantly harmful sub-
stance. Among the charges levelled against marihuana have been the
following: (1) it is addictive; (2) it leads to crime or sexual mis-
behavior; (3) it is the first step on the road to heroin; and (4) it
produces physical or psychological harm to the user. When one
turns to scientific evidence rather than rumor and hysteria it is
found that not one of the above contentions is supported by sub-
stantial evidence; indeed, many reputable studies positively refute all
of these charges.
Such were the conclusions of the most comprehensive study on
the effects of marihuana undertaken in this country, carried out from
1939 to 1943 by a committee of distinguished scientists, doctors, and
sociologists at the behest of Mayor La Guardia under the auspices of
the New York Academy of Medicine.
44
1. Marihuana Is Not an Addictive Drug
As a very recent report of the Medical Society of the County of
New York observed, "Marihuana is not a narcotic nor is it addicting.
It is a mild hallucinogen. '4 5 The Mayor's committee found that "the
practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the
medical sense of the word."46 These reports and numerous other
studies,47 corroborate the testimony of Dr. Joel Fort, a world au-
43 Indeed, the leading British Medical Journal recently approved of the
general availability of marihuana. THE LANcET, Nov. 9, 1962.
44 THE MAYoR's COMMITTEE ON MARIHUANA, THE MARIHUANA PROBLEM ni
THE CITY OF NEW YoRK (1944) [hereinafter cited as MAYOR's COmMITTEE].
45 22 N.Y. MEDicIn No. 9, May 5, 1966.
46 MAYoR'S ComwaTTEE 25. See also id. at 214.
47 Drewry, Some Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxication, 10 Psy-
cHrATRic Q. 232-42 (1956); Jeffer, Narcotics Addiction, 43 J. CRnw. LAw 329
(1952); Reichard, Some Myths About Marihuana, Oct.-Dec. FM. PROBATION 16
(1946); Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 LAw & CONTEmP.
PROB. 11 (1957).
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thority on drug abuse, that marihuana is "not addicting in any
sense"; a user does not develop tolerance or suffer withdrawal ill-
ness upon discontinuing its use (Tr.) .48
2. Marihuana Does Not Cause Crime
The major basis for the original federal antimarihuana legislation
in 1937 was the allegation by enforcement officials that marihuana
was responsible for the commission of crimes involving sex and vio-
lence.4 9 Virtually every scientific study undertaken since that enact-
ment has refuted this premise.
The 1963 White House Conference states: "Although marihuana
has long held the reputation of inciting individuals to commit sexual
offenses and other anti-social acts, evidence is inadequate to substan-
tiate this."50
The Medical Society of the County of New York finds "no evidence
that marihuana use is associated with crimes of violence in the United
States."51 A number of major studies reach the same conclusion.52
The most that can be said for the material presented to the 1937
Congress is that it revealed that a number of criminals smoked mari-
huana. This, of course, has no tendency to demonstrate that most
marihuana smokers are criminals, 53 or, far more important, that mari-
huana smoking is a cause of crime. Indeed, many more criminals
smoke tobacco, imbibe alcohol, attend movies, and drive automobiles
than ingest marihuana, yet who would suggest that such a statistical
48 See also 1963 WTE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARcoTics AND DRUG ABUSE
286.
49 See Hearings on H.R. 6385 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
50 1963 WmTE HousE CONFERENCE ON NARcoTIcs AND DRUG ABUSE 286
(emphasis added).
51 22 N.Y. MEniciwE No. 9, May 5, 1966 (emphasis added).
52 Allentuck & Bowman, The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxica-
tion, 99 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 248, 250 (1942); Bromberg, Marihuana, A Phychi-
atric Study, 113 J.A.M.A. 4, 12 (1932); Bromberg & Rodgers, Marihuana and
Aggressive Crime, 102 AM. J. PSYCHiATRY 825-26 (1948); MAYoR's Colrrm=
25; The Marihuana Bugaboo, 93 MILITARY SURGEON 95 (1943); Reichard, supra
note 47, at 16.
Indeed, several researchers corroborate the expert testimony below in
finding that marihuana produces quiescence and passivity and reduces ag-
gression and sexual drives. See, e.g., Chopra & Chopra, Cannabis Sativa in
Relation to Mental Disease and Crime in India, 30 INDiAN J. M EDIcAL RESEARCH
155, 168 (1942); MAYOR'S COMMITEE 130; Murphy, The Cannabis Habit, A
Review of Recent Psychiatric Literature, 15 BULL. NARCOTICS 1, 19 (1963);
Reichard, supra note 47, at 16.
53 Even if it could be shown that a significant proportion of people who
use marihuana are criminals, this may mean only that, in the past, marihuana
primarily attracted members of subcultural environments likely to produce
criminal propensities, or, more likely, that marihuana users from respectable
classes evaded statistical attention.
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coincidence tends to establish a causal relationship between these ac-
tivities and crime?5 4
If indeed, marihuana, like alcohol, may tend to alleviate anxieties
of those bent on crime,55 this is surely no justification for denying it
to those whose purpose is religious experience.
3. Marihuana does Not Lead to Heroin Addiction
It is frequently asserted by enforcement officials that pro-
longed use of marihuana causes one 'to graduate to heroin. The
medical and scientific evidence wholly belies this allegation,50 as does
the testimony of the experts at trial (Tr.). Indeed, the leading pro-
ponent of the federal antimarihuana legislation, Harry Anslinger,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics, while vigorously asserting
that marihuana caused crime, informed the 1937 Congress in no un-
certain terms that marihuana does not lead to heroin!
Congressman Dingle:
"I am just wondering whether the marihuana addict graduates
into a heroin, an opium, or a cocaine user."
Mr. Anslinger:
"No, sir; I have not heard of a case of that kind. I think it is
an entirely different class. The marihuana addict does not go
in that direction."57
The mere showing that many heroin addicts have smoked mari-
huana55 tells us nothing about the number of marihuana smokers
54 The erroneous belief that marihuana causes crime may be due in part
to confusion with hashish, a hemp derivative associated in literary and his-
torical writings with crime and eroticism. That marihuana does not lead to
such behavior is explained by the fact that it is one-fifth to one-eighth the
potency of hashish. See 22 N.Y. MEDICINE No. 9, May 5, 1966. See also Hear-
ings Before Special Senate Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Inter-
state Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1951); McGlothlin, Hallucinogenic
Drugs, a Perspective With Special Reference to Peyote and Cannabis, Pre-
sented At The Second Conference on the use of LSD in Psychotherapy, Amity-
ville, N.Y., reprinted in 6 PsYcEDELic REv. 36 (1965).
55 See Baren & Perelman, Personality Studies of Marihuana Addicts, 102
Am. J. PsYcmrAmY 676-77 (1946); Gaskill, Marihuana, An Intoxicant, 102 Am.
J. PsycmATrY 203, 204 (1945).
56 See Allentuck & Bowman, The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana In-
toxication, 99 Am. J. PsYcmATRY 248, 250 (1942); MAYOR'S CoiMmr 13. See
also Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
11 (1957).
57 Hearings on H.R. 6385 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1937) (emphasis added). Perhaps worthy of note is
Mr. Anslinger's change of tune in 1955, when he testified that "eventually if
used over a long period it does lead to heroin addiction." Daniel Subcomm.
Hearings, pt. 5, at 6 (1955).
58 It may well be that the existence of punitive legislation against the
use of marihuana is substantially responsible for even this wholly inconclusive
relationship between the use of marihuana and heroin. Once marihuana was
who -never progress to heroin.59 In fact, among the hundreds of
thousands of persons who have had marihuana experiences only a
small-number subsequently become heroin -addicts.60 There is no
evidence whatsoever to suggest that the use of marihuana inherently
generates physiological or psychological processes which eventuate in
a craving for heroin. 61
To prohibit marihuana by relying on a statistical fallacy which
tends to prove that cigarette smoking or movie attendance causes
heroin addiction (i.e. many or most heroin addicts have engaged in
such activities) is arbitrary -and irrational and surely no basis for in-
hibiting religious freedom.
4. "Marihuana Does Not Produce Physiological or Psychological
Harm
Medical research has- established- that prolonged use of mari-
huana does not produce disease or physical deterioration; nor, unlike
the. occasional -consequence of hashish, does it create serious mental
abnormalities.62
5. Since Alcohol Is in No Respect Less Dangerous Than Marihuana
and Since Society Does Not Find the Former Sufficiently Dangerous
to Warrant Prohibition Even of Its Frivolous Social Uses, There Is
No Basis for Finding That Marihuana Creates a Grave Abuse Justi-
fying Infringement of. Religious Exercise or That There Is a Com-
pelling Governmental Interest in Prohibiting Its Religious Use
- Alcohol is a more. dangerous drug than marihuana. It is addic-
tive -producing increasing tolerance and severe withdrawal symp-
outlawed, its distribution fell into the hands of those who took a great risk
of.long punishment, a risk which could only be compensated by the profits
to be made by convincing marihuana smokers to switch to heroin. See A.
LI nEsMr, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 233 (1965).
Moreover, the character traits that would inevitably lead some individuals
to- heroin could readily explain-their initial association with marihuana.
59 See Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 LAW & CoNzTV I.
PRoS. 11 (1957)-. ." . " -"
- 60 22 N:Y. Micnm No, 9, May 5,. 1966.
61 In recent years, marihuana has been increasingly used by members of
the middle class" and- significant -proportions of college students. See Tm
SATuRDAY EvEN NG POST, May 28, June 4, 1966. Where is the evidence that
such users move on to heroin? - -
62 Allentuck & Bowman, The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxica-
tion, 99 Am. J. PsYcBTATRY 248 (1942); Bromberg, Marihuana, A Psychiatric
Study, 113 J.A.M.A. 4 (1932); Freedman & Rockmore, Marihuana Factor in
Personality Evaluation and'Army-Adjustment, 7 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
765-82, (1946);8 J. CLIMCcL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 221-36 (1946); REPORT OF TWE
IwDrs HEmp COMavssloN (1894), quoted in TAYLOR, NARcOTIcs: NATURE'S
DANGEROUS GIFT 19 (1949); Murphy, The Cannabis Habit, A Review of Recent
Psychiatric Literature, 15 BULL. NA",concs 19 (1963); Siler, Marihuana Smok-
ing in Panama, 73: .iTARY .SuRcsoN:269-88 (1933). -
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tOms. 6 3 It leads to crime, by substantially reducing inhibitions and
releasing aggressive drives.64  It produces special psychoses 'and
diseases (alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver is a major cause of death),4
vast industrial absenteeism and job loss, numerous accidents and
broken homes.66 In short, "[f]rom the pohit of view of public health
and safety, the effects of marihuana present a very minor problem
compared with the abuse of alcohol."
67
When this *country responded to the evils of alcohol by enacting
national prohibition, religious exemptions were sensibly afforded.s
If today society finds such evils sufficiently tolerable to leave even
social drinking unrestricted, there is surely no compelling interest in
punishing the use of marihuana in the exercise of religious values
protected by the first amendment.69
63 Five to six million Americans are so addicted. See MAcMILLiAN's
STANDARD MEDICAL TEXT 295 (2d ed. Goodman & Gilman 1955); 1963 WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 276, 284; Allentuck & Bow-
man, The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxication, 99 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY
248 (1942); Fort, Social and Legal Response to Pleasure-Giving Drugs, in THE
UTOPiATES 209-10 (Blum & Blum ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Fort]..
64 See R. DE RoPP, DRUGS AND THE MIND 126 (1957); A. INDEsmiH, THE
ADDICT AND THE LAw 228 (1965); Fort 209-10; Horton, The.Functions of Alcohol
in Primitive Societies, 3 Q.J.' ALCOHOLIC STUDIES 199 (1943).,
65 See R. DE Ropp, DRUGS AND THE MN 122-33 (1957); A. LINDESMTrH,
THE ADDICT AND TE LAW 228 (1965); Fort 209-10.
66 See Fort 210.
67 D. MAURER k V. VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTICS AmDICT ON (1962).
See also Aldous Huxley's fascinating advocacy of the use of mescaline (a
derivative of peyote) as a far safer and a far more meaningful practice han
the imbibing of alcohol. A. HuxLEY, DOORS OF PERCEPTION 62-71 (1956)..
6S National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 3, 41 Stat. 308-09 (1919).
69 AUTHOR'S NOTE: In the year since this brief was filed there has been
increasing acknowledgment or corroboration of marihuana's relative harm-
lessness or the absence of proof of its harmlessness. See generally PRESIENTS
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTRATION-OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 224-25 (1967);. Blum, Mind-Altering Drugs
and Dangerous Behavior: Dangerous Drugs, in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTiCS
AND DRUG ABUSE (1967); Rosenthal, Proposals for Dangerous Drug -Legislation,
in PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF USTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: -NARCOTICS AND DRvq'ABUSE (1961); THE MuHUANA PA-
PERs (D. Solomon ed. 1966); Boyko & Rotberg, Constitutional Objjctions- to
California's Marijuana Possession Statute-. 14 UC.L.A.L. REv. 775-81 (1967).-. -
A recent report prepared by the California Youth Authority and the -In-
stitute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency--concludes that a majority of
young people arrested for nonopiate drug offenses were never .:arested
again for subsequent narcotic violations, only 12% of the 886- juveniles studied
were subsequently arrested for- using opiates. CAL RqIA-YoUTH AUTaORITy
& INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CRIME AND DELINQuENCY, A FOLLOW-UP STUDY
OF THE JUVENILE DRUG OFFENDER 31 (1967). " -
Dr. James Goddard,' Director of the Food and Drug- Administration, has
expressed the view that "whether marihuana is -a more- dangerous drug than
alcohol is debatable-I don't happen to think it is." N.Y. Times, October 20,
1967, at 36, col. 3. See also Marijuana: Dangerous -as Alcohol,. THE NEw
REPUBLIC October 28, 1967, at 7.
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C. Since the Testimony Below Tended to Establish That Marihuana
Plays an Integral Role in Appellant's Religious Life, As a Sacramental
Aid Facilitating the Spiritual Experience at the Core of Religion
(As Understood by the Supreme Court and Religious Scholars),
Appellant Was Entitled to a Jury Determination of the Honesty and
Sincerity of His Religious Claims
1. The Religious Exercise Protected by the First Amendment Clearly
Includes the Spiritual, Transcendental Experience Involving Com-
munion With and Worship of God
Although the phenomenon of religion may be so complex as to
defy comprehensive definition,70 opinions of the Supreme Court (as
well as nonlegal scholarship) strongly suggest that religious experi-
ence (with the Western emphasis on the word "worship") -man's
personal, transcendental spiritual communion with God, with the In-
finite and the Eternal-deserves and is given the highest degree of
constitutional protection:
Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ulti-
mate mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed be-
yond the reach of the law.7 1
Man's relation to God was made no concern of the State.72
[Fireedom to adhere to such.., form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law. 73
I have no loftier responsibility than to uphold spiritual freedom to its
greatest reaches. 74
Regarding the alleged relationship between marihuana and crime, ap-
pellee inevitably rehashed the old story about hashish and the Old Man of
the Mountain. Virtually every popular magazine article on marihuana pre-
ceding passage of the 1937 federal legislation told of how the Old Man of the
Mountain "drugged" the assassins with hashish before sending them out on
their deadly missions. This ancient myth is exploded in Mandel, Hashish,
Assassins, and the Love of God, 2 IssuEs OF CRnTVINOLOGY 149 (1966). This
examination of the historical evidence suggests that these llth century free-
dom fighters were not stimulated by ingestion of hashish but encouraged to
carry out their assignments by the promise of the "exquisite paradisaical
beauty" produced by hashish. If, as the author observes, "Eleventh Century
folklore cannot be the basis for an important twentieth century prohibition"
it certainly cannot provide a basis for violating contemporary religious
freedom.'
Obviously the literature on marihuana does not uniformly attest to its
harmlessness; refutation is not spontaneously generated. Allegations of each
of the evils denied in the brief have found their way, by one means or
another, to the printed page. The Commentary, supra, will examine the role
of the court as finder of "legislative fact," and explore more subtle forms of
"harmfulness."
70 See, e.g., K. DUNLOP, RELIGION: ITs FuNcTioNs n HUMAN LIw (1946);
Oman, The Sphere of Religion, in SCIENCE, RELIGION AND REALriY 261 (Need-
ham ed. 1925).
71 Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940).
72 United States v."Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1044).
73 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U'S. 296; 303 (1940).
74 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943)(concurring opinion of Murphy, J.). See also text accompanying notes 21-25
supra.
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Recognition by the Supreme Court that "freedom to believe" is
"absolute" but freedom to act, "in the nature of things ... cannot
be"7  was not only an observation that religious activity, like speech,
can be regulated where vital state interests are jeopardized, but also
that internal, personal religious activity is entitled to special constitu-
tional consideration:
[T]he believe-action distinction was an implicit affirmation that it
was belief, prayer, and worship which comprised the central and
essential core of religion....
[Tihe earlier judicial usage of religion envisioned a sacramental core
surrounded by concentric circles of action, each more eternal and less
purely religious than the last.7 6
The Supreme Court recently cast considerable light on its under-
standing of the scope and meaning of "religion" protected by the
first amendment. 77 The 1940 Selective Training and Service -Act ex-
empted any conscientious objector "who, by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form." In 1948 Congress attempted to clarify the phrase "reli-
gious training and belief" by defining it as "an individual's belief in
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those aris-
ing from any human relation .. ".. '78 Nevertheless the Court con-
cluded that "religious training and belief" were not limited to belief
in an anthropomorphic God, but included "all sincere religious be-
liefs which are based upon a power or being or upon a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent.179 Recognizing the "long established policy of not picking
and choosing among religious beliefs," and that "in Hindu philoso-
phy, the Supreme Being is the transcendental reality which is truth,
knowledge and bliss,"8 0 the Court held that the exemption applied
to "a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly
qualifying for the exemption."81  Quoting liberally from Dr. Paul
75 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1944).
76 Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?,
1966 WIs. L. REV. 217, 274-75.
77 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (construing the congres-
sional draft exemption for conscientious objectors).
78 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6 (J), 62 Stat. 612.
70 380 U.S. at 176. Although the Seeger opinion purported to deal only
with the meaning of legislation, constitutional issues of free exercise, estab-
lishment and religious discrimination, developed in the briefs and arguments,
were implicitly resolved. See Brodie & Sutherland, Conscience, the Constitu-
tion and the Supreme Court, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306, 319-27. Had the Court
construed the statutory definition of religious belief to be as narrow as *it
appeared on its face rather than to include all religious beliefs protected by
the first amendment, the statute would have discriminated against particular
religious beliefs and violated the establishment clause and the fifth amend-
ment. See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
80 380 U.S. at 174-75.
81 Id.
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Tillich and other religious scholars, the Court clearly indicated that
the notion of parallelism or equivalence could not constitutionally be
confined to parochial or traditionally American concepts of religion.82
The judicial task of defining religion or religious exercise has by
no means been limited to conscientious objector cases.83 Where a
cherished constitutional right is at stake, the difficulty of defining
the outer limits is surely no basis for denying protection to the central
expression of that freedom.84
2. The Testimony Below Indicated Appellant's Deep Religious Com-
mitment and the Integral Role of Marihuana in Facilitating What
Authorities Have Recognized as the Central Religious Experience
The testimony tending to establish appellant's deep religious com-
mitment has been discussed fully in the statement above. Briefly
summarizing: Following Dr. Leary's profound religious experience
through ingestion of the sacred mushrooms of Mexico in 1960, he
dedicated his life to pursuit of the meaning of that experience, by
conducting religious seminars and experiments at Harvard and in
Mexico, joining a Hindu sect, in Boston, journeying to Japan and
India to study under Buddhist and Hindu religious teachers, direct-
ing a center for religious and scientific research and publishing nu-
merous writings on the religious and scientific significance of psy-
chedelic drugs. While in India he became a member of a sect which
uses ganja (a hemp derivative more potent than marihuana) in reli-
gious worship, and participated in such services.85
Appellant's religious beliefs and practices unquestionably fall
within the ambit of protected religious activity as formulated in
Seeger, and involve the spiritual communion with God emphasized
82 E.g., "'[A]nd if that word [God] has not much meaning for you,
translate it, and speak of the depth of your life, of the source of your being,
of your ultimate concern of what you take seriously without any reserva-
tion.'" .Id. at 187, quqting P. TiLLIcH, THE SHAiNG OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57(1948). 'See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965).
.83 E.g., claims for religious tax exemption: Washington Ethical Soc'y v.
District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda, .153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 395 (1957); claims for
qualification as a religious trust: Stephan's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 A.
653 (1937); claims for religious equality within a prison system: Wilford v.
California, 217 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Cal. 1963); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.
Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
84 The Supreme Court has recognized that the accommodation and pres-
ervation of religious values, required by the "free exercise" clause are wholly
compatible with the strictures of the "establishment" clause. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374.U.S. 398, 409 (1963); Selective Service Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366, 389-90 (1918).
85 Appellant's testimony on these matters was corroborated in all sig-
nificant aspects by the testimony of Dr. Ralph Metzner (Tr.) and Sri Kalidas
(Fred Swain), an American Hindu Monk (Tr.).
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in other cited opinions; indeed the experience he sought and attained
through marihuana and other psychedelic drugs is virtually indis-
tinguishable from authoritative descriptions of the classical mysti-
cal religious experience.
(a) Appellant's Initial Experience With a Psychedelic Substance
Dr. Leary:
The experience that I had taking these mushrooms was the most
intense religious experience that I have ever had in my life. It was
an experience that I can only describe as revelatory, or as a conver-
sion experience, and I have done practically nothing in my waking
hours since taking these mushrooms in 1960 except to try and under-
stand the meaning of this experience and how it can be applied to
help a man, not only with his psychological problems, but find out
who he is and what the religious nature of himself is. (Tr.)
It's very hard to explain these experiences.... (Tr.)
It's not at all like being intoxicated or it's not like being unconscious-
far from it. It's as though every sense has a microscope-vision, hear-
ing and many, many other senses that you never realize you had. It's"
a heightened state of awareness. You are aware of more, in one min-
ute than you would be, perhaps, in a year, because your mind is
speeded up so much and you are not thinking in the ordinary sense.
You are experiencing at other levels .... (Tr.)
You are aware of the fact that you weren't born tonight, that I wasn't
born in 1920... that the process of which I am a part has been going
on for millions and millions of years. It's as though God would open
up the veils of his workshop, or let you, take him by the hand and
show you-say, "Listen, Timothy Leary. Don't be so self-centered."
Because this process that exists in every cell and that exists in every
plant and leaf, and it's all in the handiwork of a supreme intelligence
and you begin to see how this is all hooked up together, and it's an
extremely humbling and extremely'shattering experience, because
you realize in a sense all of your life has been a loss, that'you have
been so certain and so smug and actually you are just a grain of
sand or a leaf on an incredibly long and lasting and large tree of
life. (Tr.)
This is the sort of thing-I apologize for my incoherence-but men
have been having these experiences for thousands of years and try-
ing to write about them and trying to tell other people that they exist,
and people in my profession have always had a hard job, because we
just don't have the words to do it. (Tr.)
There is a feeling to go-the feeling to go along with this experience
-- and this again is typical of these experiences--this reverence and.
this tremendous gratitude for being able to see this, and also terror,
because you feel that you are dying or that you feel that you are
just a flash or that your ego-you are just really dissolved during that
time, and that is why it can be very frightening during this. (Tr.)
There is also a feeling of almost laughter, of how seriously you
took your little selfish ambition and how you failed to see the beauty
and the wisdom and the God engineering and everything around.
(Tr.)
There can be no question that Dr. Leary's understanding of his ex-
perience with psychedelic drugs falls well within the definition of
religious belief formulated by the Supreme Court in Seeger. For
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the psychedelic experience graphically demonstrated to appellant
that we are dependent on and subordinate to a Divine energy process
which he recognizes as God.8 6
(b) Mysticism and Religion
Many scholars have concluded that the type of experience attained
by Dr. Leary-the mystical, transcendental consciousness-is the es-
sence and source of all religion:
The very beginning, the intrinsic core, the essence, the universal
nucleus of every known religion ... has been the private, lonely,
personal illumination, revelation, or ecstasy of some acutely sensitive
prophet or seer...
The transcendent experience is what is common to all religions.
*87
W. T. Stace, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, holds that the "es-
sence of religion is mysticism. 88s Philosophers such as Henri Berg-
son, William James and Aldous Huxley have found the mystical
experience to be a central phenomenon in religion.8 9 Indeed, this
experience has played a significant role in all religions,0 being re-
86 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). See also United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (dissenting opinion of Hughes,
J.): "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation."
87 A. MASLOW, RELIGIONS, VALUES AND PEAK-ExPERIENcEs 19-20 (1964).
88 W. STAcE, RELIGION AND THE MODERN MIND 257 (1952).
89 See, e.g., H. BERGSON, Two SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION (1935)
[hereinafter cited as BERGSON]; A. HUXLEY, THE PERENNIAL PHILoSoPHY (1944);
W. JAMES, VARETIEs OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1901) [hereinafter cited as
JAMES]. See also Scholem, Religious Authority and Mysticism, COMMENTARY,
November 1964, at 31.
Several well-known definitions of religion imply the transcendental,
mystical experience. For example, James defines religion as "the feelings,
acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they appre-
hend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they consider Divine."
JAMES 69. Stratton concludes that religion "is the appreciation of an unseen
world or of unseen company." G. STRATTON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELI-
aious L= (1911). McTaggard holds that religion is "best described as an
emotion resting on a conviction of harmony between ourselves and the uni-
verse at large." McTAGGARD, SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION (1906).
Even one who denies that mysticism is the "essence" of religion agrees
that it is a central phenomenon. W. KAUFMANN, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
331 (1961).
90 In Western religious traditions the significance of the transcendental
experience is expressed in the writings of St. John of the Cross, Ignatius of
Loyola, St. Teresa, Meister Eckhart, Rudolph Otto, Israel Baal-Shem and
John Wesley, and in the tenets of such sects as the Sufis, the Kabbalists, the
Gnostics, the Quakers, the Brethren of the Free Spirit and the Spanish Alum-
brados. See generally A. HUXLEY, THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY (1944); R.
OTTO, MYSTICISM EAST AND WEST (1932); E. UNDERHILL, MYSTICISM 105 (1955);
Scholem, Religious Authority and Mysticism, COMMENTARY, November 1964,
at 31 (the author is Professor of Jewish Mysticism, Hebrew University, Jeru-
salem).
In Eastern religions, which are far more private and subjective and less
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markably similar throughout history in all parts of the world.91
Without unduly burdening this text, let it simply be noted that
the religious authenticity of the experience related by appellant is
amply demonstrated by comparison with the following principal
characteristics of the classical, mystical, religious experience: (a)
comprehension of the Divine process, existing in and unifying all
things; 92 (b) ineffability, insight and heightened sensory awareness; 93
(c) transcendence of ego and spiritual rebirth;94 and (d) intense emo-
organized and institutional than those in the West, the ultimate and primary
objective is the attainment of a state of transcendental consciousness, e.g.,
Nirvana or Dhanyi in Buddhism, Satori in Zen Buddhism, Samadhi or Moshki
in Hinduism. See generally A. BHARATI THE TANTaIc TRADITION (1965); VE-
DANTA FOR THE WESTERN WORLD (C. Isherwood ed. 1948); R. OTTO, MYSTICISM
EAST AND WEST (1932); H. SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN 14-216 (1958); H.
ZIMMER, PmLosoPIEs OF INDIA (1951).
91 See BERGSON 246; A. HUxLEY, THE PERRENAL PHIosoPHY (1944).
92 Evelyn Underhill, probably the leading Western authority on mysti-
cism, defines it as "the art of establishing [man's] conscious relation with
the Absolute." E. UNDERHILL, MYSTICISM 81 (1955). The French philosopher
Henry Bergson recognizes that: "The mystics do not posit an arbitrary con-
ception of God. They obviously mean by experience of the Divine, an energy
to which no limit can be assigned, and a power of loving and creating which
surpasses all imagination" and that "the ultimate end of mysticism is the
establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence with the
creative effort which life itself manifests." BERGSON, supra note 89, at 262.
See also id. at 230. Many other writers have stressed the communion with
God. See, e.g., J. WACH, SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGIO N 376 (1944). And James de-
scribes the religious life as including the following beliefs: "1. That the
visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its
chief significance; 2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher
universe is our true end; 3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit
thereof is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows
in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal
world." JAMES 367.
93 Julian Huxley observes that through mystical, religious consciousness
"vital experiences [are organized] on a new level, above that of the ordinary
self, above that of all merely discursive activity, in which new intensity is
gained through so much more than usual being seen and felt together in a
single organized moment of spiritual perception." J. HUXLEY, RELIGION WITH-
OUT REVELATION 186 (1957).
James describes the two principal characteristics of mystical experience
as: "Ineffability .... [N]o adequate report of its contents can be given in
words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced;
it cannot be imparted or transferred to others .... Noetic quality....
[A]lthough so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who
experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight
into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illu-
minations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate
though they remain and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of
authority for aftertime." JAMEs 292-93. See also A. HUxLEY, DOORS OF PER-
CEPTION (1954); A. HUxLEY, HEAVEN AND HELL (1954). On ineffability, see also
F. ALLPORT, INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR: ESSAYS TOWARD A REINTERPRETING OF
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 423, 427-28 (1933).
94 Appellant's experience of a loss (death) and transcendance of self and
ego, his awareness for the first time of the profound beauty and wisdom of
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tional qualities.95
(c) The Role of Marihuana in Appellant's Religious Life
Appellant testified that marihuana played an "integral" role in
his religious life (Tr.), as a sacramental . .. aid (Tr.), that its use
was essential to attain a unique level of spiritual consciousness (Tr.);
and that since his religious sojourn to India, where he was initiated
into a sect which uses a hemp derivative as a religious aid he has
used marihuana exclusively for religious practice. He compared the
effect of depriving him of marihuana with that of forbidding a
Catholic to celebrate the Mass: while his beliefs might be strength-
ened, the exercise of his religion would be impeded (Tr.).
Sri Kalidas (Fred Swain), an American Hindu Monk, testified
that a number of Hindu religious leaders use marihuana in their
religion (Tr.), that it plays an important part in the Indian sect in
which Dr. Leary was initiated (Tr.); that he, Sri Kalidas, has been
unable to practice his full religion in this country because of the
prohibition against marihuana (Tr.) and that were marihuana avail-
able it would play a significant role in his religious life (Tr.).
(d) Drugs and Religion
Throughout history, in all parts of the world, drugs have played a
significant role in religious practices. In an extensively documented
commentary on the immemorial relation between drugs and religion,
Phillippe de Felice has concluded:
The employment for religious purposes of toxic substances is extra-
ordinarily widespread .... [It occurs] in every region of the earth,
among primitives no less than among those who have reached a high
pitch of civilization. We are therefore dealing not with excep-
tional facts . . . but with a general and, in the widest sense of the
word, a human phenomenon, the kind of phenomenon which cannot
be disregarded by anyone who is trying to discover what religion is,
and what are the deep needs which it must satisfy.9 6
God's work, and his "consuming desire to help man understand his religious
nature, is the process of death and rebirth through revelation that is central
to the religious mystical experience. See generally A. HUXLEY, Tim PEREN-
Nvz PnmosoPHn (1944). Professor Stace finds that common to all religions
is the assertion of an experience in which one transcends differences and all
things are seen as elements of one, uniform process. W. STAcE, RELIcioN AND
ME MODERN Mn 257-58 (1952).
95 Several religious scholars have emphasized the intense emotional as-
pects of the religious experience-awe, reverence, humility, terror, gratitude,
glory and mystery. See J. HUXLEY, RELIGION WrrHOUT REVELATION 104 (1957);
JAMES 376; and the German Protestant theologian, R. OTTO, Tim IDEA orT
HOLY (2d ed. 1952).
96 POISON SAcRES, IVRESSEs DIVINES, translated and quoted by A. HUxLEY,
DooRs OF PERCEPTION 67, 68 (1954) (emphasis added).
For discussion of the drugs used by religious groups around the world,
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In recent years, many recognized authorities in the field of reli-
gion have discovered that psychedelic drugs, of which marihuana is
the mildest9 7 can produce profound religious experiences.98 One
scholar has found that the psychedelic experience "corresponds almost
exactly to the theological concept of a sacrament or means of grace."199
Indeed, it has been suggested in the Journal of Phi Beta Kappa
that the source of all religion and theology may well have been an
intense mystical experience generated by the accidental ingestion of
hallucinogenic substances. 00
(e) Hemp and Hinduism
The highest objective of Hinduism is samadhi, a state of transcen-
dental consciousness that is direct experience of "the divine life force
that pervades the universe and inhabits every creature."'0' "The
see generally S. COHEN, THE BEYOND WITHIN 10-31 (1964); H. Smith, Do Drugs
Have Religious Import?, in LSD, THE CoNscIousNEss-EPANDING DRUG 152, 159
(D. Solomon ed. 1964); Wasson, The Hallucinogenic Fungi of Mexico: An
Inquiry Into the Origin of the Religious Idea Among Primitive People, in
BOTANICAL MUSEUM LEAFLETS 19 (Harvard Univ. 1961).
07 Testimony of Dr. Ralph Metzner, Editor of the Psychedelic Review
(Tr.).
98 Professor Stace has concluded that the psychedelic drug experience is
not merely akin to mystical experience, "it is mystical experience." Quoted
in H. Smith, Do Drugs Have Religious Import?, in LSD, THE CONSCIOUSNESS-
EXPANDING DRUG 152, 159 (D. Solomon ed. 1964).
William James found that nitrous oxide "stimulat[ed] the mystical con-
sciousness in an extraordinary degree," a consciousness which he believed
could not be disregarded in seeking understanding of the reality of the uni-
verse. JAMES 298.
See generally A. HUXLEY, DOORS OF PERCEPTION (1954); A. HuxLEy,
HAvEN Aim HELL (1954); A. WATTS, THE Joyous COSMOLOGY (1962); Watts,
A Psychedelic Experience: Fact or Fantasy?, in LSD, THE CONSCIOUSNESS-
EXPANDING DRUG 152, 159 (D. Solomon ed. 1964). Appellant has written the
introductions to the works by Solomon and Watts, above.
For further recognition that psychedelic drugs can produce religious ex-
perience, see A. BHARATi, THE TANTRiC TRADITION 286-87 (1965); A. MASLOW,
RELIGIONS, VALUES, AND PEAK-EXPERIENCES (1964); Downing & Wygant, Psy-
chedelic Experience and Religious Belief, in THE UTOPIATES (Blum & Blum
ed. 1964).
99 A. WATTS, THE JoYous COSMOLOGY 18-19 (1962). See also Van Dusen,
LSD and the Enlightenment of Zen, 4 PSYCHOLOGIA 11 (1961).
100 Barnard, The God in the Flowerpot, 32 AM. SCHOLAR 584-86 (1963).
101 H. ZIMMER, PHI.OSOPHIES OF INDIA 410 (1951). See also Swami
Prabhavanda, Smadhi, in VEDANTA FOR THE WESTERN WORLD 212 (C. Isherwood
ed. 1948).
Stated more fully, the objective is (a) awareness and liberation of
Atman, man's hidden Divine Self, his infinite soul, the transcental knowledge
that lies within, and (b) communion and ultimate Oneness with Brahman,
i.e., God, "that which lies beyond the sphere and reach of intellectual con-
sciousness." This objective is singular, not twofold, for the aim is to exper-
ience the identity of Brahman, the God which pervades the universe and
Atman, the God within all of us. See H. SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN 27
(1958); H. Zimmm, PHILosoPHiEs OF INDIA 79 (1951). See also R. OTTO,
MYSTICISM EAST AND WEST ch. VII (1932).
Atman, or immanent eternal Self, is one with Brahman, the Absolute
Principle of all existence; and the last end of every human being is to
discover the fact for himself, to find out Who he really is. 1 0 2 In-
tellectual comprehension of Brahman, Atman and their identity is
wholly inadequate; this must be experienced through transcendental,
mystical, nonverbal, ineffable, revelatory consciousness. 0 3 To achieve
this experience is to realize that the perspective of our worldly lives is
distorted by illusion (maya); that the sole reality is God and His
Divine processes. 04
It is no wonder that Dr. Leary's quest for understanding the
meaning of his "sacred mushroom" experience ultimately led him to
join Hindu sects in this country and India, for by his testimony his
psychedelic drug experiences, his samadhi, revealed to him the illu-
sions of his worldly existence, impelled him to find out who he really
is, and provided an intense consciousness of the handiwork of a Su-
preme Intelligence pervading the Universe.
The hemp plant, cannabis sativa, is the source of a number of
psychedelic substances of which marihuana (called bhang in India)
is the mildest, and ganja (widely cultivated in India and sold under
a licensing system) and hashish are progressively more potent.'05
To the Hindu the hemp plant is holy.
A guardian lives in the bhang leaf.... To see in a dream the
leaves, plant or water of bhang is lucky .... In the ecstasy of bhang
the spark of the Eternal in man turns into light the murkiness of mat-
ter ... No god or man is as good as the religious drinker of bhang.
At Benares, Ujjain and other holy places, yogis, bairagis and sanyasis
take deep draughts of bhang that they may center their thoughts on
the Eternal .... To forbid or even seriously to restrain the use of so
holy and gracious an herb as the hemp would cause widespread suf-
fering and annoyance and to large bands of worshipped aescetics deep-
seated anger.106
Hindus consider the state produced by bhang and ganja as "fix-
ing the mind on God."'10 7
102 A. HuxLEY, DOORS OF PERCEPTION 2 (1954).
103 W. STACE, RELIGION AND TIM MODERN MIND 265, 267 (1952).
104 See, e.g., id. at 274.
105 See generally R. DE Ropp, DRUGS AND THE MIND 62-65 (1957); TAYLOR,
NARCOTICS: NATURE'S DANGEROUS GIFTS 7-28 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
TAYLOR]. Hashish (also called charas) is the subject of vivid and dangerous
accounts in the romantic writings of Baudelaire, Gautier and Ludlow. Bhang
is considered by middle class Indians to be a low quality substitute for ganja.
TAYLOR 7-28.
106 TAYLOR 22-23. See also 3 REPORT OF THE INDIAN HEmP CommI'vIssIoN
250 (1894); Daru and Bhang, Cultural Factors in the Choice of Intoxicant, 15
Q.J. ALCOHOLIC STUDIES 220-37 (1954).
107 TAYLOR 23.
A Hindu painting in the Musee Guimet in Paris shows a tortoise as a
reincarnation of the Hindu God Vishnu. According to legend, the hairs of the
tortoise represent hemp. Robinson, in 8 CIBA SYMPOSIUM 381 (1946).
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The religious significance of hemp has deep roots in Hindu
mythology, which holds that one of the two paths to the sacred
mystical experience is through soma.08 Many authorities have con-
cluded that the properties of the hemp plant closely approximate the
legendary powers of soma,10 9 and indeed, that "soma may well have
been hemp."110
D. The District Court Applied Unconstitutional Standards in Refus-
ing to Submit the Issue of Appellant's Sincerity to the Jury.
Where testimony raises the defense of religious exercise, and the
practice does not amount to a grave abuse engendering a compelling
state interest in its prohibition, the proper procedure requires sub-
mission to the jury of the question whether the religious claim is
made sincerely and in good faith."' The Supreme Court's articula-
tion in Seeger of the role of draft boards and courts is instructive;
they are to determine "whether the beliefs professed by the registrant
are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things,
religious."112  Appellant has not suggested, however, that an ac-
tivity is religious merely because it is sincere," 3 but has demon-
strated that his claims objectively involve the very essence of re-
ligion as understood by the courts and religious scholars, and thus
entitle him to no less than a jury determination of his sincerity.
The district court refused to submit to the jury the issue of the
sincerity and good faith of defendant's religious professions, finding
that, unlike the use of peyote in the Native American Church, (a) the
use of marihuana was not an essential part of defendant's belief,
but "as he put it ... an outward manifestation," and "there are many
other substances that might be used"; (b) defendant's religion had
not followed the same rite for perhaps hundreds of years; (c) de-
fendant's ingestion of marihuana was not attendant with the trap-
108 See BERGSON 223.
109 See Robinson, supra note 107, at 378; BHARATI, THE TANTTic TRADrION
287 (1965); YOGA-SUTRA OF PATANJALI ch. 4, sutra 1 (Vyasa's Commentary,
Univ. of Calcutta 1963).
In Bengal the word for hemp is "siddhi" which means "occult power."
In Tantric Hinduism, hemp (vijaya) is formally ingested in the initial phase
of ritualistic worship. BHAEATI, supra at 250.
11o A. BAsEum, THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA 235 (1954).
11 See, e.g., In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1964). Petitioner claimed that peyote "is a very spiritual plant because it
gives you direct contact with God .. .and when used for prayer, the best
thing that can happen to you;" the California Supreme Court remanded for
a factual determination of whether "the defendant's belief ... was [asserted]
... honestly and in good faith ... ." Id. at 729. See also In re Jenison, 267
Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1964), remanded by 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
112 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (emphasis added).
13 See Golden Rule Church Association, 41 T.C. 719 (1964).
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pings of a religious ceremony but was taken at "different hours of
the day or night . .. alone or with a few friends . .. to more effec-
tively put him in a mood to contemplate and reflect"; and (d) mari-
huana did not serve as a sacramental symbol (Tr.).
In the first place, the very words of the first amendment reveal
that religious freedom is far more than the right to believe. It is the
exercise of religion which is guaranteed freedom, i.e., the "manner in
which an expression shall be made of . . . belief." 1" 4 As we have
seen, the Supreme Court has held this to include the carrying out- of
one's belief, inter alia, by solicitation, and by refusals to work on
Saturdays, salute the flag, and serve on juries. Moreover, appellant's
religious practice, like the Mass, is not merely a religiously motivated
activity or forbearance for him but a means of worship, of Divine
communion, of attaining the spiritual experience, recognized by the
Supreme Court as central to religion and its constitutional protection.
The district court compounded its constitutional error by im-
plicitly holding that a practice is not protected if not essential to a
man's religion. In protecting religiously motivated activities and for-
bearances, the Supreme Court has never suggested that religious
freedom is limited to essentials; such an approach would undermine
all our religions. For the Bible, the altar, the ark, and bread and
wine all give religion a vital richness and depth; even though none of
these qualify as a sine qua non, without them our religious life would
be emotionally and spiritually shallow.
Moreover, appellant did testify that marihuana was integral to
his 'religious beliefs and enabled him to attain a unique level of
spiritual consciousness.1 5 Such testimony was ignored in the court's
statement that "he has told us . . . that there are many other sub-
stances that might be used and that this is only one of a number."
To deprive appellant of any one sacramental aid is to deprive him
of every one, if "essentiality" is the test; indeed, psychedelic sub-
stances considerably more potent than marihuana might not survive
a "grave abuse" test; in either event appellant's religion would be
wholly stripped and destroyed.
The district court's suggestion that private religious "experi-
ences, absent the "trapping of religious ceremoni [es]," are not pro-
tected by the first amendment, ignored judicial precedent as well as
authoritative understandings of religion. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that the blessings of religious liberty are not
limited to any particular form of worship, and that bona fide personal
114 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
115 Thus, appellant's testimony indicated that marihuana played a far
more important role than merely putting him "in a mood to contemplate or
reflect."
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worship enjoys no less protection than organized church practices.
In United States v. Ballard"6 the Court emphasized the principle that
the constitutional guarantee extends to the most unorthodox, even
incredible, religious claims.117 In Seeger, the Court read the congres-
sional religious exemption from the draft to include highly personal
religious claims, independent of the theology of recognized institu-
tional religions.118 In Jenison, the claimant's refusal to serve on a
jury was upheld even though it was based on a personal interpretation
of a religious passage.119 In In re Grady, the California Supreme
Court held that a self-styled peyote-preacher, claiming to see God
through peyote, was entitled to a jury determination of his sincerity
and good faith even though he was "not formally connected with an
organized church."'120 As Mr. Justice Stewart observed in Sherbert
v. Verner,121 "Our constitution commands the positive protection
of religious freedom-not only for a minority, however small ...
but for each of us."'
1 22
Throughout history and around the world, religious men have
worshipped "alone or with a few friends," at "different hours of the
day or night," as well as in formal ceremonies. As observed above,
this personal relationship with God is at or close to the heart of
religion as understood by the Supreme Court and religious scholars.
The "trappings of religious ceremony" thought significant by the dis-
trict court are hardly what religion or religious freedom are all about:
[TIhe essential, the intrinsic, the basic, the most fundamental religious
or transcendent experience [is] a totally private and personal one
which can hardly be shared. . . . As a consequence, all the para-
phernalia of organized religion-buildings and specialized personnel,
rituals, dogmas, ceremonials, and the like-are to [one who has mysti-
cal religious experiences] secondary, peripheral and of doubtful value
in relation to the intrinsic and essential religious or transcendent ex-
perience.1 23
116 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
117 In holding that a jury may not consider the truth or falsity of reli-
gious claims, but only their sincerity, the Court said,
"[H]eresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doc-
trines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may
be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the
ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law."
Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
118 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
119 In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 120 N.W.
2d 515 (1964).
120 In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
121 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
122 Id. at 416. See also Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal.
App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 84 N.J. Super. 569, 202 A.2d
889 (1964).
123 A. MASLow, RELIGIoNs, VALUEs AND PEAx-ExPERIENcES 27-28 (1964).
The New Testament is also instructive in this regard:
"And when you pray, you must Aot be likd the hypocrites; for they love
In any event, appellant's religious beliefs and practices are far from a
matter of personal idiosyncracy. They are rooted in the philosophy
and practice of Hinduism, probably the oldest religion in the world
(in existence at least 3000 years) .124
In conclusion, the district court not only disregarded the Supreme
Court's admonition to consider whether the defendant's religious
claims "are, in his own scheme of things, religious";1 2 5 it demon-
strated the validity of James Madison's warning that "religion is too
personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its unhallowed perversion by
a civil magistrate."' 26
E. The Limited Ramifications of Reversal on First Amendment
Grounds
While a sincere religious defense may not be denied merely for
fear of fraudulent claims in other cases, 27 appellant is not unaware
of the likelihood of judicial concern regarding possible undesirable
consequences of reversal on first amendment grounds. Appellant
submits that such concern, although understandable, is unwarranted.
To protect appellant's right to seek Communion with God in the way
of his religion is not to create exemptions for all who assert a religious
motive; the requirement of sincerity and good faith will preclude
any significant detraction from the general enforcement of the mari-
huana laws. For the mere assertion of a religious defense is a far cry
from the proof of it. Such a defense can-succeed only if a jury of 12
ordinary citizens (with their typical cynicism toward the bona fides
of "exotic" religious claims) can be persuaded (at least to the point of
reasonable doubt) that the defendant is honest and sincere in assert-
ing that marihuana plays a significant role in his religious life.
It seems unlikely that a religious defense could succeed even as
often as the rarely successful assertion of conscientious objector status
(given congressional immunity from the compulsory draft laws).
For religious sincerity as commonly understood is not something
that can be acquired overnight or that can be principally motivated
by a desire to smoke marihuana. Religion is commitment. It is
to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, that they may
be seen by men.... But when you pray, go into your room and shut the
door and pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in
secret will reward you." Matthew 6:5-9 (Revised Standard Version 1952).
124 Thus, there is no justification either in law or fact for distinguishing
Woody because the Native American Church practiced the same rite "for per-
haps hundreds of years."
125 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1966).
126 Memorial and Remonstrance, in 6 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (VT.
Hutchinson & W. Rachal ed. 1962), quoted in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432
(1962).
127 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963).
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dedication. It is a profound search for ultimate answers through
awareness of the Divine. Wary of being defrauded, a jury is likely
to pay close attention to everything in a claimant's life that has any
bearing on his sincerity. It would seem that little less than the
commitment and dedication to religious values demonstrated by
appellant through his revelatory experience, his writing, his speeches,
his home, and his entire way of life 128 could satisfy a jury of the
sincerity of a religious defense. 2 9
128 Indeed, testimony such as that given by the witness Cutler, if believed
by the jury, might tend to undermine the religious defense. This witness
testified that he had observed Leary smoking marihuana under frivolous cir-
cumstances on an unspecified date between January and March 1964, at an
unspecified address in Greenwich Village, New York, contradicting Leary's
testimony that the first time he used marihuana was in August or September
of 1964 and then only for scientific purposes until his visit to India in January
1965. See, however, Point V infra. [AUTHOR'S NoTE: One of the points on the
appeal is that the prosecution committed error in failing to disclose that Cutler
was under two federal indictments at the time he testified, and in arguing to
the jury that "there is no reason to disbelieve this man-no motivation for
him to falsify .... ," The author urged that such error was reversible and
not harmless, in light. of (a) the jury's resolution of several relevant issues
depended on its assessment of Dr. Leary's credibility and (b) the government
argued to the jury that in light of Cutler's testimony it should disbelieve
everything Leary "testified to from the witness stand."]
In People v. Mitchell, a California district court of appeal rejected a reli-
gious defense to a marihuana prosecution, finding that the "defendant has
offered no evidence that his use of marihuana is a religious practice in any
sense of that term. In defendant's discourse to the jury he did refer to the
Bible and to the practices of some Hindus, but in essence he was expressing
only his own personal philosophy and way of life." People v. Mitchell, 244
Cal. App. 2d 176, 182, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884, 888 (1966).
The court purported to distinguish People v. Woody by virtue of the
stipulation that "the use of peyote by the Indians was a central part of their
religious ceremony" and the showing that "such use of peyote, under the
safeguards prescribed by the church, had no antisocial consequence, and that
the danger of misuse of the substance, under improper claim of religious
immunity, was minimal." Id.
As appellant has indicated above, the first amendment does not permit
courts or legislatures to limit religious freedom to central religious exercises
or to organized church religion. This has been recognized by the California
Supreme Court. In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1964). Moreover, appellant has demonstrated the minimal danger of mari-
huana as far from constituting a grave abuse.
The defendant's testimony in Mitchell would seem to corroborate your
appellant's contention that the required jury determination of sincerity is a
more than adequate safeguard against fraudulent claims of religious immu-
nity.
129 Of course, the procedures and jury instructions should be designed to
prevent, to the extent possible, the exercise of religious prejudice or the
jurors' application of personal notions of religion and religious freedom. Cf.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 72, 92 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Jack-
son, J.). AUTHoR's NOTE: In its brief the Government asserted: "This is
not a question of religious freedom but rather an after-the-fact attempt to
justify otherwise illicit acts by imposing a question of freedom of religion."
Appellant replied: "The suggestion that Leary 'got religion' in order to
Finally, judicial recognition that marihuana does not present a
grave abuse justifying infringement of religious freedom will provide
little, if any, precedent for constitutionally exempting the religious
use of other more potent drugs. Whatever the danger of other sub-
stances, the religious use of something as relatively harmless as mari-
huana must be constitutionally protected if the promise of the first
amendment is not to be broken.
Conclusion
Throughout the ages men have been punished for pursuing God
in ways contrary to established orthodoxy. In search of an end to
religious oppression the men who adopted and ratified the first
amendment came to these shores "with the hope that they could find
a place in which they could pray when they please to the God of
their faith in the language they chose."'1 80 The majority can protect
its own religious practices simply by not legislating. Minorities must
ultimately rely on the first amendment as enforced by the courts.
Appellant seeks no privileges. He seeks only the spiritual free-
dom constitutionally guaranteed to every man. Appellant's way to
God is harmful to no one, not even himself. It does not coerce; it
does not exploit; it does not injure. By no stretch of the imagina-
tion can it be deemed a grave abuse.
To know the meaning of constitutional freedom is to know that
"the spirit of liberty is [that] . . .spirit which is not too sure that it
is right,"''1 and which can rarely hope to see, but through a glass
darkly. To affirm these convictions is to permit incarceration, for
no less than 5 years, of a man whose religious sincerity has never
been denied by judge or jury. Surely the first amendment deserves
the benefit of any doubt.
evade the law is refuted by the great weight of evidence below: appellant's
original profound religious experience, his religious writings, religious sem-
inars, religious lectures, all occurred at a time when the law permitted the
use of psychedelics more potent than marihuana. Leary's initial use of mari-
huana for scientific purposes is a matter for jury consideration in evaluating
his sincerity."
130 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).
13 L. HAND, THE SPMIT OF LmanRTY 190 (1960).
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II.
FREE EXERCISE, COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS AND PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS:
THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AuTHOR'S NoTE: Notwithstanding my affiliation with Dr. Leary, the article
which follows expresses my considered and unsponsored views. It is intended
to stand or fall as an effort of scholarship, not advocacy. I adopt as directly
in point Alan Watts' preface to his work, "The Supreme Identity" (1957):
"It is surely a kind of spiritual pride to refrain from 'thinking out loud,' and
to be unwilling to let a thesis appear in print until you are prepared to
champion it to the death. Philosophy [and law], like science, is a social
function, for a man cannot think rightly alone, and the philosopher must
publish his thought as much to learn from criticism as to contribute to the
sum of wisdom. If, then, I sometimes make statements in an authoritative
and dogmatic manner, it is for the sake of clarity rather than from the desire
to pose as an oracle."
I. Psychedelic Experience as Religious Exercise1
In a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review 2 Professor Donald
Giannella, writing about the meaning and scope of the free exercise
clause, confidently asserts that the use of psychedelic drugs is not
deservant of status as a free exercise claim under the first amend-
ment, at least where the claimants practice what he terms "modern
1 In denying Dr. Leary's first amendment contention in Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit relied principally
on the presumed evils of marihuana and the "harm which would result if the
criminal statutes against marihuana were nullified as to those who claim the
right to possess and traffic in this drug for religious purposes." We will dis-
cuss at length the constitutionally required justification for infringing reli-
gious freedom.
On the status of Dr. Leary's contention as a religious claimant under the
first amendment, the court had this to say: "There is no evidence in this
case that the use of marihuana is a formal requisite of the practices of
Hinduism, the religion which Dr. Leary professes. At most, the evidence
shows that it is considered by some as being an aid to attaining consciousness
expansion by which an individual can more easily meditate or commune with
his god. Even as such an aid, it is not used by Hindus universally." Id. at
860.
The court dealt with People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), and In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 912 (1964), as follows: "With due deference to the California Supreme
Court, we are of course not bound by its decisions. However, we note an
essential difference between Woody and the instant matter in that peyote in
the Woody case played 'a central role in the ceremony and practice of the
Native American Church, a religious organization of Indians,' and that the
'ceremony' marked by the sacramental -use of peyote, composes the corner-
stone of the peyote religion. Grady was apparently the spiritual leader of
a group of individuals and provided peyote for the group which he said was
for religious purposes." 383 F.2d at 861.
2 Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Devel-
opment Part I. The Religious Guarantee, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
nontheistic religion [s] ." In the course of his discussion, four argu-
ments are more or less explicitly advanced in support of the conclu-
sion that mystical psychedelic practices should be denied the status
of religious claims. A major contention is that
denial of exemption for these practices does not create problems for
the individual's conscience similar to those created by traditionally
religious claims to freedom of worship. Personal alienation from
one's Maker, frustration of one's ultimate mission in life, and violation
of the religious person's integrity are all at stake when the right to
worship is threatened. Although the seeker of new psychological
worlds may feel equally frustrated when deprived of his gropings for
a higher reality, there is not the same sense of acute loss-the loss of
the Be-all and End-all of life.4
With due respect, it is submitted that this contention is unten-
able; it ignores those individuals who find in psychedelics the
only accessible path to genuine religious experience, and the only
meaningful answer to what Dr. Tillich regarded as perhaps the ques-
tion of the century-whether man could know again that sense of
awe he had once known through direct, personal awareness and ex-
perience of his Ground of Being.5 How gratuitously insensitive is the
assertion that outlawing of the mystical psychedelic experience will
not produce "the same sense of acute loss" as interference with the
"traditional" right to worship! It is perhaps a contestable but hardly
a radical thought that revelation, intuition, mystical consciousness or
some such bridge must be crossed in order to ascend from empty
ritualistic tradition to authentic religion, and that this ultimate ex-
perience is the foundation of institutional religion and the source of
any validity it may have. Traditionally such an experience has been
attained by only a few, whose accounts have inspired and attracted
followers. To many there can be no authentic religion without this
experience, and to some no such experience has been possible without
psychedelics. Giannella would deny such persons psychedelics and
comfort them with the assertion, "You have not been exercising re-
ligion, but you are free to do so by seeking God through 'traditional
3 Id. at 1426-27. "[N]ontheistic practices seeking to advance individual
psychological and spiritual development are to be denied equal status with
sacramental acts of worship." Id. at 1431.
4 Id. at 1427.
5 Contemporary criticism of LSD cults is to some extent paralleled by
Dr. Tillich's reservations about Eastern mysticism: "'Mysticism ... does not
take seriously the concrete and the doubt concerning the concrete. It plunges
directly into the ground of being and meaning, and leaves the concrete, the
world of finite values and meanings, behind."' Quoted in W. BRADEN, THE
PRIvATE SEA: LSD AND THE SEARCH FOR GOD 194 (1967). On the social and
pragmatic value of psychedelic philosophy, see, however, Dr. Harvey Cox(Harvard Divinity Faculty), God and the Hippies, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1968, at 93,
and Dr. Michael Novak (Stanford Religion Faculty), Commencement Address,
Stanford University, June 1967, reprinted .n Stanford Daily, Sept. 26, 1967, at
3, col. 1.
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worship'-through liturgy, prayer, sacrament, ritual, doctrine, dog-
ma and church, through all the avenues which have failed you; surely
you will suffer no 'acute loss.'" This is small solace indeed to those
stifled in their search for direct and experiential answers to funda-
mental, universal, metaphysical questions, deprived of their one effec-
tive vehicle to God or Ultimate Ground, and prevented from know-
ing Divinity as experience rather than shadow, symbol or concept.
Additional arguments advanced by Professor Giannella are (1)
that the psychedelic experience is "nontheistic,"6 has "no transcen-
dental referent, '7 and therefore would be outside religion unless the
Supreme Court expands8 its understanding in United States v. See-
ger;9 and (2) that such claims, involving neither "cultic bond '10 nor a
theological system of discipline and ritual will and should be dis-
tinguished from the successful contentions of the Native American
Church and of humanistic organizations receiving favorable tax treat-
ment by courts applying statutory religious exemptions.
It is difficult to understand the meaning and significance of the
assertion that the psychedelic experience is "nontheistic" and has
"no transcendental referent"; and, in light of Seeger, which as Gian-
nella concedes "seems to suggest the Court's ultimate definition of
religion for constitutional purposes,"'1 2 it is far from easy to accept
his notion that "it will be extremely difficult to find an analogue to
the sacramental worship of God in their [users of psychedelics] prac-
tices."'13 In the first place, the psychedelic mystical experience can
be deemed "nontheistic" and without "transcendental referent," only
in the very limited sense of not involving belief in a personal God "out
there," a sense which is nonetheless "religious" in theology or law.
Psychedelic mysticism does involve Ultimate Unity or Communion
with, and thus belief in, a Divine Force or Ground of Being;1 4 it is
perceived as an immanent power, the manifestation of the indwelling
nature of God.15 The experience has historically been deemed
"transcendental" in the sense of carrying man beyond his ordinary
symbolic perceptions, rational, conceptual framework and egoistic per-
spective; it involves confrontation of "the beyond within." The-reli-
gious-psychedelic movement, like Dr. Thomas Altizer's "God is Dead"
6 Giannella, supra note 2, at 1426, 1431.
7 Id. at 1426.
8 Id. at 1426, 1431.
9 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See Brief, supra at 687-88, where Seeger is
discussed.
10 GianneHa, supra note 2, at 1430.
11 Id. at 1427-28, 1430.
12 Id. at 1425.
13 Id. at 1426.
14 See Brief, supra at 694; R. MASTERS & J. HOUSTON, Tnn VARIETIES OF
PsYcHEDELic EXPERIENCE 301 (1966).
15 W. BRADEN, supra note 5, at 17.
theology, is apparently carrying immanence to the conclusion of pan-
theism-God is Man.16 These psychedelic religious cultists are re-
turning to ontology-the metaphysics of Being: "They are asking
who they are, and who God is, and what is the relationship, if "any,
between them and him .... [They] accept the basic religious prem-
ises, as William James defined it: 'The belief that there is an unseen
order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting our-
selves thereto.' ",17
The Seeger view of religious belief requires no stretching to em-
brace the mystical psychedelic experience. The Court construed "be-
lief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation"-i.e., theism-as including belief
in "a power or being or faith to which all else is subordinate or upon
which all else is ultimately dependent."1 8 The Court included as
theists "those who think of God as the depth of our being,"'19 and
recognized the "Hindu philosophy [in which] the Supreme Being is
the transcendental reality of Hinduism which is 'truth, knowledge
and bliss.' ,,20 The Seeger Court referred approvingly to Dr. Tillich's
definition of God "not as a projection 'out there' or beyond the skies
but as the ground of our very being,"21 and as "'not the God of
traditional theism but the "God above God," the power of being,
which works through those who have no name for it, not even the
name God.' "22 Petitioner Peter, whose conscientious objection claim
was upheld in Seeger, endorsed a definition of religion as "the
consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man
in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands . .. ;
[it] is the supreme expression of human nature . . .. ,"23 Finally,
the Court formulated no less broad a test for determining whether a
belief is religious than whether the belief "occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly
qualifying for the exemption .... -24
The suggestion that religion requires a "cultic bond and a body
16 Id. at 17-18.
'17 Id. at 20-21.
18 380 U.S. at 174.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 174-75.
21 Id. at 180.
22 Id. Quoting from the Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council, the
Court recognized that an intrinsic function of all religion is providing answers
to ultimate questions: "'Men expect from the various religions answers to the
riddles of the human condition: What is man? What is the meaning and pur-
pose of our lives? What is the moral good and what is sin? -What are death,judgment, and retribution after death?"' Id. at 182. Cf. W. BRADEN, supra
note 5, at 20-21.
23 380 U.S. at 169.
24 Id. at 176.
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of established doctrine' 25 draws as little support from Seeger and
other decisions26 as from religious writings. The Seeger claimants
were not members of organized churches, nor did their views reflect
established doctrine. In its opinion the Court observed:
Congress recognized that one might be religious without belonging to
an organized church .... Indeed, the consensus of the witnesses
appearing before the congressional committees was that individual
belief-rather than membership in a church or sect-determined the
duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct
.27
There is simply no basis for assuming that the Supreme Court's
theologically sophisticated understanding of religion and religious be-
liefs, embracing the ancient and the contemporary, the oriental and
the occidental, and therefore drawing no distinction between belief in
a God "out there" and an Ultimate Force within, or between or-
ganized and personal religion, will be forgotten or ignored when and
if the Court must determine whether the use of psychedelics can be
an exercise of religion under the first amendment.2 8
Professor Giannella is willing to accept as religious, for pur-
poses of construing statutory tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions, groups founded on "nontheistic" beliefs, because "they promote
the common good just as religious associations do";29 and he would
extend conscientious objector status (either under the free exercise
or due process and equal protection clauses) to "those nontheistic
conscientious objections that are based on an intensely felt, self-
less, and thoroughgoing personal commitment to the brotherhood of
man .. ."30 Were religion to be constitutionally defined in terms of
social utility, could one reasonably expect or desire that the Court
would deny that the search for direct, experiential answers to ulti-
mate questions which have perplexed and profoundly disturbed man
from his beginnings is an activity of social value? 31 Regarding com-
mitment to the brotherhood of man, suffice it to note the observation
that
25 Giannella, supra note 2, at 1430.
28 See Brief, supra at 687-88.
27 380 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added).
28 Professor Giannella finds that the practices of the Native American
Church protected in the Woody case were "directly related to the worship of
God and strictly limited in intensity, time, and place by a theological system
of discipline," and asserts that it follows that "the indiscriminate use of hallu-
cinogenic agents, in accordance with some private religious mystique, would
have extremely difficult sledding in the courts." Giannella, supra note 2, at
1428. Aside from the fact that this observation does not explain the Grady
opinion, it would seem relevant not to determining the religious status of the
claim, but to assessing the degree of harm that might accompany religious
exemptions. See text accompanying notes 181-214 infra.
29 Giannella, supra note 2, at 1430.
30 Id. at 1431.
31 See Brief, supra at 690. -
[the] psychedelic experience does seem to hint at a brotherhood
which is something more than a brotherhood .... [A] man who
looks at ultimate reality will know thereafter from his own experi-
ence "that we are elements of a greater whole and that what one
does to another he does ineluctably to himself."32
The "social value" of the religious aspects of "hippieism" is well
expressed in a recent article8 3 by Dr. Harvey Cox of the Harvard
Divinity School. He notes parallels between the conduct and beliefs
found in the hippie movement, and the "antisocial" activities of St.
Francis and the early Christian sects. He suggests that
Ehlippieness represents a secular version of the historic American
quest for a faith that warms the heart, a religion one can experience
deeply and feel intensely. The love-ins are our 20th Century equiva-
lent of the 19th Century Methodist camp meetings-with the same
kind of fervor and the same thirst for a God who speaks through
emotion and not through the anagrams of doctrine. 34
Psychedelic religion challenges the contemporary Christian
church with the questions, "Why has conventional Christianity turned
its back on man's age-old quest for the ecstatic and the mystical?
Has Western Religion and its obsessive interest in doctrinal clarity and
rational formulation lost sight of a very significant aspect of religi-
ous experience?" 35
Perhaps more important, the psychedelic sects are confronting
and living their answers to the most profound, practical question our
society may face in the not-too-distant future, a question which
"established" Western religions have gravely neglected-How are peo-
ple blessed with extraordinary material wealth and an abundance of
leisure time to find meaning and value in their lives?36 As Dr. Cox
observes:
Many of these youngsters come from ordinary middle-class families,
where the parents bowl and watch TV. They themselves, however,
prefer to paint, make movies, write poetry, meditate, frolic in the
meadows and talk to one another endlessly about God and love and
what it means to be human. In doing so, they may be-engaging in
advanced research for the whole society, devising a new leisure life
style.S7
In conclusion, Dr. Cox asserts that
[the movement] demonstrates that man's thirst for God and love and
authenticity may take strange forms, but it is never quenched. It also
suggests that a church still absorbed in its own internal problems,
and often preoccupied with the past, must bestir itself if its discipline
and its vision are to mean anything to the young Americans of the
Sixties" and Seventies. 8
32 W. BwmUEN, supra note 5, at 189-90.
33 Cox, supra note 5.
34 Id. at 94.
35 Id. at 206.
36 Professor Michael Novak observes that hippies have turned from their
parents' question "how to?" to the question "what for?" Novak, supra note 5.
37 Cox, supra note 5, at 207.
38 Id. at 210.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
March 19681 PSYCHEDELICS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 707
A final argument 39 advanced by Professor Giannella for denying
the psychedelic claimant religious status under the first amendment
is that
to adopt a sympathetic view toward the nontheistic claim would be to
equate the free exercise of religion with the pursuit of happiness....
The blissful enjoyment of rich psychological vistas, whether new or
old, cannot describe the heart of the religious experience for free exer-
cise purposes, because such a definition would merge secular and
religious values and eliminate the historical and theoretical basis for
special treatment of the latter.40
As demonstrated in the Brief, the psychological, mystical experience,
in the view of reputable scholars, is indeed "the heart of the religious
experience," and can be triggered in certain individuals by ingestion
of psychedelic drugs.41  Moreover, it might be argued, in light of
the relatively firm criteria by which the mystical experience can be
recognized,42 that misgivings regarding judicial capacity to distin-
guish religious from psychological experience are unwarranted. Cita-
tions to recent studies, however, would lend apparent support to Gian-
nella's argument, for in several experiments (of varying degrees of
39 Giannella argues further that the use of psychedelics subverts "the
state's interest in maintaining normality in personal behavior." Giannella,
supra note 2, at 1427. Since this consideration has nothing to do with the
religiosity of the claim for psychedelics, it is misplaced as a reason for denying
the use of psychedelics status as religious exercise, and will be treated in the
subsequent discussion of a court's role in evaluating the interests protected
or preserved by legislation interfering with religious liberty. See text ac-
companying notes 96-149 infra.
40 Giannella, supra note 2, at 1427 n.142.
41 See Brief, supra at 692-93. For further support for the capacity of psy-
chedelics to produce authentic mystical experiences see, e.g., R. MASTERS & J.
HOUSTON, supra note 14, at 247-313; Pahnke, LSD and Religious Experience,
in LSD, Mx AiN SociETY 60 (R. De Bold & R. Leaf ed. 1967).
In Dr. Pahnke's "Good Friday experiment" (described briefly in Pahnke,
supra at 70-76, and fully in his unpublished doctoral dissertation, Drugs and
Mysticism: an Analysis of the Relationship Between Psychedelic Drugs and
the Mystical Consciousness, (1963) (on file in the Harvard Library)), psilo-
cybin-a psychedelic derived from the "sacred mushroom"-was administered
to 10 theology students, while 10 others received nicotinic acid, an active
placebo which produces a tingling sensation but no psychic effects. Members
of the latter group were told they had been given psiocybin. They all spent
the day (Good Friday, 1962) in the Boston University Chapel. Each of them
gave accounts of their experience, which were graded "blind" by college
graduates who had been given a checklist of criteria prepared by Dr. Pahnke
after extensive readings of classical descriptions of the nondrug-induced
mystical experience. Applying a rather strict test of correspondence in de-
ciding whether an experience was "mystical," Dr. Pahnke found that three
or four of the psiocybin subjects but none of the control subjects had such an
experience.
42 Formulations of the characteristics of the experience by those who
have studied mystical literature differ from each other only in minor respects.
Compare W. STAcE, MvsTicism AND PintosoPHY 110-11 (1960), with Pahnke,
supra note 41, at 63-64 and Brief, supra at 690-92.
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reliability) -rather high percentages of subjects had or reported hav-
ing had religious experience following ingestion of psychedelics. 43 To
accept such reports as authentic for constitutional purposes would
indeed come close to obliterating or rendering meaningless the his-
toric differences between religious exercise (somber, deep, profound)
and secular recreation. It might be answered that a defendant's mere
43 In two studies conducted by Dr. Pahnke, involving careful controls,
conservative resolution of close cases, and analysis of the content of the re-
ported experiences (rather than reliance on labels attached by the subjects),
he reported 30 to 40% mystical experiences in the Good Friday experiment,
and 20 to 40% in experiments at the Massachusetts Mental Health Center.
Pahnke's Dissertation, supra note 41, at 68.
Other studies, using LSD, mescaline or psilocybin, relied on the subjective
claims of volunteer subjects in responding to questionnaires. For example,
question: "Looking back on your LSD experience how does it look to you
now?" Included in a list of possible evaluations is: "A religious experience."
A response was credited if the subject answered "quite a bit" or "very much."
Other tests were somewhat less conclusive. For example, question: "[W]hat
were you left with, after your experience?" One of the possible answers was:
"A greater awareness .of God, or a Higher Power, or an Ultimate Reality."
The percentages of religious responses reported were: W. McGLOTHLIN, S.
COHEN & W. McGLOTHIaN, LONG-LASTING EFFECTS OF LSD ON NomvALs (U.C.
L.A. Inst. of Gov't & Pub. Affairs MR-75, 1966) (33%); Ditman, Hayman &
Whittlesey, Nature and Frequency of Claims Following LSD, 134 J. NERVOUS
& MENTAL DISEASE 346 (1962) (32%); Kurland, Unger, Shaffer & Savage,
Psychedelic Therapy Utilizing LSD in the Treatment of the Alcoholic Patient:
A Preliminary Report, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1202 (1967) (75%); McGlothlin,
Cohen & McGlothlin, Short-Term" Effects of LSD on Anxiety, Attitudes and
Performance, 139 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 266 (1964) (27%); Subjective
After-Effects of Psychedelic Experiences: A Summary of Four Recent Ques-
tionnaire Studies, 1 PSYCHEDELIC REV. 18, 19 (1963), summarizing Savage, Har-
man, Fadiman & Savage, A Follow-Up Note on the Psychedelic Experience,
in PSYCHEDELIC DRUG THERAPY: A NEW APPROACH TO PERSONALITY CHANGE
(S. Unger ed. 1964) (83%); and the Janiger study presented by W. McGLoTH-
LIN, LONGLASTING EFFECTS OF LSD ON CERTAIN ATTITUDES OF NoRmALS: AN
EXPERIMENTAL PROPOSAL (Rand Corp. reprint 1962) (24%).
Summarizing his own studies and those of Janiger, supra, Ditman, Hay-
man & Whittlesey, supra, and Savage,.supra, Dr. Leary contends: "(1) if the
setting is supportive but not spiritual, between 40 to 75 percent of psychedelic
subjects will report intense and life-changing religious experiences; and ...
_(2) if the set and setting are supportive and spiritual, then from 40 to 90
percent of the experiences will be revelatory and mystico-religious." Leary,
The Religious Experience: Its Production and Interpretation, 1 PSYcHEDELIC
REV. 324, 328 (1964). See also Leary, Litwin & Metzner, Reactions to Psilo-
cy bin-Administered in a Supportive Environment, 137 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 561 (1963).
R. MASTERS & J. HOUSTON, supra note 14, at 307, objectively applying Dr.
Stace's criteria to the subjects' narrative descriptions, reported a considerably
lower incidence of genuine mystical experience than the findings summarized
above. They found that only six of 206 subjects had authentic mystical ex-
periences with psychedelics, that all six "were over forty years of age, were
of superior intelligence, and were well-adjusted and creative personalities,"
and that they had "'in the course of their lives either actively sought the
mystical experience in meditation and other spiritual disciplines or have for
many years demonstrated a considerable interest in integral levels of con-
sciousness."
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assertion that he achieved a "religious experience" is legally inade-
quate, being a conclusion of law; that his use of religious metaphois
to describe his* experience, or even a correspondence between certain
stages of his described "trip" and stages of the mystical experience,
does not constrain a court to accept his experience as religious; and
that it should not be so characterized unless the defendant confronted
or touched what he felt to be the depth of his being, experienced,
in his view, unification with the Source of Reality at his deepest
level, or derived ultimate meaning, direction or structure for hu-
man experience.4 4 In reply it might be asserted that- the defendant's
description is nevertheless "subjective," and that any judicial formula
ultimately adopted as a definition of "religious experience" would
be exceedingly vulnerable to perjurious exploitation. But was not the
religiosity of the claimant's assertions in Seeger and United States v.
Ballard45 determined by "subjective" testimony-descriptions of be-
liefs and visions? Does not -the jury's power to find lack of sincerity
provide sufficient protection against fraudulent claims?
We could continue this "dialogue," but I submit that it would
lead us astray, for our starting point-Giannella's contention that
mystical experiences are indistinguishable from psychological ex-
periences or the pursuit of happiness-misses the point. The question
a court must ask is not "Has the defendant attained a religious ex-
perience through this drug?"-but is closer to, "Does the defendant's
testimony, subject to a jury finding of sincerity, indicate that he em-
ploys this drug in the exercise of his religious beliefs' 46 That the
defendant or others have attained a mystical experience via the
drug is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to status as a
religious claimant; it is simply evidence in support of his claim.
The courts have never required that the religiously motivated act be
intrinsically or exclusively "religious.147 Such a requirement would
exclude from first amendment protection the employment of wine ag a
sacrament or religious symbol, since it is also used socially. Nor of
course need the substance be one which produces the full-blown
religious experience; the use of a substance to ease the path to
meditation, contemplation and communion (the role which,.. accord-
ing to Leary's testimony, marihuana plays in his religion),: as well
44 See R. MASTERS & J. HousToN, suprd note 14, at 258. See generally 1
P. TmicH, SYSTEmATic THEOLOGY (1963).
45 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See Brief, supra at 697.-
46 As an alternative to this broad definition of religious exercise, we sug-
gest consideration of a standard more closely related to the essence of re-
ligion. See text accompanying note 57 infra.
47 Indeed, the conscientious objector -cases have held that a clairiant is
entitled to the statutory religious exemption if one of his grounds is sincere
religious objection, even though he may also object to participation in war
on other grounds, e.g., philosophical, political. See Fleming v. United States,
344 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1965). d a
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as for symbolic or sacramental purposes, may well be in the exercise
of one's religion.48 And even where the drug has produced the reli-
gious experience in the defendant or others, the claimant's testimony
may indicate that his purposes were other than that which the Con-
stitution deems "religious."
With respect to Giannella's thesis, individuals who use psyche-
delics for psychic introspection, aesthetic visions or insights, or sens-
ory, sexual or undifferentiated adventure, are as distinguishable from
religious claimants as are those who resist military induction for
political reasons, refuse jury service out of financial selfishness and
decline Saturday employment in order to be with their families. Con-
trary to the thrust of Giannella's argument, the fact that different
individuals may have different motives for a given activity has not
left the courts with the necessity of "equat [ing] the free exercise of
religion with the pursuit of happiness"; they have equated the former,
not surprisingly, with the pursuit of religion or religious beliefs.4 9
Turning to other considerations arguably relevant to the question
whether an activity is religious exercise under the first amendment,
it is submitted that there is no justification for the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion that Leary's use of marihuana was not protected because
it is not a "formal requisite of the practice of Hinduism" and is not
practiced universally among Hindus.50 Is it not "religious exercise"
if, as Sri Kalidas testified (in the court's words), "marihuana plays a
very important part in the rituals of the Hindu sect conducted by
Sri Asoke Fukir [the sect which, according to uncontradicted testi-
mony, Dr. Leary joined in India], ' 51 and these rituals have religious
significance to the claimant?
"Formal requisites" play a minor role in Eastern religious life;
religious practices are learned less through commands recorded in
sacred scriptures than through nontranscribed traditions. Further-
more, the official tenets of the central church with which an in-
dividual claims affiliation cannot be conclusively indicative of what his
48 Perhaps the Brief tended somewhat to exaggerate the similarity of
experience produced by marihuana and other psychedelics. The fact that
marihuana did not induce the-levels of consciousness brought about by "sacred
mushrooms" and other psychedelics played no role in the court's opinion, and
as the textual argument urges, should not have.
The fact that other drugs used by Dr. Leary brought about the full-
blown religious experience for him and others was evidence in support of his
contention that (a) he had become a religious person in search of religious
answers, values and experiences; and (b) marihuana, the mildest member of
the psychedelic experience, served the claimed role in his religious life.
49 As he recognizes, one who seeks a religious exemption from drug laws
will not find it easy to persuade a fact-finder of his sincerity. Giannella,
supra note 2, at 1428.
50 See note 1 supra.
51 383 F.2d at 857.
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beliefs are or should be. Within every major religion there are nu-
merous differences among numerous sects, not infrequently to the
point of conflicts the parties regard as fundamental. It is now
rather clear that the protection of the first amendment encompasses
the religious beliefs and activities of members of an unorthodox
sect,52 the unorthodox religious beliefs and activities of a member of
any religious sect,53 and indeed the religious beliefs and activities of
any individual, whether or not a member of any religious organiza-
tion.5
4
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's position that only requisites of
one's religion are protected, if meant in the sense that failure to ob-
serve the practice must be sacrilegious, is far too narrow. Meaning-
ful religious commitment embraces a good deal beyond avoidance
of sin; indeed the concepts of sin and sacrilege play a minor role in
many of the world's religions.
The court's distinction of People v. Woody55 on the ground that
peyote plays a central role in the Native American Church suggests
that in using the term "requisite," the court was endorsing the lower
court's "essentiality" test, to which we responded on the law and
facts in the Brief.56 We seriously doubt that faced with a religious
objection to jury service, the court would require that the belief be
"central" or indispensable to the claimant's religion.
The "centrality" rationale was no doubt significantly influenced
by the court's belief that the use of marihuana is a grave evil. This
suggests a flexible definition varying with the gravity of the harm-
in other words, a sliding scale of religiosity, "centrality" or "essen-
tiality" requiring correspondingly more (or less) compelling govern-
mental interests to justify suppression. Such a "balancing test"
would seem unworkable in view of the impossibility of assigning a dis-
crete series of weights to a range of governmental interests on one
52 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
53 Indeed, even if (contrary to the Leary record) the official doctrine of
an organized religion or sect to which the claimant professes to belong, ap-
parently rejects or denounces practices which he claims has personal religious
significance, the disparity would bear only on the factual issue of sincerity
and would be far from legally conclusive. "Does not the right of conscience
extend to disagreement with religious authorities about the implications of
religious tenets?" Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A
Turning Point?, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 215, 274. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965).
54 In Seeger, the Court instructed draft boards and lower courts to in-
quire "whether the beliefs professed by a registrant [claiming conscientious
objector status] are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme
of things, religious." 380 U.S. at 185. It should be-noted that the successful
Seeger claimants had not relied on their membership in any religious or-
ganization.
55 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); see note 1 supra.
56 See Brief, supra at 695-98.
side, and religious interests on the other. The soundness of this ap-
prehension is strongly corroborated by the complexities encountered
in attempting to fix just one point on one side of the balance-the
magnitude of state interest which should be deemed "compelling."
There is something to be said for distinguishing between a
standard which includes all activities motivated by or in pursuit of
religious beliefs,57 and the narrower standard of activities closely
related to worship-prayer, communion, or the religious experience
(i.e., contact with the Force or Process or Being one regards as the
most fundamental or the universal first premise), activities which are
principally motivated by a deep, psychological commitment to experi-
encing or knowing (at a transrational, transintellectual level) answers
to ultimate questions of existence. The latter standard would limit
the considerable protection implied by the requirement of a com-
pelling state interest to those activities which reflect the raison d'etre
of religious freedom, -those which embrace the sacred core of man's
life and which deeply involve him in a profound search for solutions
to problems of eternal and universal significance.
Furthermore, such a definition of religious exercise would reduce
what appears to some as friction between our values of religious free-
dom and egalitarianism; it would better reflect the fact that religion
is not socially, psychologically or ontologically "equal to" other bases
for engaging in given activities, legal or illegal; it would thus perhaps
more persuasively demonstrate why religion is constitutionally en-
titled to special immunities which may be denied to other pursuits.
An activity motivated by man's need to touch and know the essence
of Existence, the Supreme Force, the Godhead, and to absorb into his
being answers to the most important questions of mankind, is not
equivalent, in social or personal significance, to an activity undertaken
on shallower, more transient foundations, or in search of less pro-
found truths. Denial of the latter does not, in Giannella's terms, in-
volve "the same sense of acute loss-the loss of the Be-all and End-
all of life."
57 Notwithstanding the criticism of the Seeger opinion for the fuzziness
of its analogy to belief in a Supreme Being, we submit that belief in a Supreme
Being broadly understood as belief in a fundamental or ultimate force or
process or design, and the psychological commitment to this belief, is the
essential characteristic of all religion. Any belief substantially rooted in this
basic belief should be deemed a religious belief. For one of the less disappoint-
ing efforts to define religious belief with greater specificity, and a review ofjudicial efforts prior to Seeger, see Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, the
Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. Cur. L. Ruv. 533 (1965). The comment
concludes that religious belief must include (a) a belief regarding the mean-
ing of life; (b) a psychological commitment to this belief; (c) a system of
moral practice resulting from adherence to this belief; and (d) an acknowl-
edgement by its adherents that the belief or belief system is their exclusive
or supreme system of ultimate beliefs.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (VOL 19
March 1968] PSYCHEDELICS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 713
II.
Evaluating the Governmental Interest
Leary v. United States:58 The Opinion of the Fifth Circuit
In reaching the conclusion that religious freedom must be sub-
ordinated to the legislative interest in prohibiting possession of mari-
huana, the Fifth Circuit panel deemed "not pertinent" "the evidence
about its so-called harmless nature."59 After wavering in its expres-
sions of the appropriate test-suggesting that a religious exemption,
inter alia, from criminal legislation or from legislation enacted "in the
interest of the public welfare and protection of society,"6 0 is never
required-the court eventually adopted the language by which the
majority of the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner6e had distin-
guished the polygamy, vaccination, and child labor decisions: "'The
conduct or action so regulated have invariably posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order.' ",62 Appreciation of the court's
approach to its constitutional duty may be gained from the following
excerpt:
Congress has made it a crime to traffic in marihuana and it was
not incumbent upon the Government to produce evidence to controvert
the testimony of witnesses on the controversial question whether use
of the drug is relatively harmless. Thus the question is whether
the conduct or action so regulated and prohibited under severe crimi-
nal penalties by Congress (i.e. trafficking in marihuana) has posed
"some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order," [citing
Sherbert] .... Congress has demonstrated beyond doubt that it
believes marihuana is an evil in American society and a serious
threat to its people. It would be difficult to imagine the harm
which would result if the criminal statutes against marihuana were
nullified as to those who claim the right to possess and traffic in
this drug for religious purposes. For all practical purposes the anti-
marihuana laws would be meaningless, and enforcement impossible.
The danger is too great, especially to the youth of the nation, at a
time when psychedelic experience, "turn on," is the "in" thing to so
many, for this court to yield to the argument that the use of mari-
huana for so-called religious purposes should be permitted under the
Free Exercise Clause. We will not, therefore, subscribe to the dan-
gerous doctrine that the free exercise of religion accords an unlimited
freedom to violate the laws of the land relative to marihuana.63
Six issues and eight pages beyond the above holding, in the course
of dealing with arguments wholly unrelated to the free exercise
claim, the court spoke in terms of still another test, and referred to
testimony before the 1937 Congress relating to the "injurious effect
5 8 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
59 Id. at 860.
60 Id. at 859.
61 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
62 383 F.2d at 860.
63 Id. at 860-61.
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it [marihuana] has had upon the public health and morals of this
country":
64
Numerous expert witnesses referred to the dangerous nature of
the drug, its effect on those who use it, to criminal episodes of terrible
character which accompanied its use. The evidence was voluminous
and convincing that marihuana is a serious evil to society. Thus did
Congress wisely and prudently enact this law and clearly meet the
"compelling state interest" test imposed in Sherbert v. Verner. . ... 65
Religious Freedom v. Governmental Inieresis: Striking ihe Balance
The history of the free exercise clause in the Supreme Court is a
history of erratic vacillation, perplexing contradiction and unallevi-
ated absence of predictability. The question, "What justification is
required before religious liberty may be infringed?" has evoked a
spectrum of answers reflecting the widest range of judicial views
about the importance of religious liberty. In some opinions66 it is
said that criminal legislation as such, or laws related to public order,
health, welfare or morals are sufficient to overcome religious liberty;
in others 7 it is argued that an infringement of religion is constitu-
tional as long as the purpose or effect of the law is secular; and in
others" that the practice is protected unless it amounts to a "grave"
abuse and the state has a "compelling" interest which cannot be
preserved without significantly infringing upon religious exercise.
Notwithstanding this highly temperamental judicial calendar, to one
commentator, Sherbert marked "the dawn of a new day for religious
freedom claims" 69 (although it would seem that Cantwell v. Connect-
icut7° and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette71 had
already cast some bright rays) *12 The language used in Sherbert, and
relied on in Leary, to distinguish opinions denying religious claims
("substantial threat to public safety, peace or order") 73 is on its face
different from the language the Court went on to apply in sustaining
Mrs. Sherbert's claim-i.e., compelling interest 74-no alternative; 75
64 Id. at 869.
65 Id. at 869-70. -
66 E.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
67 E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
68 E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
69 Galanter, supra note 53, at 241.
70 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
71 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
72 This observation is qualified by the facts that Barnette's invalidation
of the compulsory flag salute, although based on the first amendment, did
not turn on proof that the refusal to salute was religiously motivated; and
Cantwell, involving religious expression, could well have rested solely on
the freedom of speech guarantee.
73 374 U.S. at 403.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 407.
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grave abuse endangering paramount state interest
76
-no alternative.77
Nevertheless, once agreement is reached on the importance of religious
freedom, all "three" Sherbert "tests" can and should be construed to
require the same conclusion in any free exercise case.
What can and should be required of any test is that it give
religious freedom and conflicting social interests their due, and that it
pay heed to the institutional limitations on judicial determination of
legislative facts.
The first premise in formulating and applying a "test" is the
idea which flows through our constitutional history, and which seems
to have survived other currents, that religion is a specially protected
value, constitutionally entitled to greater immunities, if not privileges,
than are given to non-first amendment liberties, notwithstanding the
establishment clause or notions of egalitarianism.78 As suggested in
76 Id. at 406.
77 Id. at 407.
18 In upholding the congressional draft exemption for conscientious ob-
jectors, the Court said of the establishment theory: "[Ilts unsoundness is too
apparent to require" discussion. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390
(1918). In Sherbert v. Verner, the establishment argument was rejected as
follows: "The extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common
with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental ob-
ligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not repre-
sent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the
object of the Establishment Clause to forestall. Nor does the recognition of
the appellant's right to unemployment compensation under the state statute
serve to abridge any other person's religious liberties." 374 U.S. at 409. Even
the two Justices dissenting from the Sherbert holding requiring an exemption,
agreed that a religious exemption would not constitute an "establishment."
374 U.S. 418, 422 ("There are ... many areas in which the pervasive activities
of the state justify some special provision for religion to prevent it from being
submerged by an all-embracing secularism"). It has been suggested that the
government's obligation of "neutrality" must be viewed in the light of the
majority's ability to protect its own religious exercise simply by not enacting
inhibiting legislation. See Galanter, supra note 53.
This is not to deny the extraordinary difficulty in formulating a principle
by which to determine the applicability of the establishment clause. Although
language occasionally appears in establishment holdings which, if literally
applied, would preclude religious exemptions from nondiscriminatory legis-
lative burdens, the Court has never been receptive to that reading of the first
amendment which would require government to ignore the religious character
of an interest for all purposes (e.g., KuRLAND, RELiGIO AND THE LAw (1963));
and in no case has the Court rejected a free exercise claim for relief on es-
tablishment grounds. Cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515
(concurring opinion).
This is not a necessary or appropriate occasion to review or adorn the
literature on establishment, since (a) there is very little likelihood that the
present Court would utilize the establishment clause to deny a free exercise
claim of a user of psychedelic drugs (see note 223 supra; and see generally
Note, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment, 34 U. Cm. L. REv.
79 (1967)); (b) there is a vast literature addressed to the establishment
problem; and (c) it is obvious in view of the importance we place in this
article on free exercise that any formulation we might advance or endorse to
the Brief 9 and preceding sections of this commentary, such special
immunity is justified inter alia by the substantial utilitarian value of
man's seeking for knowledge and experience, for answers to first
questions through the Force or Energy or Power which he regards
as most fundamental; .and by the fact that (by definition) religion in-
volves values and. beliefs which man regards as more sacred than any
other aspects of -his existence. •
Just as it would too severely limit the legislature to hold that
denials of religious exemptions are only permissible where essential
to avoid destruction of absolutely vital legislative interests, 0 so it
would.too narrowly limit religious liberty to uphold restrictions when-
ever the legislation (or. denial of religious exemptions) merely tends to
further a .legitimate legislative interest. As is true of any verbal
balancing test -designed to resolve competing claims in an area of
social control, the words used cannot supply a mathematical measure
against which the degree of harmfulness of a prohibited activity
can be weighed; they can at best convey to courts an impression of
the importance. of the protected interest, influence judicial attitudes
and values, and color the perspective from which competing claims of
state 'nd citizen are resolved. In that light it should suffice to sug-
gest that. religious exeptions may not constitutionally be denied
unless- (1)-they would seriously jeopardize (pose a significant threat
t9) d Very imp6rtant ("compelling," ."paramount," "substantial") state
interest,81 and (2) such interest could not adequately be protected by
legislation which would avoid significant infringement of religious
freedom.82  -.
resolve the conflicting* thrusts within the first amendment would reject those
which.broadly construe the establishment clause (and treat it as controlling),
aid -embrace, those. which find in the establishment clause no inhospitality
toward -generous freedom.for the religious.
-. " For reasons manifest in, the textual discussion throughout section.. I, in
our view, equal protection would not be denied those who do not qualify for
a religious exemption from general- statutory burdens. Nonreligious activities
dre "siniply not equal,.in relevant respects, to religious ones, particularly if
the latter involve worship; a search for ultimate answers at the deepest levels,
or. .other aspects of .tMe fundamental religious experience or undertaking. Cf.
Fernanddz, The Free Exercise. of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. Rv. 546 (1963).
79-. See Brief, supra at 675476. .. -
- 80 See, however, the language in the concurring opinion of Justices Black
and.-Douglas in'West Virginia State Board of Education v. -Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 643- (1943), qjuoted in Brief, supra at 674 n.11.
81 Throughout the analysis which follows, these terms are used inter-
than'geably. In'order to avoid -lengthy, and repetitious phraseology, the term
:"compelling -harm" or. "compelling injury"- is occasionally used instead- of
"significant threat *to a compelling interest" or "significant risk" of a "com-
pelling" or "paramount" harm. Occasionally the terms "suppressible danger"
or "sufficiently dangerous" will be used in a context which indicates its equiv-
alence to "compelling interest.",
:.' 82 The above formulation is subject to our recommendation that even
whero the governnient cannot establish the absence of an acceptable less-
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The latter requirement embraces the concept of the less-restic-
tive alternative. The state, in preserving paramount interests; must
choose the legislative path which will have the least restrictive fini
pact on protected freedom. This principle, reiterated in Sherbit, is
derived from decisions enforcing freedom of speech and other con-
stitutional guarantees:
83
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly- stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly...
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same purpose.
84
"
Thus the Court has invalidated legislation infringing expression, "be-
cause the breadth of its application went far beyond what was neces-
sary to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose.
"8 5
Although the majority opinions in Braunfeld v. Brown 8 :suggest
that the burden is on religious claimants to demonstrate that the
secular purpose of the challenged legislation could be achieved with
equal effect by regulations which do not significantly' impede. reli-
gion,8 7 the Court was extremely imprecise in its efforts to indicate
the conditions under which the claimant must bear that burden,1
8s
restrictive alternative, it should prevail if it demonstrates the defendant's
defective "standing"-i.e. that his actual conduct in violation-, of -the statute
would not be protected by any constitutionally required less-restrictive alter-
native. See text accompanying notes 199-214 supra. .
83 The Supreme Court applied the less-restrictive alternative doctrine- to
legislation infringing on economic interests, when they were considered cher-
ished constitutional values. Compare Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504, 513-17 (1924), and Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 US.- 402, 412-15
(1926), with Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313
U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941). See generally,- Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alter-
native Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1463 (1967). The
Court has also invalidated discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce-on
finding that the state's goals could be effected by alternative legislation. Dead
M Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). The free speech,-cases
are discussed at text accompanying notes 140-44 infra. "
84 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). - ... .
s5 Id. at 489, characterizing the holding in Talley v. Califprnia,-362 U.S.
60 (1960). See also -Aptheker v. Secretary of State,- 378. U.S. 500, 512-14
(1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U..S. 288,'.307 (1964). - •
86 366 U.S. 599 (1961). -. "
87 Id. at 607.
88 The test suggested in Braunfeld is as vague'and ambiguous as language
can be: "If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of Qne
or all religions or is to -discriminate invidiously-between religions, .that law
is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect. But if the state regulates conduct by enacting a general
law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect 'burden on religious ob-
servance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do
not impose such a burden." Id. at 607. The first sentence in the quoted
passage is inconsistent with the Braunfeld holding, and indeed would give
more to religion than any Justice has ever suggested. The- Sunday. closing
and implied that its holding in this regard was limited to "indirect"
infringements of religious liberty. The Sherbert Court clarified
the burden of proof, broadly construing the concept of "direct" in-
fringement, 9 and holding that "even if the possibility of spurious
claims did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of
work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demon-
strate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."9 0
laws, which Brautfeld dealt with, did have the effect of impeding the ob-
servance of Sabbatarian religions, by making it more costly to close one's
business on Saturday and observe the religious obligations of that holy day.
Obviously the state interest underlying the statute producing such an effect
must be considered, since the right to observe one's religion, by acts or for-
bearances, is not absolute. The Court found a strong state interest in pro-
viding one uniform day of rest. The second sentence, putting the burden of
demonstrating a less-restrictive alternative on the religious claimant, where
the purpose and effect is to advance secular goals and the burden on religion
is indirect, raises more questions than it answers. Does it apply whenever a
statute imposing indirect burdens has any secular effects? If so, then sentence
one is applicable only where the purpose or sole effect is to impede religion.
Yet the Sherbert Court, invalidating a provision requiring availability for
Saturday employment as a condition to unemployment compensation, relied
on sentence one (plus finding lack of a compelling state interest), even though
such provision had secular effects. 374 U.S. at 404. Furthermore, the second
sentence refers only to an indirect burden on religion. Does it mean to imply
that the state must prove lack of less-restrictive alternatives if the burden is
direct? Is a burden "indirect" because incidental to the purpose or principal
effect, because it takes the form of denial of a "privilege" rather than im-
position of a penalty, or because it "merely" makes the religious practice
more expensive? According to Sherbert none of these conditions indicates
a direct burden. Id. Was the burden in Braunfeld "indirect" because the
state was not imposing punishment or withholding benefits on the basis of acts
or forbearances which had religious significance for the claimant? While
such a distinction-between the government as immediate and remote cause
of adverse consequences-ignores the fact that the statute is effectively re-
sponsible for privately imposed consequences, statutes which impose such an
"indirect" burden (and thus require the religious claimant to demonstrate
alternatives) would be rare. On the basis of (a) this meaning of "indirect"
burden on religion, (b) the fact that those receiving religious exemptions from
Sunday closing laws could thereby take economic advantage of non-Sabbatar-
ian competitors, and (c) the requirement of uniformity in the very conception
of the governmental goal, Braunfeld can live in the same constitutional man-
sion as Sherbert (although surely with one foot out the door because of the
relative insubstantiality of the governmental interest).
89 See discussion in note 88 supra.
0 374 U.S. at 407 (emphasis added). While it is often said to be a general
rule that a citizen has the burden of establishing that governmental action
violates his constitutional rights (i.e. that such action is presumably constitu-
tional), once the government is shown to have invaded a constitutionally
protected interest, the burden often shifts, requiring the government to justify
that invasion. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (state must show
probable cause to justify warrantless arrest); Gibson v. Florida Legislation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (to justify legislative investigation which
intrudes on freedom of expression, state must "convincingly show a substantial
relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest").
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Not every less-restrictive alternative should invalidate a statute
infringing religious freedom. The statute should be upheld if and
only if the less-restrictive alternative would significantly threaten
very important governmental interests. Application of this doctrine
will be examined throughout the following discussion.
In considering a claim for a religious exemption, it is not a
court's function to make a de novo determination whether there is
the requisite danger and lack of alternatives. The legislative judg-
ment is entitled to a fair degree of judicial deference, not only for
reasons relating to federalism or separation of powers, but also be-
cause the legislative process is presumably better suited to obtaining
social, scientific or economic data, evaluating the impact of a practice
on important social interests, and assessing the relative efficacy of
possible solutions. Nevertheless the courts cannot carry out their
function of protecting "constitutionally protected" rights by regard-
ing as conclusive the fact that the legislature "believes" a practice is
an "evil" and "serious threat,"9' or by sustaining all legislative
judgments that are not clearly arbitrary or capricious. As the Court
indicated in Barnette2 and Sherbert,93 the judicial acceptance, in due
process cases, of legislative judgments supported by minimum ration-
ality is not appropriate where legislation invades first amendment
interests.9 4 The government should not, however, be required to
persuade a court, beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponder-
ance of evidence, of the requisite harm and lack of alternatives. The
government should be required to show, at least where the religious
claimant comes forward with contrary evidence, that a legislature
could reasonably find that the requisite danger and lack of alterna-
tives are demonstrated by a preponderance of available evidence.9 5
The Importance of the Legislative Interest
It has been claimed, in support of legislation prohibiting the
possession or use of marihuana and other psychedelic drugs, that
they lead to some or all of the following:98 (1) violent crimes; (2)
sex offenses; (3) genetic defects; 97 (4) bizarre behavior; (5) suicides;
91 Compare excerpt from opinion in Leary v. United States, accompanying
note 63 supra, with excerpt from United States v. Robel, 88 Sup. Ct. 419 (1967)
quoted in note 156 infra.
92 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
93 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
94 See Brief, supra at 675.
95 In other words, to justify infringement of a freedom protected by the
first amendment, the government must show both an evil greater than a mere
colorable interest and more persuasive evidence of that evil than is needed
to justify interference with due process liberties.
96 See Brief, supra at 681-85.
97 See, e.g., Studies Conflict on LSD Damage to Chromosomes, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1967, at 21, col. 3.
(6) psychoses; (7) "deterioration" (mental or physical); (8) addiction
or "preaddiction" (physiological or psychological); (9) "vagabondage"
(indolence, sloth); (10) social dependency; (11) quietism;9 or that
(12) such use is widely regarded as immoral. Which of these allega-
tions of harm, if supported by substantial evidence, would justify
infringement of religious liberty? 99
.. i ; t would not seriously be suggested that the value of the free
exercise of religion could or should justify behavior which creates
a significant risk of crimes of violence, sexual imposition, genetic de-
formities, or even direct and revolting psychic intrusion (e.g. inde-
cent exposure). Beyond this looms the deeply rooted and unsettled
philosophical, and political controversy about the proper limits of
state control over individual behavior through the criminal law, most
recently manifested in the stimulating dialogues (provoked by the
'"olfenden Report"'100 and the strictures of John Stuart Mill'01 ) be-
.tween H. L. A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin, each with several
scholarly interpreters and defenders. 10 2 The task of the judiciary is
made more burdensome by the fact that neither the Supreme Court
nor constitutional commentators have made much progress toward
an elaboration of rationale for judicial performance of the freedom
calculus. The discussion which follows is not an effort to construct a
general theory to guide judicial determination of compelling harms;
its purpose is to identify various values that legislation affecting psy-
chedelics may be thought to serve, and to suggest considerations that
bear on the existence and magnitude of legitimate governmental
interests in protecting these values by criminal legislation.
It is useful to examine John Stuart Mill's suggested limitations
on state power, not for the purpose of determining the constitutional
scope of the police power (Mill is no more a constitutional prophet
than Herbert Spencer), but to gauge both the strength of govern-
mental claims against various "evils" and the magnitude of concomi-
tant risks necessary to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying
infringement of religious freedom. Mill asserted the
very simple principle ... that the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
98 For the suggestions that prolonged and heavy use of marihuana leads
to mental and physical deterioration, psychological addiction, social depen-
dency, vagabondage and withdrawal, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1967, at 1, col. 2,
and N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1967, at 58, col. 3. See also Wyzanski, Marijuana:
It's Up to the Young to Solve the Problem, NEw REPuBLIc, Oct. 21, 1967, at 15.
q . .9 The discussion which follows assumes, in many cases contrary to fact,
that-the assertion of each of these evils can be supported by sufficient evidence.
0 OO REPoRT OF THE ColViTTEE ON HoMosEXUAL OFFENCES AND PRosTrru-
TiON (1957) (report to Parliament).
101 J. M1iLL, ON Li E TY (World's Classics ed. 1966).
_102 See H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MoRAuTY (1963); Devlin, Mill on
Liberty in Morals, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 215 (1964).
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of action of any of their number is self protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient war-
rant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,*
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be' wise or evenr
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him or reason--
ing with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for com-..
pelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.103
Application of this thesis would seem to preclude physical and psy-
chic (as well as moral) paternalism; society would have no right to
prohibit behavior which leads to suicide or psychosis on the ground
that such behavior is contrary to the actor's best interests. The
Supreme Court of Illinois has held it improper for the state to au-
thorize a blood transfusion in violation of the patient's religious
convictions, even when it was necessary to save her life.10 4 Reviewing
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Illinois court
concluded that
[t]hose cases which have sustained governmental action as against the ,
challenge that it violated the religious guarantees of the First Amend-
ment have found the proscribed practice to be immediately ddleteri-
ous to some phase of public welfare, health or morality. The deci-
sions which have held the conduct complained of immune from pro-..
scription involve no such public injury and no danger thereof.105
H. L. A. Hart, the leading proponent of the *position that the law
may not enforce morality as such, contends that legal paternalism .is
not necessarily inconsistent with that principle, and he is' amenable
to modifying Mill's philosophy by affirming the validity bf, legisla-
tion designed to prevent people from suffering *ith or wiithout 'their
consent. 106 Hart's justification for paternalism designed to prevent
self-inflicted physical suffering is as follows:
[There is] a general decline in the belief that individuals know
their own interests best, and ... an increased awareness of a great
range of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an
apparently free choice or to consent. Choices may be made or. con-
sent given without adequate reflection or appreciation of the conse-
quences; or in pursuit of merely transitory desires; or in various pre-..
dicaments when the judgment is likely to be .clouded; or under. ..
inner psychological compulsion; or under pressure by others of a
kind too subtle to be susceptible of proof in a law. court. Underlying- ,
Mill's extreme fear of paternalism there perhaps- is a conception of"
what a normal human being is like which now seems not to corres-,
pond to the facts.'0 7
The assumption underlying Professor Hart's remarks is that the act
reveals the actor's incompetence to determine whether the cond-dct is
103 J. MILL, supra note 101, at 14-15.
104 Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
1O5 Id. at 372, 205 N.E.2d at 441-42. .
106 H. HAaRT supra note 102, at 30-34.
107 Id. at 32-33.
contrary to his best interests; anyone who deliberately inflicts harm
(i.e. that which the "average" or "normal" person would consider
harmful) on himself must be irrational or non compos mentis. But
why should a majority impose their assessment of the value of each of
their lives and well-beings on a dissenter if his manifestation of his
views interferes in no significant way with the interests of others,
and if the prevention of his conduct will not even improve the
lot of others? The paternalistic rationale would involve the state in
far-reaching infringements of personal choice. When society presumes
to decide when a man may voluntarily risk his life, it must also de-
cide what values are worth various risks of death. On the one hand
there is the individual's concept of his own best interest, and the value
of freedom of personal choice; on the other hand there is society's
purported concern for the best interests of the individual, but, by
hypothesis, no social interest harmed by the conduct. Even without
the special value of religious freedom, it is doubtful that our demo-
cratic traditions could tolerate pervasive criminal prohibitions against
the behavior of legally competent adults, on the sole basis of the
paternalism rationale.
Perhaps stronger justification for the prohibition of acts which
entail at least a fairly high risk of self-destruction is the economic
(and possibly the psychic) impact on dependents'0 8 and close rela-
tions.10 9 Since economic harm to dependents follows only some cases
of death, and is of a lesser magnitude than the evil of violence and
sexual imposition, a considerably greater risk of suicide should be
required than the risk of the latter consequences to justify restriction
of religious liberty; and if such a risk exists only from certain abusive
practices, perhaps the prohibition should only be applied to those
abuses and to those religious users having dependents, under the doc-
108 Glanville Williams observes that Seneca, who did not disapprove of
suicide, nevertheless admitted a duty to live for others, such as one's parents
or wife. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANcTrrz OF LIE= AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 253
(1957). It is interesting to note that (a) while under Roman law attempted
suicide was not generally forbidden, attempted suicide by a soldier was con-
sidered desertion from his post, id. at 254, and (b) the first Christian enact-
ment dealing with suicide was directed against the suicide of servants. Id. at
257. Cf. J. MImL, supra note 101, at 99, suggesting that while failure to per-
form specific and assignable obligations is punishable, conduct that might
lead to such failure is not. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
109 See the opinion of Judge J. Skelly Wright, in Application of Directors
of Georgetown, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), holding that a religious objec-
tion to receiving a blood transfusion could not prevail where the patient was
the mother of an infant. Aside from regulating the sui generis relationship
between parent and child, would a state be justified in prohibiting suicide in
order to prevent the "emotional damage" to close friends and relatives of the
deceased? See G. WILLiAMs, supra note 108, at 270-71. Would a legislature
be acting within acceptable limitations were it to forbid abandonment by
parent or spouse where economic obligations were met?
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trine of the least restrictive alternative. 10 Other arguments for leg-
islating against conduct entailing a risk of death will be discussed
below, since they also pertain to other alleged evils of psychedel-
ics.111
Much of the above discussion also applies to the asserted state
interest in preventing psychosis; the state's interest in the individual's
psychic welfare as such should not sustain infringement of religious
liberty. Its interest in protecting dependents from hardship, and the
public treasury from the costs of welfare and commitment could jus-
tify prohibition or regulation only if (1) the probability of psychosis
and/or the estimated numerical strength of the religion were so
high as to indicate a compelling financial burden;112 and (2) such less
restrictive alternatives as limiting the quantity or frequency of use,
screening potential users for actual or incipient mental illness, or
restricting the prohibition to users with dependents, would impose a
compelling financial burden on the government.
The assertion that a practice creates a risk of "psychosis" or men-
tal or physical "debilitation" should not be judicially accepted with-
out inquiry into the state's definition of those terms. Medical ter-
minology is the language of sickness. What to a religious mystic are
beatific visions, transcendence of worldly consciousness, and spiritual
illumination and enlightenment, may carry such medical labels as
stupor, intoxication, hallucination and delusion." 3 Similar linguistic
pitfalls inhere in suggestions of detrimental physical effects:
Suppose we were to ask what are the effects of playing tennis
on the individual? In response, we would have to describe a height-
ened pulse rate, facial flushing, sweating, marked adrenal activity
and so forth. In some cases, we would observe loss of breath fol-
lowed by feelings of dizziness and nausea, in some instances, death
has even resulted. We could well conclude with a fairly frightening
sounding clinical picture for a reader who has never experienced a
game of tennis. The description would not be untrue, but out of con-
text it would have a far different effect on our reader than it sug-
gests to the tennis player.114
110 Of course if emotional impact is considered a cognizable state interest,
this less-restrictive alternative would not be satisfactory.
111 Indeed the suicide argument has very weak empirical support even
where the most powerful psychedelics are concerned. See note 191 infra.
112 The quantification problem is discussed at text accompanying notes
163-80 infra.
"5s A perfect example is the opinion in State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148
S.E.2d 565 (1966) (see Brief, supra at 680 n.42), quoted in Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851, 862 (5th Cir. 1967): "[I]t is not a violation of his con-
stitutional rights to forbid him, in the guise of his religion, to possess a drug
which will produce hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in
cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia ...." 267 N.C. at 605,
148 S.E.2d at 669.
114 SKOLNICK, Coercion to Virtue: A Sociological Discussion of the
Enforcement of Morals in PssmSDENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMiNsTRATION OF JUsTIcE, 10 SELECTED CONSULTANT'S PAPER II (1967).
Unusual mental and physical phenomena, even if temporarily and
partially incapacitating, (e.g., those produced by the more potent psy-
chedelics) hardly justify infringement of fifth amendment liberty,
let alone religious freedom 15 (particularly in view of comparable
risks from permissible substances or activities). Moreover, we have
been sufficiently educated by Thomas Szasz" 6 and others to be at
least wary of the possibility that medical "experts" will find strongly
corroborative of psychosis, any pattern of behavior, perceptions, or
beliefs which manifest extreme or outrageous unconventionality, but
which are not, in a nonsocial sense, intrinsically malevolent to the
psychic welfare, or symptomatic of such detriment. Under some
views of psychosis the man who has recently experienced the classic
mystical enlightenment and confrontation, who has been profoundly
moved by his voyage, whether or not drug induced, may well be a
most likely candidate for psychiatric commitment. Throughout his-
tory the religious mystic has been treated as a madman. If the first
amendment is not to be undermined, courts must, in reviewing
claims that drug ingestion leads to mental illness, demand a defini-
tion of psychosis which minimizes the possibility of weighing the re-
ligious experience as a negative consequence of religious freedom.
How substantial is society's interest in preventing long range
deterioration, debilitation, sloth, indolence, withdrawal, and psycho-
logical dependency, which are alleged to result from constant and
large dosages of marihuana and other psychedelics? Society's interest
in protecting dependents and in avoiding the cost of providing medi-
cal, psychiatric or social care is important, but is only as relevant as
the risk that the user will be unable to sustain himself or his de-
pendents." 7 If prolonged use has the effect of providing some in-
115 Such temporary disablement would at most justify restriction of drug
ingestion to circumstances which minimized the possibility of harm (e.g.,
presence of guide, arrangements for fulfilling needs of dependents, prohibi-
tion of driving).
116 See generally T. SZAsz, LAW, LiBFRTY AND PsYcHIATIY (1963); T.
SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
"7 In a case challenging restrictions on the distribution of alcohol but not
involving first amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court considered the
argument that "as the liquors are used as a beverage, and the injury follow-
ing them, if taken in excess, is voluntarily inflicted and is confined to the
party offending, their sale should be without restrictions, the contention
being that what a man shall drink, equally with what he shall eat, is not
properly matter for legislation." Rejecting this argument, in Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890), the Court responded: "There is in this posi-
tion an assumption of fact which does not exist, that when the liquors are
taken in excess, the injuries are confined to the party offending. The injury,
it is true, first falls on him .... But, as it leads to neglect of business and
waste of property and general demoralization, it affects those who are im-
mediately connected with and dependent upon him." Id. at 89-91; As noted
in the Brief, supra at 685, national prohibition legislation did grant a religious
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dividuals with a motive to abandon their obligations, but does not
significantly reduce their capacity to respond to the threat of penal
sanctions, then the deterrent suggested by Mill-punishment for non-
performance of specific and assignable obligations-would seem an
appropriate less-restrictive alternative to prohibition.,"8 If indeed
the use of a particular drug under certain conditions (e.g., frequency,
quantity) or by ascertainably vulnerable users, creates a serious risk
of physiological or psychological addiction and of rendering the user
so weak and dependent that he cannot meet his specific obligations
or must be taken care of by society,1" 9 then society would be justi-
fied in prohibiting the use of that drug under those conditions or
by such users.
20
The possibility that the user may exchange higher income-pro-
ducing activities for lower ones is obviously not sufficient to evoke
the "dependents-welfare costs" rationale. But does the state have an
interest, enforceable by criminal sanctions, in inducing its citizens
to lead an economically productive, competitive, service-oriented, con-
cerned, active social existence? Is the state justified in demanding,
exemption for sacramental use of wine. But cf. Shapiro v. Lyle, 30 F.2d 971
(D.D.C. 1929) (upholding quantitative restrictions on such religious use of
wine).
118 See J. MILL, supra note 101, at 99.
119 See Wyzanski, supra note 98, at 16: "Undoubtedly for those who use
marijuana so frequently and so excessively as to become social derelicts, soci-
ety pays a large cost. In the first place, these unfortunates use either private
or public resources for their medical and social care. In the second place, and
of great consequence, our relatively limited medical, hospital and welfare per-
sonnel and facilities used for those victims of marijuana are unavailable for
others whose illness or poverty is more deserving of our compassion." See
also Devlin, supra note 102, at 218, 227. The notion that two distinct costs
are involved reflects unsound economics. The cost is the difference between
what society now spends on medical and social welfare and what it must
spend if a new class of welfare recipients comes into being.
Judge Wyzanski, supra at 16, goes on to observe that "there is no such
thing as a vice which is purely private in its total aspect. He who overin-
dulges in any way with respect to drugs, with respect to food, with respect
to liquor, with respect to sensuality, alters the lives of others than himself
and his private associates. He is unavailable for civic obligation which rests
upon him. He bears a responsibility for the unavailability of social and med-
ical services gravely needed by others."
The fact is, of course, that we do not prohibit indulgence in many activi-
ties which if done excessively would impair one's capacities to meet his obli-
gations, including his duty to sustain himself. Indeed Judge Wyzanski con-
cludes that these dangers (presumed) from excessive use of marihuana do
not justify the social and economic costs of prohibition (let alone the con-
stitutional cost of infringing religious freedom). Id. He observes that "[i]n
the end, liberty tends to be sacrificed for the supposedly greater advantage
of health, safety and morals. To some, including myself, the sacrifice is incon-
sistent with our ultimate political beliefs." Id.
120 Perhaps even "excessive" use could be permitted even where there is
sufficient risk of disability, if a religious society accepted the full financial
responsibility of caring for its members.
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on pain of punishment, that its citizens eschew a life of quietism,
'Withdrawal, passivity, meditation, reflection, subsistence income,
and social and political disengagement? Amil's contention that soci-
ety has no business interfering with the exercise of liberty except to
prevent harm to others provides no ready answer, for "harm" might
be said to include economic detriment, and in an economically inter-
dependent society one man's diminution of productivity arguably af-
fects every man's lot.121 But the assumption that the average citizen
contributes more to society than he takes from it is probably in-
correct.. 22 If so, then as Hume said, "A man who retires from life
does no harm to society: he only ceases to do good; which, if it is
an injury, is of the lowest kind."' 23  In any event our system has
generally relied on economic and social motivation to allocate human
"resources" to their most productive employment, and has respected
the right of individuals to choose for any motives whatsoever liveli-
121 Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942), upholding the imposition
of a financial penalty on a farmer's growth of produce for his own consump-
tion as within the commerce power because such consumption reduced his
demand for wheat and affected the market price. "That appellee's own con-
tribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contri-
bution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial." Id. at 127-28.
Mill recognized the economic interdependence argument: "How it may
be asked can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of
indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being;
it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful
to himself without mischief reaching at least to his near connections and often
far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who
directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a
greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he de-
teriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all
who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies
himself from rendering services which he owes to his fellow creatures gen-
erally." J. MiLL, supra note 101, at 97. Mill's answer was that punishment
should be limited to violations of a "distinct and assignable obligation to any
other person or persons." Id. at 99. "[B]ut with regard to the merely con-
tingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to
society by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor
occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself, the
inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the
greater good of human freedom." Id. at 100.
122 "Of how many of us is it true that the world or any part of it would
be the loser were we to end our citizenship of it? In my opinion, of very
few. Anyway, it seems to me a problem for each person to decide for him-
self, if any problem is to be left to individual solution." RoBEaTs, EuTHANAsA
AND OTHER ASPECTS oF LIFE AND DEATH 31-32 (1936). It is a macroeconomic
truism that income received by capital and labor equals the output of goods
and services. Unless labor as a class is receiving less than its contribution
to output, the average worker is receiving no more or less than his produc-
tivity.
123 D. HUME, On Suicide, in OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE AND OTHER ESSAYS
158 (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1965).
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hoods which are less than optimally productive.124 It has not made
criminal the living of a contemplative life. It can hardly claim a
compelling interest in prohibiting religious activities which lead to or
manifest this life, simply because of the diffuse and remote impact of
low economic productivity.
1 25
124 We do not ignore the fact that it has come to be accepted that govern-
ment has a legitimate role in influencing the vocational and professional am-
bitions of its citizens through fellowships, scholarships, loans, industrial sub-
sidies, manpower retraining programs, job corps, etc., as well as through the
enormous sums spent on "normal" government contracts for defense and
space activities. The issue assumes significantly more ominous dimensions
when it begins to look as if the government has gone beyond inducement by
the carrot to coercion by the stick-as where the government denies draft
exemptions to those whose vocation or profession are not deemed to be essen-
tial to the national interest. See excerpts from Selective Service Document,
Channeling (July 1965), in RAmPARTS, Dec. 1967, at 34-35: "The meaning of
the word 'service' with its former restricted application to the armed forces,
is certain to become widened much more in the future. This brings with it
the ever increasing problem of how to control effectively the service of in-
dividuals who are not in the armed forces."
The club of induction has been used to drive out of areas considered to
be less important to the areas of greater importance in which deferments
were given, the individuals who did not or could not participate in activities
which were considered essential to the defense of the Nation. The Selective
Service System anticipates further evolution ... in this area.
"Throughout his career as a student, the pressure-the threat of loss of
deferment-continues. It continues with equal intensity after graduation.
His local board requires periodic reports to find out what he's up to. He is
impelled to pursue his skill rather than embark on some less important enter-
prise and is encouraged to apply his skill in an essential activity in the na-
tional interest. The loss of deferred status is the consequence for the individ-
ual who has acquired the skill and either does not use it or uses it in a non-
essential activity."
Although this document has been withdrawn, recent recommendations of
the National Security Council along similar lines have provoked intense con-
troversy within and without the halls of Congress. For a report of a major
constitutional challenge to the requirement that conscientious objectors en-
gage in alternative civilian "service" as directed by their Selective Service
Boards, see letter from Professor Richard Flacks, in NEw YoRK REviEW OF
BooKs, Dec. 21, 1967, at 42. Certainly, traditional notions of a free society
would be profoundly affronted by a law deeming it criminal for a person to
devote the ordinary working hours to endeavors less productive than his
capabilities (the vagueness problem aside) or to endeavors other than those
specifically prescribed for him by a governmental authority.
125 "The concern is that the anti-materialism and introspection of the
Eastern mystic, if practiced on a large enough scale, would pose a threat to
our status as the industrial and military colossus of the modern-day world.
... [Suppose] that a Buddhist movement were to become extremely success-
ful in the United States. Suppose it resulted in many of the nation's brightest
youths eschewing responsible positions, taking up instead menial jobs that
provided them with mere subsistence and devoting the bulk of their mental
energies to contemplative and spiritual activities. Would the fact that this
trend threatened our social, military and economic institutions justify an
abridgement of the religious freedom of the Buddhists or of the free speech
It might be argued that banning the use of psychedelics does not
interfere with one's right to choose a way of life because these drugs
"diminish freedom of choice" and almost invariably "twist the mind"
in certain directions. But if the user knows the direction in advance
of consuming the drug (a condition which could be legislated), is not
society simply prohibiting him from choosing to travel in that direc-
tion? In rebuttal to this answer, one might employ Mill's justifica-
tion for holding invalid an agreement to sell one's self as a slave:
The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of
his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this ex-
treme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of
others, with a person's voluntary acts is consideration for his liberty.
His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable,
or at least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it.
But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes
any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in
his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing
him to dispose of himself. . .. The principle of freedom cannot
require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to
be allowed to alienate his freedom. 126
One difficulty with applying this argument is that it may be impos-
sible to make a meaningful determination whether one who chooses
a quietistic life following use of psychedelics has lost his freedom.
We could not consider as evidence, without begging the question, the
fact that the user has renounced his earlier way of life. How could
we tell whether the drug (1) enhanced his freedom by increasing
his knowledge, illuminating his values and expanding his options for
meaningful choice (an explanation which might be given for mass
conversions to pacifism subsequent to viewing a powerful antiwar
film); or (2) diminished his capacity to resist the lure of intoxi-
cating and seductive illusions? Moreover, the slavery example is
significantly qualified by Mill's staunch defense of contractual free-
dom, and must be viewed against the background of his strong dis-
approval of paternalism. In using a drug, like making a contract, one
may be giving up freedom along certain lines for a temporary period,
in order to enjoy certain benefits-e.g., religious experience. An argu-
ment that a drug twists the mind should be considered as weighing
against psychedelic religious freedom only where there is satisfactory
proof that it leads to "mental illness," defined to minimize the pos-
sibility of treating unorthodox social, aesthetic or religious value
of those who advocated that more adopt that faith? It cannot be reasonably
argued that it would .... ." Laughlin, LSD-25 and Other Hallucinogens: A
Pre-Re form Proposal, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 23, 39-40 (1967). At some point,
however, given the less pacifistic outlook of other nations, would not our
government be justified on grounds of national preservation, in taking steps
to prevent our emergence as a nation of pacifists?
126 J. M LL, supra note 101, at 125-26.
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judgments as independent and substantial evidence of mental disease.
Professor Giannella argues that the denial of religious exemp-
tions for the use of drugs is justified by the state's power to regulate
public morals, 2 7 and by "the state's interest in maintaining normality
in personal behavior which is akin to its interest in maintaining pub-
lic morality."'128 The "normality" rationale is an example of a danger
127 Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Devel-
opment Part L The Religious Guarantee, 80 HAav. L. REv. 1381, 1426-27 (1967).
He distinguishes State v. Bullard, 269 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (see
Brief, supra at 680) from Woody on two grounds: (a) "Whereas North Caro-
lina seemed to intimate that the use of peyote was intrinsically immoral,
California treated it strictly as conduct subject to criminal sanction in order
to protect the public health;" Giannella, supra at 1407, and (b) "the result in
Woody can be justified if one regards only the regular use of peyote as a
corrupting practice . . . ." Id. at 1408. As Giannella reads these opinions,
the California court could have been impressed with the fact that within the
Native American Church "[o]nly a prescribed amount of peyote is used once
a week as part of a fairly well-defined ritual, with the purpose of achieving
a communal experience of union with God," and "could have concluded that
such limited sacramental use was quite distinct from a religiously inspired
use which advocates reliance on peyote as a way of life." Id. On the other
hand, "the North Carolina court probably would have concluded [even if it
is believed Bullard were sincere] that he had made the use of peyote a dom-
inant way of life rather than a way to experience God in a highly restricted
ritual." Id. at 1409.
The difficulty with the argument that the California Supreme Court did
not recognize the peyote prohibition as embracing considerations of morality
as well as health, is that the Woody court considered and rejected as paternal-
istic the state's argument that the use of peyote obstructed the Indians' moral
progress toward acculturization. Giannella answers that Devlin's view (that
society may enforce morals as such) was not tested and rejected in Woody
because "[a]n indirect attempt by the state to eliminate a lawful, albeit back-
ward tribal ethos is not to be equated with its direct coercive protection of
the dominant moral climate of a society." Id. at 1407. This concedes that the
California statute was indeed "morals legislation" (in Professor Fuller's sense
of "morality of aspiration" see FULLER, THE Moamry Or LAW (1964)), but
what basis is there for the assumption that it was directed primarily at the
Native American Church? Since the court granted the religious exemption,
yet did not suggest it was prepared to invalidate the statute under the due
process clause, it most probably rejected Devlin's view, as put by Giannella,
that "to warrant criminal sanctions the morality must be so important that it
cannot allow of a religious exemption." Id. at 1406.
Giannella's second explanation of Woody as being consistent with the
state's power to regulate morals-i.e. that the Native American Church re-
stricted its use of peyote-ignores the California Supreme Court's decision in
In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), granting
an exemption to a self-styled peyote preacher (if his alleged religious beliefs
could be shown to be sincere) where no showing was made or required to
the effect that the claimant restricted his use of peyote. The manner of
religious use may be relevant to an issue of "standing" to assert a less-
restrictive alternative. See text accompanying notes 199-214 infra.
128 Giannelia, supra note 127, at 1427. "To the extent that such practices
are forbidden by the criminal law, because contrary to public morality, no
problem arises so long as the courts continue to deny all exemptions from
criminal statutes of this kind." Id. at 1426-27.
emphasized above, for Giannella's justification for punishing the use
of psychedelics as abnormal behavior is that
such pursuits do more than seek limited exemption from regulations
that have been designed to serve psychological or "mental health"
purposes, if you will. They quarrel with those very ends. They
tend to be as subversive of the existing secular order as conduct
made criminal because it is offensive to public morality.129
He does not say why it is part of the "mental health" function of
the law to prohibit abnormal conduct, or in what way such conduct
(which is not defined to require physical, economic or psychic harm to
the actor or others) subverts the existing secular order.
The problem can best be viewed as an aspect of the question,
To what extent may a state enforce through the criminal laws, moral-
ity as such?130 Lord Devlin's thesis is that (1) a common morality
is necessary to the preservation of society; 131 (2) immoral conduct
can loosen the invisible bonds that hold society together and even-
tually lead to its "disintegration"; 3 2 (3) just as society protects its
essential political structure by punishing treasonable conduct, so
may it protect itself by punishing some immoral conduct, even
though such behavior causes no demonstrable secular injury;133 and
(4) in determining what immoral behavior may be punished, a legis-
lature should ask itself whether the vast majority, (or whether 12
"right-minded" men drawn at random, would unanimously) view the
behavior with intolerance, indignation, and disgust-whether it is a
vice regarded as so "abominable" that its "mere presence is an of-
fense."' 34 Professor Hart and his supporters respond: It does not
necessarily follow that the failure to prohibit any conduct generally
regarded with disgust, indignation and intolerance, will lead to dis-
integration of society, to a breakdown of those universal moral stand-
ards truly necessary for existence of society.135 The treason analogy
ignores the fact that a change of morals, like a change in the gov-
ernment, may be a sign of social health and progress. The prohibi-
tion of conduct irrationally regarded as immoral, tends to freeze
129 Id. at 1427.
130 See generally P. DEvLix, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MOIRALs (1965); H. HART,
LAw, LIBERTY AND MORA ITY (1963) (both works incorporating and expanding
on the authors' earlier writings); Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174 (a major defense of Lord Devlin's thesis); Dworkin, Lord
Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Wollheim,
Crime, Sin and Justice Devlin, ENCOUNTER, Nov. 1959, at 34-40; Comment,
Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in
the Enforcement of Morals, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 581 (1967) (the last three cited
works are critical of Devlin).
131 DEvLiN, supra note 130, at 24.
132 Id. at 13.
133 Id. at 14.
134 Id. at 15, 17.
135 See generally H. HART, supra note 130.
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existing morality and inhibit desirable social change. A moral prin-
ciple, more widely and deeply held than any particular intensely felt
preference, is that restrictions of freedom may not be justified by
mere prejudice, rationalization and personal aversion. In determin-
ing whether to enforce a particular morality, a legislature should ask
whether the practice is itself harmful or whether, if not prohibited,
it will have harmful repercussions on that part of the common moral
code actually essential to hold society together.
It is submitted that for courts to adopt the view, in free exer-
cise cases, that the legislature may deny religious exemptions for any
conduct widely regarded as immoral and abominable, on the a priori
assumption that failure to do so will destroy society, would negate a
principle purpose of the Bill of Rights-to protect the dignity and
individuality of the man in the- minority from invasion by majority
authoritarianism. To ban the religious use of psychedelics simply
because such use is deeply offensive would deny any validity to Justice
Brandeis' view, repeated by numerous Justices, of the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution:
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feel-
ings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroach-
ment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 3 6
It cannot be denied that the Court has, in its polygamy decisions,
affirmed infringements of religious freedom, on the ground that the
conduct violated prevailing morality;137 and the inclusion of morals
or morality in descriptions of the object of the "police power" (along
with order, health, safety and welfare) is frequent.138 Nevertheless
there are heavy strands in our constitutional history that would sup-
port judicial reexamination of purported governmental power to
regulate morals. As Professor Henkin has suggested, to the phil-
osophical arguments of Mill and Hart
136 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (Brandeis, J. dissent-
ing) (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 88 Sup. Ct. 507 (1967).
137 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Professor
H. L. A. Hart suggests that prohibition of bigamy can be justified on a public
nuisance theory, i.e. "as an attempt to protect religious feelings from offence
by a public act desecrating the ceremony." H. HART, supra note 130, at 41.
Other nonmoral grounds have been given, based on the functions of the .insti-
tution of the family within our society and the threat to these functions pre-
sented by bigamy and polygamy.
138 See the review of such pronouncements in Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLum. L. REV. 391, 402-04 (1963).
we have added the special concerns of the American Constitution: that
government should be limited; that the limitations should be subject
and susceptible to judicial scrutiny and enforcement; that legisla-
tures shall therefore be limited, to the rational and the reasonable
[the foregoing based on the due process clause]; that in addition-for
reasons particular to our society [the establishment clause]-legisla-
tures are debarred from enacting those nonrationalities of the major-
ity which reflect its religions.13 9
The obscenity decisions do not detract as seriously as Professor Hen-
kin suggests, 140 from a principle that immorality per se is not an
adequate basis for restriction of a first amendment freedom. The
obscenity doctrine does not permit legislatures to ban any speech it
deems immoral.14 1 It requires that the material arouse a prurient
interest, an impact presumed (but not proven) to provoke illegal
sexual behavior.1 42 It also requires that the material have no re-
deeming social value,143 a criterion which severely limits (although
certainly not to the satisfaction of Mill's followers) the state's power
to enforce morals. In view of the constitutionally protected status of
bona fide religious pursuits, and the proven link between psychedelics
and the religious experience, a court could not deny redeeming social
value without denying a principal rationale of the free exercise clause
itself.14 4
Moreover, that reading of Devlin which would allow prohibition
of conduct widely thought to be disgusting and intolerable on the
basis of an unsupported presumption that such conduct would lead
to "disintegration" of society, cannot well survive the Court's reading
139 Id. at 413-14.
140 Id. at 412.
141 See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York,
360 U.S. 684 (1959). Whatever the outcome of pending cases before the Su-
preme Court involving challenges to legislation against the burning of un-
expired draft cards, defended on grounds of national security, it is highly
doubtful that courts would uphold, under a "public morals" power, legislation
forbidding individuals to burn their expired draft cards.
142 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Of course some sexual
behavior presently deemed illegal could not be punished were "immorality"
a constitutionally inadequate basis of penal legislation. We are here suggest-
ing only that immorality cannot justify prohibition of first amendment free-
doms. Perhaps heavy penalties for conduct beyond first amendment protec-
tion forbidden only because regarded as immoral (or which produces rela-
tively trivial "evils") warrants application of the eighth amendment's prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment.
143 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
144 The Supreme Court has said that obscenity is not speech, within the
meaning and protection of the first amendment. Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 483 (1957). But such question-begging cannot solve cases; the Court
has had to define obscenity and requires as a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition that the material have no redeeming social value. Id. at 484. While
the Court may be able to differentiate various utterances or publications by
that standard, it could not intelligently hold that all religious beliefs and
practices in which drugs play a significant role, have no redeeming social
value.
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of the Constitution per Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette, where the
state sought to justify a compulsory flag salute as a means of en-
forcing a concensus of political (not merely moral) ideals. The Court
observed that the asserted freedom did not interfere with or deny the
rights of any other individual; 45 that compelled uniformity leads to
deep divisions and bitter strife; 40 that it had no reason to "fear that
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary
will disintegrate the social organization"; 47 that eccentricity and ab-
normal attitudes provide rich cultural diversities, and that "[w]hen
they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with
here, the price is not too great."' 48
Finally, it is noteworthy that the language in Sherbert, relied on
by the Fifth Court in Leary, distinguishing earlier decisions, spoke of
acts which posed "some substantial threat to public safety, peace or or-
der," omitting any reference to morals. If the Sherbert Court meant
what it went on to say, regarding the requirement that the regulation
serve a compelling interest, which could not be served by alternative
legislation, it is difficult to believe that the Court will find such a
justification in deeply felt, widespread irrational disgust and in-
tolerance toward a practice (if indeed there were a consensus of
such feelings about the use of psychedelics), without demanding
proof by the state of probable harmful consequences to secular inter-




In assessing the state's interest in prohibiting an activity (or
denying a religious exemption), courts should not accept as justifica-
tion proof of the mere possibility that the activity will produce a
compelling evil. For the state interest in prohibiting an activity
145 319 U.S. at 630.
146 Id. at 641.
'47 Id.
148 Id. at 642. Of course the facts of Barnette can be distinguished from
prohibition of psychedelics on the ground that in the former, the state de-
manded an act affirming a belief. But in prohibiting psychedelics society is
imposing its belief that a practice is immoral on some who believe it has
positive religious significances; indeed in Barnette the dissenters to the flag
salute prevailed without judicial inquiry into their religious convictions. See
Devlin, Mill on Liberty in Morals, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 215 (1965).
149 A state should prevail where revulsion against a practice is so intense
and widespread that permitting it would undermine the bases of the moral
code necessary to security of person and property. The dynamics of such a
process would involve the willingness of people to take the law into their
own hands against those receiving exemptions, or to disregard other legal
strictures because of anger, disrespect for law, or a belief that if something
so evil is permissible, anything goes.
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threatening such an evil is, all other things equal, directly propor-
tional to the risk that the evil will materialize. In terms of lan-
guage in the principal opinions, the greater the probability that
activity X will lead to harmful consequence Y, the more "substantial"
the "relation" between X and Y, the "graver" is X's "abuse" and the
more "compelling" the state's interest in suppressing X.
Moreover, since purported resultant evils are of different magni-
tudes, the less serious the cognizable evil, the higher the risk which
should be necessary to overcome the religious claim. For example,
whereas a risk that one in 500 ingestions will produce violent crime
might justify prohibition, a risk of one in 100 that the user will fail
to support his dependents might not.
The key concept is "dangerousness"-the risk times the magni-
tude of harm. Courts would be well-advised, in considering whether
an activity (or the grant of a religious exemption) significantly
jeopardizes an important legislative objective, to follow Chief Judge
Learned Hand's test (under the free speech provision), adopted by
the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States:150 "In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger."'u5
Comparative Dangers of Nonprohibited Activities
In support of the argument that the government had no com-
pelling interest in prohibiting the use of marihuana, the Brief' 52
pointed to evidence that alcohol was at least as harmful (i.e., en-
tailed no less risk of similar or graver consequences). Is this kind of
proof relevant? Professor Giannella contends that where a religious
exemption from a prohibited or required practice (e.g., vaccination)
would involve "even the smallest risks" to "public health," courts
might be justified in disregarding the fact that other practices, not
legislatively forbidden (e.g., use of swimming pools), involve "much
greater" risks of similar or greater harms. 153  His reasons are
that (1) exemptions "from public health requirements should per-
haps be expressed by the legislature, which is directly responsi-
ble to the electorate"; 5 4 and (2) "the evil involved may be such
that should disaster strike, the courts would incur intense bitter-
ness."' 55 This argument would surrender religious freedom to labels.
150 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
151 Id. at 510, quoting from United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d
Cir. 1950).
152 See Brief, supra at 684-85.




March 1968] PSYCHEDELICS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 735
The mere possibility that the practice may adversely affect some as-
pect of "public health" or "public safety" does not magically render
the state's interest "compelling," or important, or "paramount";156 nor
does it render irrelevant comparable risks from nonprohibited ac-
tivities. Suppose, for example, a legislature finds that the daily risk
of fire breaking out in the average home is two in 10,000 (.0002), but
that in homes where candles are burned the risk is three in 10,000
(.0003). If the legislature should prohibit the use of candles, surely
an automatic denial of an exemption for religious ceremonies could
be justified neither by the rubric "public safety," nor by the "small-
est risk" that disaster would strike and "the courts would incur in-
tense bitterness."
If we liberally translate "smallest risk" into "significant risk,"
Giannella is arguing that courts should not impose such a risk on
society, notwithstanding the fact that some unprohibited activities in-
volve higher risk of harm. But in determining whether a risk is
"significant" (or an interest "compelling," and so forth), courts can-
not operate in a vacuum. In the realm of constitutional balancing
there is no bureau of weights and measures. No needle or dial reads
off a ready answer. Does a .0003 risk of fire in a house where candles
are burned present a "compelling" interest in prohibiting candles?
Perhaps not, if society is quite willing to live with a .0004 probability
of fire from electric blankets.157 Of course, the fact that a non-
prohibited activity is more dangerous than the forbidden one is not
a fortiori proof that the state's interest in banning the latter is not
compelling. Gas stoves might be more dangerous than candles, but
the social disutility of forbidding the former could be enormous. The
stronger the reason for not prohibiting a dangerous activity, the
weaker the claim that a religious exemption must be granted for an
activity equally as dangerous. For example, were the use of a certain
drug, involving a 20 percent risk of death, permitted where and only
where a physician deems it medically necessary (where in his opinion
it could reduce a higher risk of death from other causes), this would
be no basis for concluding that denial of an exemption for religious
use of this drug is not justified.158
156 Striking down a provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, tit. I, § 5, 64 Stat. 992, prohibiting members of a "Communist-action
organization," which is under a final registration order, from working in de-
fense plants, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, warned of the
tyranny of the labels "national defense" and "war power." "[Tihe phrase
'War Power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any
exercise of Congressional power which can be brought within its ambit....
[T]his concept of 'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in itself justify-
ing any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal." United
States v. Robel, 88 Sup. Ct. 419, 423 (1967).
157 Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
158 If a medical exemption is very broad, permitting wide risks to be
Nevertheless, orthodox equal protection doctrine will not suffice.
Under such analysis, a legislature could constitutionally prohibit the
use of candles while permitting the use of electric blankets, since it
could rationally differentiate on the basis that candles served prin-
cipally decorative functions while electric blankets maintained one's
physical comfort. But that is not an adequate reason for denying a
religious exemption from the ban on candles. Religious freedom is a
preferred value; legislators are constitutionally obliged to accord it
considerable magnitude in their social utility calculus. Is it not obvi-
ously a constitutional anomaly for legislators to ignore the wholly
frivolous use of the dangerous drug alcohol, while punishing with
heavy penalties those who use a no more dangerous drug in pursuit
of God?159 A court should not be deterred from protecting constitu-
tional rights by fear of community bitterness, particularly if such
bitterness is irrational, prejudiced or manifestly ignorant of constitu-
tional principles. 160
It has been argued by Dr. Donald Louria, President of the New
York State Council on Drug Addiction, that the appropriate question
a legislature must ask, in considering whether to repeal marihuana
prohibitions, is not whether marihuana is more or less harmful than
alcohol, which society tolerates, but whether society should tolerate
the cumulative evils which would flow from unrestricted use of
both alcohol and marihuana. 161 This point will best be analyzed be-
low,1 2 following discussion of other material issues.
Number of Adherents
We have argued in behalf of Dr. Leary (in a portion of the
Brief not included above), that "in light of the exemption from re-
strictive legislation granted by the federal government to religious
users of peyote163 and appellee's inability to establish that mari-
huana is more harmful than peyote, the denial of a religious exemp-
tion from the marihuana legislation would be an invidious religious
taken in noncritical situations, a state would be 'hard pressed to justify denial
of a religious exemption. Cf. Blum, Drugs, Dangerous- Behavior, and Social
Policy, in.PRESimENT's COM'N ON LAW. ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION. OF
JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AN DRUG .ABuSE 64 (1967).
159 Cf. note 119 supra.
160 Cf. Dworkin, supra note 130.
161 Louria, Cool Talk About Hot Drugs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1967, § 6
(Magazine), at 44, col. 1.
162 See text following note 215 infra.
163 Under regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration,
the sale and distribution of peyote intended for use in religious practices by
the Native American Church are exempted from statutory prohibitions. 21
C.F.R. § 166.3 (1967). See also Hearings Before Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.; 1st Sess. at 370
(1965).
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discrimination in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.
1 64
The Fifth Circuit responded that "[t]he exemption accorded the use
of peyote in the limited bona fide religious ceremonies of the rela-
tively small, unknown Native American Church is clearly distinguish-
able from the private and personal use of marihuana by any person
who claims he is using it as a religious practice."' 6 5 Dealing directly
with the first amendment contention, the court found it "difficult
to imagine the harm which would result if the criminal statutes
against marihuana were nullified as to those who claim the right to
possess and traffic in this drug for religious purposes."'
66
If we assume that the number of religious exemptions which
would follow from the grant of a free exercise claim is relevant to a
determination of harmfulness, the court was wholly unjustified in
equating the mere assertion of a religious claim with its successful
assertion. 167 As argued in the Brief,168 it would be a rare case in
which a jury could be defrauded into accepting a specious claim.
Those who acquire and declare or otherwise manifest their purported
religious beliefs subsequent to arrest or to their use of marihuana,
would have correspondingly serious difficulties in persuading a jury of
their sincerity,169 whichever party bears the burden of proof on that
issue. 70 An additional deterrent to fraudulent claims for religious
164 See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (invalidating convic-
tion of Jehovah's Witness for holding a public meeting where other religious
groups were permitted to hold more orthodox religious ceremonies); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (the Court found it significant that South
Carolina protected the right of employees to refuse to work on Sundays while
denying unemployment compensation to those religious convictions precluded
Saturday employment). See also -United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409,
415 (2d Cir. 1963), holding the congressional draft exemption a violation of
the first amendment because it discriminated among religions. On review
the Supreme Court avoided this constitutional doctrine by construing the
statute to include all religions. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944): "The First Amendment does
not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment.
It puts them all in that position." Id. at 87.
165 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 n.11 (5th Cir. 1967).
166 Id. at 861.
167 The total number of claims, fraudulent and bona fide (as opposed to
the number of successful claims), may be relevant to a determination of the
cost of administering a system of religious exemptions, if this is a permissible
consideration. But cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
168 See Brief, supra at 698.
169 Belatedness of "religious conversion" is a factor casting doubt on
sincerity of conscientious objector claims. United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d
808 (2d Cir. 1960). "Sudden accessions of belief may be utterly sincere, as
the memorable one on the . . . Damascus road, but they seldom synchronize
so perfectly ... with external facts making them convenient .... " Id. at
812.
170 It is by no means clear who should bear the burden of proof on the
sincerity issue. The California Supreme Court, in In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887,
exemptions from criminal statutes is the probability that convictions
following unsuccessful religious defenses will draw heavier penalties
than convictions based on pleas of guilty.
Whether a court is estimating the total number of claims, fraudu-
lent and genuine (arguably relevant to assessing the cost of adminis-
tering an exemption system), i7i or the number of successful claims
(relevant to assessing the total impact of exemptions on statutory
objectives), the Supreme Court has indicated that the government
cannot rest on mere speculation. There must be support for these
claims in the record.1 72 There was nothing in the Leary record to
suggest either that the probable cost of administering a religious
exemption system would produce a compelling governmental interest,
or that the probable number of successful claimants for religious
exemptions create such an interest or would be as high as, let alone
significantly greater than, the number of adherents to the Native
American Church.
The discussion in the Brief, in the quoted language of the Fifth
Circuit's opinion, and in the preceding paragraphs, assume that the
number of individuals entitled to religious exemptions is relevant to
a determination of society's interest in denying the religious claim.
But it is by no means obvious that the numerical strength of a
particular religion or religious belief should be the basis of a deter-
mination of the constitutional rights of its adherents. Arguably, it is
in some sense improper to deny to those whose religious beliefs are
shared by many, exemptions which would be granted to members of
small, isolated sects, 1 73 or to "revoke" an exemption, once found con-
394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), placed the burden on the claimant.
Perhaps this is justified by the fact that once religious infringement is shown,
the burden is on the government to defend it; the defendant's religious sin-
cerity involves a second-level "standing" question. On the other hand, con-
sider that (a) the Supreme Court, in finding no constitutional right to a re-
ligious exemption from Sunday closing laws, observed that such an exemption
"might make necessary a state-conducted inquiry into the sincerity of ...
religious beliefs, a practice which a state might believe would itself run afoul
of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees." Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961); (b) In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407
(1963), the Court expressed the proposition on which it "intimate[d] no
view" that consideration of evidence of spurious claims might be "foreclosed
by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious
beliefs, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 . . ."; and (c) while Ballard did
recognize that a claim based on religious beliefs could be defeated by a find-
ing of insincerity, it may be that the danger that a jury will improperly find
a belief "insincere" solely because it thinks the belief "false" would justify
placing the burden on the government of proving insincerity by a preponder-
ance of evidence.
171 But see note 167 supra.
172 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407.
173 See Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning
Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 215, 284.
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stitutionally required, when the religion grows beyond a given size.1
74
Yet, while certain types of harm endanger compelling interests be-
cause of their quality (e.g., personal violence, genetic deformities),
and thus require universal prohibition, 175 other dangers may or may
not involve compelling interests, depending on the incidence of ac-
tivity. The latter situation arises, for example, where the economy or
state treasury is threatened (e.g., from increased social and medical
welfare payments to the claimant or his dependents), or where soci-
ety's interests can be fully protected as long as available manpower
does not fall below a given level (e.g., selective service, jury duty).
Treating the number of religious exemptions as relevant would
not favor small over large sects with regard to religious practices in
violation of the same statute. The right to a religious exemption
cannot rationally be made to depend on the outcome of a race to the
courts or the legislature; it cannot be granted only to the first claim-
ants. Insofar as the quantity of religious exemptions is relevant to
assessment of harm, what should be considered is the total number
of adherents to all religious beliefs which involve practices contrary
to a given statutory stricture. There is no anomaly in finding that
the first amendment requires exemption for religious violation of
statute X while denying an exemption for religious violation of
statute Y, even if the latter practice is no more dangerous than the
former, on the basis of a finding in the former case that the religious
practice is rare and, in the latter case, that the different religious
practice is widespread. Such a situation reflects the same constitu-
tional logic which gives a small gathering "greater" first amendment
protection than a large crowd.176
The difficulty is not that the number of adherents is or should
be irrelevant, but that the assessment may be beyond the bounds
174 Id. at 296. On remand from the United States Supreme Court, In re
Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), the Minnesota Supreme Court, reversing a crim-
inal contempt conviction of a woman who based her refusal to render jury
service on religious grounds, stated: "[U]ntil and unless further experience
indicates that the indiscriminate invoking of the First Amendment presents a
serious threat to the effective functioning of our jury system, any person
whose religious convictions prohibit compulsory jury duty shall henceforth
be exempt." 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963) (emphasis added).
175 That is, denial of exemptions to every activity which significantly
threatens to produce the harm, with the possible exception of activities which
preserve interests of greater magnitude than either religion or the statutory
objective-e.g., medical practices which save lives. Some regulatory schemes,
involving mala prohibita offenses, may contemplate universal compliance.
Although the Supreme Court in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
found that Sunday closing laws fit this category, the statutory scheme was
riddled with exceptions, and in any event it is doubtful that such laws would
have survived a "compelling state interest" test.
176 If the total assemblage is so large as to justify infringement of first
amendment rights, a large subgroup could not validly be punished while a
small subgroup were given constitutional protection.
of judicial competence. How are the litigants to acquire evidence
of the number of individuals whose religious beliefs are infringed
by the statute? Not simply by consulting membership lists of
organized religions, since religious beliefs and practices of the non-
affiliated are also protected.177 Moreover, religion is open to every-
one. Those who today possess no religious beliefs, or follow religions
whose practices are lawful, may tomorrow find their way to contact
with the Divine and experience meaningful answers to ancient and
ultimate questions, through practices which are presently illegal and
the subject of constitutional challenge. Recognizing the complexity of
judicial crystal-gazing, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that a
religious exemption is constitutionally required only where a univer-
sal exemption would not significantly threaten a paramount govern-
mental interest.178
Notwithstanding these observations, it seems unnecessarily sup-
pressive to deny an exemption for a manifestly unusual religious
claim (e.g., freedom from jury service) on the basis of an unsubstan-
tiated presumption that the underlying religious belief is, or may be-
come, widespread and indeed universal. Estimates of the number of
users or religious users of the drug, while varying considerably, can
provide courts with a useful picture of the present maximum quanti-
tative effect of a religious exemption. Should the very grant of an
exemption subsequently produce an intolerable increase in the num-
ber of claimants (and the tolerably low number of claimants for
conscientious objector status suggests that it would be error to pre-
sume such an effect), no constitutional stricture would prevent leg-
islative or judicial revocation of the exemption 79 The course most
consonant with maximizing religious freedom, while protecting sub-
stantial governmental interests in situations where the substantiality
of the interest depends on the quantitative incidence of exemptions,
is to require that unless there is some basis in fact which could sup-
port a legislative finding of the compelling quantitative impact, an
exemption should be granted, accompanied by a judicial attitude of
177 Moreover, those who are affiliated with religions which do not require
a given practice may nevertheless be religiously committed to that practice.
But as the conscientious objector cases recognize, a disparity between the
official doctrine of the formal religion claimed by the defendant and his pro-
fessed beliefs is evidence casting doubt on his sincerity.
178 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), can be read as holding that
even a universal exemption from the requirement of availability for a 6-day
work week would not jeopardize a paramount state interest since the major
purpose of the state's unemployment compensation program-alleviating hard-
ship-would still be served.
179 Judicial revocation should probably be announced prospectively, in
an opinion granting the exemption or denying it on grounds other than quan-
titative harmfulness. But cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL 19
March 1968] PSYCHEDELICS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 741
"wait and see."'8s0
The Less-Restrictive Alternative
An exemption for all religious acts in violation of the statutory
prohibition is obviously one example of a less-restrictive alternative-
the least restrictive of religious freedom for it is unconditional. If
this would produce suppressible danger, a state must nevertheless
choose regulation over prohibition where the former can reduce the
danger to a level which constitutionally must be tolerated (i.e., not a
significant threat to a paramount interest). Thus, for example, the
government might have a compelling interest only in limiting the
frequency or quantity of usage of certain drugs, or forbidding or
restricting usage of certain drugs by people with dependents or with
strong psychotic potential.18' Unless the cost of administering such
regulations is not so great as to constitute a compelling interest,
legislation which forbids-acts beyond these categories (that which is
overinclusive) cannot constitutionally be applied to religious acts.1 2
In a paper entitled LSD and Constitutional Morality,8 3 this au-
thor has examined the principal claims regarding the dangers of LSD-
that it leads to self-inflicted harm from panic reactions, long term
psychoses and recurrent psychotic symptoms. 8 4 The thesis was ad-
180 See note 174 supra. Cf. Comment, LSD and Freedom of Religion, 1
U.S,F.L. Ra. 131, 143-44 (1966): "[T]he Woody court felt that effective ad-
ministration of the law would not be endangered by religious use of peyote
at a -tirme when the drug. was being used by 30,000 to 250,000 persons-whereas
LSD is currently being used by some 40,000 persons" (the latter figure based
on an estimate in Editorial, 4 PsYcHEDELIc REv. No. 7, 1966). Other estimates
have been considerably higher. See, e.g., Louria, The Abuse of LSD in LSD,
MAN An SOcMTY 36 (R. de Bold & R. Leaf ed. 19671.
181 See text accompanying notes 117-120 supra.
182 The recent holding in United States v:. Robel, 88 Sup. Ct. 419 (1967)
(described supra note 156). The Court found the employment prohibition
too broad, "indiscriminately trapping membership which can be constitution-
ally punished and membership which cannot be so proscribed." .Id. at 424.
The Court pointed to less restrictive alternatives which might consider wheth-
er, inter alia, the position was a "sensitive one," or the member was active,
knowing, and/or in agreement with the illegal aims of Communist organiza-
tion. Id.
The Court did not read into the statute such relevant exemptions, for the
statute was clear and precise and ould not be construed as consistent with
the Constitution without substantial judicial rewriting.
The legislation we discuss in, this commentary is not on its face directed
at religious activity; it would be unwise for a COurt to invalidate such statutes;
they should be construed torapply in'a manner consistent with the guarantees
of the free .exercise, i.lause, or- in" reaching'the same result, certain applications
of the statute can be held invalid without invalidating all applications.
183 Presented Mar. 22, 1967 in Washington, D.C., at the annual meeting
of the American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n, on file with the Hastings Law Journal.
184 Recent preliminary studies suggest-the possibility that LSD use pro-
duces chromosome damage in white blood cells. See M. Cohen, Marinello &
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vanced, based on medical-scientific studies, that certain safeguards can
reduce the risk of these harms (presumed for present purposes to be
constitutionally cognizable) to a nonsuppressible level.18 5 While
indiscriminate use of LSD produces psychotic reactions requiring hos-
pitalization in perhaps no less than 2 to 4 percent of the population,188
a major study (involving 5,000 subjects and 25,000 ingestions of LSD
or mescaline) indicates that where ingestions are supervised, only
8/100 of 1 percent of subjects previously screened to exclude those
with present or incipient emotional disorders, have prolonged (more
than 48 hours) psychotic reactions, and virtually none attempt sui-
cide; and even where emotionally disturbed patients ingest LSD
under supervision, only 18/100 of 1 percent have prolonged psychotic
reactions, and 12/100 of 1 percent attempt suicide. 87 In another
study of over 200 subjects lacking previous mental disorder, "no sub-
ject ever experienced a postsession psychotic reaction, much less at-
Back, Chromosomal Damage in Human Leukocytes Induced by Lysergic Acid
Diethylamide, 155 SCIENCE 1417 (1967). Since a compelling state interest in
protecting future generations from hereditary deformities cannot be gainsaid,
reasonable proof of even a relatively low risk would justify prohibitions of
ingestion under conditions which create that risk. Present evidence is incon-
clusive (as Dr. M. M. Cohen was among the first to admit); there are studies
which indicate no significant correlation between use of LSD and chromosome
damage or between chromosome breaks in white blood cells and genetic de-
formities (see, e.g., N.Y. Times, October 27, 1967, at 21, col. 3), and others
which suggest such correlation only where the mother ingested high dosages
during pregnancy (in which case only users in that category could justifiably
be denied religious use). Should scientific experts disagree, a court could of
course properly find that the legislature could reasonably accept the testi-
mony of those who believe there is a correlation, albeit a low one, between
the use of certain uses of a particular drug, and genetic defects. There may
be some verifiable risks of even this harm that are so low as not to justify
suppression of religious practices. Regarding comparative risks from per-
missible activities, recent studies have found a relationship between birth
defects and the expectant mother's ingestion of tranquilizers, analgesics and
antihistamines.
185 The data is presented to illustrate a possible application of the less-
restrictive alternative doctrine. The aforementioned paper advanced the thesis
that a legislature is obliged by considerations of political morality (even if
not by constitutional strictures) to protect values reflected by the constitution
(e.g., the right to pursue aesthetic experience and development, to seek knowl-
edge of oneself, to be let alone (privacy)), by choosing that course of pro-
tective regulation which will least infringe on those values. Just how a court
reviews medical-scientific evidence in order to determine whether a legisla-
ture could reasonably find a compelling interest in denying a religious ex-
emption and in rejecting alternatives will be explored in the next section;
particular attention will be paid to the marihuana issue.
186 See THE UTOPIATES 117 n.7 (Blum & Blum ed. 1964).
187 Cohen, Lysergic Acid Diethelmyde: Side Effects and Complications,
130 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 30 (1960). "Only one instance of a psy-
chotic reaction lasting more than two days was reported" in "experimental
subjects who had been selected for their freedom from mental disturbances."
S. COHEN, THE BEYOND WITN 210-11 (1964).
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tempted or completed suicide.'. 8 8 Other studies have found (1) that
of 70 LSD users admitted for emergency psychiatric treatment at the
U.C.L.A. Neuropsychiatric Institute during a 6-month period, none
had taken the drug after screening or with supervision;8 9 (2) that
panic reactions of users admitted to Bellevue Hospital were related
to the setting under which the drug was taken (e.g., many had taken
the drug alone), and the user's psychological state at the time of
ingestion ("recovery was rapid and these patients were usually dis-
charged within 3 days"), and that in all studied cases of extended
psychoses the users (admitted to Bellevue) were either psychotic, or
had serious personality disturbances prior to ingestion;90 and (3)
that "[e]ven after reviewing 1000 medical publications, surveying all
of the literature ... the author [employed by the Food and Drug
Administration] was unable to confirm reports that a psychosis can
develop in a hitherto mentally healthy individual several months
after his last LSD intake."' 91
In light of this and other evidence, it was suggested that legisla-
tures could significantly reduce the danger' 92 by adopting regula-
tions permitting the use of LSD by those who "pass" psychiatric
screening for present or incipient mental illness, are adequately
prepared for the "trip,' u 93 and are attended by a qualified guide'94
188 R. MASTERS & J. HOUSTON, Tim VARIETIES OF PSYCHEDEIC FaXPERIENCE
317 n.1, 319-20 n.23 (1966). The nature of any guidance given these subjects
is unspecified.
189 Ungerleider, Fisher & Fuller, The Dangers of LSD, 197 J.A.M.A. 389
(1966).
190 Statement of Dr. William A. Frosch, Psychiatrist, Hearings Before a
Special Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 302-05
(1966).
191 Ochota, What is the Clinical Evidence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 14, 1966,
at 21. Dr. Ochota also noted that "the suicide rate (in investigational group)
has been reported as 0.1 percent [it is not clear whether this figure is based
on the Cohen study, supra note 187], a remarkably low rate considering that
LSD has been usually given to the rather severely ill patients, including
chronic alcoholics, neurotics, psycopaths, drug addicts, etc." Id.
192 "While a legislature may be morally justified in overriding constitu-
tionally protected values when the danger level (risk times harm) rises above
a certain point, it is not justified in suppressing such values completely if it
can reduce the danger below the level of serious concern by regulations which
substantially preserve the protected freedoms. So even if the unsupervised,
uninformed ingestion of LSD by a population not screened of pre-psychotic
personalities does create a serious danger warranting restrictive legislation, I
submit that a politically moral law-making body has an obligation to permit
men to pursue God, creativity, knowledge, personal development and adven-
ture, by means which create no greater risk of harm than the manufacture of
knives, the construction of buildings or highways, the performance of minor
surgery and perhaps even the practice of psychoanalysis." Finer, LSD and
Constitutional Morality, supra note 183, at 13.
193 "When neither the subject nor his companions have prepared for the
"trip" or have any realistic understanding of the nature of a psychedelic ex-
perience, what for the informed, can be glory, insight and joy, can, for the
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(and perhaps also with a physician on call).195 In a stimulating
recent article,196 Professor Stanley Laughlin, Jr. has proposed that use
of LSD be permitted either at public clinics, or at regulated private
institutions, under safeguards similar to those recommended above.197
It is doubtful that the cost to the government of administering these
regulations would be such as to provide a compelling reason for re-
jecting that alternative,0 8 particularly in view of the far greater pub-
lic sums that are devoted to interests of lesser constitutional magni-
tude than religious freedom.
uninitiate, be shock, terror and anguish. I wonder how an African bushman
would react if he suddenly found himself sitting at the window of an airplane
during a noisy take-off over a city of skyscrapers and neon lights with no
one present but a Braniff hostess in her psychedelic circus suit, who spoke
not a word of Bush-talk." Id. at 12.
194 "There is no existing academic training of guides or gurus. But the
same was once true in psychoanalysis. Teachers and students will come from
the behavioral sciences, from religion, from the arts, and perhaps from medi-
cine. Standards of competence will be developed. Perhaps at the beginning,
before we are sure of the caliber of our guides, and unless and until evidence
of minimal risk is strong, doctors should be at least on call during all admin-
istrations." Id. at 14. We also suggested that "perhaps some restrictions on
the physical and social setting could be derived from factors known to be
highly conducive to a "bad trip" (e.g., bizarre, hostile, or excessively clinical
environment)." Id. at 13.
For an enlightening discussion of the qualifications a guide should pos-
sess, the most favorable characteristics of the setting in which a psychedelic
session takes place, and the' preparations of subjects, see R. MASTERS & J.
HOUSTON, supra note 188, at 129-50.
195 The state's historical interest in the welfare of minors probably jus-
tifies prohibition of their use at a lower danger point, but whether the risks
given the suggested safeguards exceed that point is an open question.
196 Laughlin, supra note 125.
197 Id. at 56-57.
198 The cost of protecting against fraudulent religious claims is probably
no higher for conditional exemptions than for unconditional exemptions. It
would seem that the cost of determining whether a statute is infringing on
bona fide religious exercise, like the cost of providing a fair criminal trial,
is the unavoidable price of ensuring constitutional freedoms at their minima.
At some point, however, the question whether there is a constitutional freedom
may turn in part on the economic cost of sustaining the claim (e.g., the right
to appointed counsel in traffic court or habeas corpus proceedings, the right
to jury trial for petty offenses, the right of a prisoner in state X to be brought
speedily to trial by state Y). Thus it would be going too far, in protecting
religious exercise, to expect the state to provide psychiatrists, training pro-
grams, guides and safe environments for religious use of psychedelics. This
would arguably run afoul of the establishment clause (although if religious
exercises can be protected from prohibitive state laws only by state action
"favoring religion," the establishment clause as interpreted would undermine
the free exercise clause).
In any event, where programs designed to minimize dangerousness are
privately financed, the public costs involved in regulating them would be
relatively minimal (e.g., licensing personnel, auditing periodic reports, etc.)
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The "Standing" of Religious Claimants
Does every person who violates a criminal statute in pursuit of
his religious beliefs have "standing" to assert the less restrictive- al-
ternative doctrine? 199 More specifically, the intriguing question of
"standing"200 is this: Where a state has a compelling interest 201 in
prohibiting the use of a drug under condition X (e.g., during preg-
nancy) or non-Y (e.g., without psychiatric screening), but not under
condition non-X or Y, and has actually prohibited use under the lat-
ter (safe) as well as the former (dangerous) conditions, should a
religious defense to prosecution be denied either where the claimant's
religious tenets do not restrict his use to safe conditions (non-X or Y) ;
or, where his religious views are silent on this matter and he fails cus-
tomarily to so restrict his use? Since, by hypothesis, qualitatively
dangerous religious use is not an alternative the legislature must per-
mit, the issue is whether the dangerous religious user may assert the
rights of the safe religious user, where no legislative distinction has
been made.
Few of the factors that militate in favor of standing to assert
the rights of others20 2 are present where one who engages in danger-
199 This question seems implicitly raised by Professor Giannella's distinc-
tion of Woody from Bullard on the ground, inter alia, that assuming both
California and North Carolina found regular use of peyote to be immoral,
the claimants in the former case used "[o]nly a prescribed amount of peyote
• . . once a week as part of a fairly well-defined ritual . . . ," while the
claimant in Bullard was a member of the Neo-Native-American Church,
"which did not appear to have a traditional body of teachings on the use of
peyote," and he evidently "made the use of peyote a dominant way of life
rather than a way to experience God in a highly restricted ritual." Giannella,
supra note 127 at 1408-09.
The discussion in the text following this note suggests that a religious
claimant should not prevail if his own conduct would not fall within the pro-
tection of an acceptable less-restrictive alternative. Suppose that any such
alternative would impose a prohibitive financial administrative burden on the
state? Would the fact that most religious users of the drug limited their use
to "safe" conditions and that "dangerous" use would create a compelling in-
terest only if numerically substantial (e.g., economic dependency) warrant
holding that an unconditional (i.e., sans regulations) religious exemption
should have been legislatively granted unless and until the quantity of dan-
gerous users became intolerable?
200 The fact that the claimant is a criminal defendant gives him "pure"
article III "case or controversy" standing. We are using the term "standing"
in the broad sense that one does not have standing to challenge on constitu-
tional grounds the application of a statute to him unless his conduct or status
meets certain requirements relating to his claim. Thus we would say that
one who did not claim to be engaged in religious activity does not have stand-
ing to raise the free exercise claim as a defense to his prosecution. See note
210 infra
203 Contrary to Giannella's viewpoint, we would not hold that the en-
forcement of morality as such should be deemed a compelling state interest.
See text accompanying notes 130-48 supra.
202 See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in
the Supreme Court, 71 YALE. L.J. 599 (1962).
ous and prohibited conduct, albeit in pursuit of religious beliefs,
assails the constitutionality of certain applications of the statute
he violates. The statute does not on its face relate to or infringe on
first amendment liberty;20 3 the party whose conduct is constitution-
ally protected against the statute-the religious, nondangerous actor-
is not less able to obtain judicial relief than the party in court,204 and
the defendant does not have any representative status vis-a-vis the
third party.20 5 Even though the constitutional right involved is very
important, the courts could properly invalidate the application of the
statute to safe religious conduct, without invalidating the statute in
toto or as applied to all religious conduct; by hypothesis such selective
invalidation, treating the statute as "severable" in its applications,
would be consistent with the most important legislative purposes.20 6
Just as one who is not religious has no standing to challenge a statute
on the ground that it interferes with the religious rights of others,207
a public official would not be heard to claim that the statute under
which he is prosecuted is invalid as applied to private persons, 2 0 and
a doctor could not assert the constitutional rights of his patients, 209 so
one whose religious behavior is not constitutionally protected should
not benefit from the invalidity of applications of the statute to rela-
tively safe religious practices.
The factual question whether a religious claimant's practices are
or are not dangerous (suppressible) is not reached where the defend-
ant's claims are "religious" as a matter of law, and the government
has failed to persuade the court that the legislation could reasonably
be found necessary to prevent significant threats to very important
interests. 210 In such a case the only factual issue is whether the re-
203 Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
204 Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
2o Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (organization could assert
rights of members); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (parents
could assert rights of teachers); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(private school could assert right of parents).
206 See Sedler, supra note 202, at 608-12.
207 Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1912).
208 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
209 Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
210 This assumes that the mere fact that there are dangerous ways by
which the statute can be violated, does not necessarily mean the statute
serves a compelling interest. The government's right to show that the de-
fendant's actual conduct would not be immune from prosecution under a less
restrictive statutory alternative should not be converted into power to punish
for conduct which, while violative of the statute, goes substantially beyond
legislative intendment. Although the difficulty of articulating a workable
principle for determining what violations of the statute involving dangerous
characteristics go beyond the contemplated acts and evils, perhaps supports
a view that any dangerous violation is punishable, consider a statute enacted
on the erroneous assumption that the ordinary use of aspirin involves a high
risk of violent crimes or suicide. Is it proper to deny a (hypothetical) re-
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ligious claims are sincerely held.21 1 On the other hand, should the
court be persuaded that the legislature could reasonably find that
the statute does protect compelling interests, and no less-restrictive
alternative could prevent injury to those or other compelling inter-
ests, then the government prevails; the defendant's religious sincerity
or actual practices become irrelevant. The defendant's actual prac-
tices (and sincerity) become relevant where (1) he has professed to a
use of the drug that is "religious" as a matter of law; (2) the govern-
ment has successfully defended the legislation as protecting a com-
pelling interest; (3) the defendant has come forward with some evi-
dence of less-dangerous, less-restrictive alternatives; 212 and (4) the
government has not established that the legislature could reasonably
reject these alternatives as significantly endangering compelling in-
terests.
The state need not persuade the court of the last requirement, if
it can demonstrate that the defendant's actual practices in violation of
the statute are so dangerous as not to be constitutionally deserving of
protection under a less-restrictive alternative.21 3 The state's burden
on this issue is not satisfied by proof that the defendant's religious
beliefs do not restrict his use to certain circumstances which a
court would regard as nonsuppressible conduct. While the claimant's
case is furthered by evidence that his religion imposes such limita-
tions (suggested by the colloquialism, "he does it religiously") the
government must prove that the defendant's use is dangerous, 21 4 what-
ligious user of aspirin "standing" if it is shown that he ingests 30 aspirins a
day and the court finds that such use does significantly endanger paramount
state interests? (The argument that the defendant should not be punished
for crimes other than those forbidden by the legislature is not a persuasive
basis for a negative response: the defendant may not be punished unless the
jury finds that he violated the statute; the question here is, When may the
government show a dangerous violation to defeat a religious claim?) Should
the suggestion not be found acceptable, the textual recommendations are
modified only to the extent that proof of the harmfulness of the defendant's
actual practices relieves the government of an obligation to defend the statute
as such.
211 For a discussion of the burden of proof on this issue, see note 170 supra.
212 Le., legislation not significantly endangering paramount interests, in-
cluding an intolerable financial burden. If "safety measures" would impose
prohibitive costs, then a defendant who used the drug safely would not be
engaging in behavior protectible under any less-restrictive alternative which
the legislature would be obliged to adopt. He should not be granted an ex-
emption, for it is not the court's function to administer its own regulations
but to determine whether the legislature could reasonably reject alternatives
permitting greater religious freedom. Where the legislature could do so,
the statute and its application to religion are valid.
213 As recognized in note 210 supra, it is arguable that proof of the de-
fendant's dangerousness should also relieve the government of having to de-
fend the statute as serving a compelling interest-the defendant's conduct
might be said to prove that interest.
214 Query: Should the inquiry regarding the dangerousness of the de-
ever the reasons behind the defendant's claimed avoidance of danger-
ous use. Finally, where there is a relevant factual question about the
defendant's conduct (to be distinguished from the legal question as to
what kind and degree of danger is constitutionally suppressible), the
jury should decide it along with the sincerity issue (the defense fails
if the jury finds against the defendant on either ground), regardless of
our analytic reliance on the "standing" concept, which, in its purer
forms, involves jurisdictional issues for judicial determination.
The Cumulative Harm Thesis
As noted earlier,215 it has been argued that even if marihuana is
no more dangerous than alcohol, society may reasonably decide not to
suffer the cumulative evils which would flow from legalization of
both substances. Let us assume that the cumulative harm theory
could overcome some rather persuasive arguments for modifying the
total prohibitions on general marihuana use;216 given the first
amendment, our purpose is to determine the circumstances under
which a legislature could preserve the religious use of marihuana and
alcohol, while avoiding a cumulative danger level we can characterize
as "compelling"-a level higher, in some unspecified degree, than the
present danger from relatively unrestricted consumption of alcohol.
We should recognize that even where the claimed harms are based
on quantitative consequences, as under the cumulation theory (e.g.,
total medical and welfare payments to the user or his dependents),
courts do not have complete empirical data sufficient to perform
mathematical calculations, and have no means of converting the
value of religious exercise into a cardinal magnitude; nevertheless, in
order to illustrate the appropriate lines of analysis (however fuzzy
fendant's violation(s) go beyond the proximate temporal vicinity of the acts
charged in the indictment?
215 See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
216 Among the negative consequences of existing marihuana legislation
are: (a) the suppression of liberty, regarded comprehensively to encompass
a right to be let alone; (b) the disrespect for law, manifested by and flowing
from pervasive disregard of strictures widely thought to be irrational and
anomalous; (c). the often distasteful and not infrequently illegal and uncon-
stitutional police practices associated with enforcement, such as the use of
secret informers, entrapment, fourth amendment violations, and other forms
of "dirty business"; (d) the broad discretion of law enforcement personnel
to select the subjects of arrest and prosecution, providing opportunity for
discrimination and persecution on political, ideological, ethnic, or socioeco-
nomic bases; (e) the heavy costs of enforcement, due to the inefficacy of
the deterrent rationale, and the concomitant channeling of scarce police re-
sources away from defense of life, limb and property; and (f) the imposition
of prison sentences and criminal stigma on many individuals who lack typical
criminal characteristics, the corresponding suffering of the defendants and
their families, and their resultant bitterness and cynicism toward a govern-
ment and society that can ill afford the loss of the allegiance and good will
of its youth.
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they appear in judicial reality), we will quantify variables bearing on
the assessment of cumulative harm.
Let us assume that equivalent risks of harming legislatively cog-
nizable interests are presented, respectively, by the average users of
alcohol and marihuana; that the risk is .01 of producing I unit of social
disutility; 2 7 assume further that in a given jurisdiction there are 2
million people above drinking age, 1 million of whom can be consid-
ered users of alcohol (under minimal criteria). Society thus tolerates
10,000 units of disutility by declining to increase restrictions on con-
sumption of alcohol.
One alternative to the present scheme is simply to permit the
unrestricted religious use of marihuana without modifying the pres-
ent permissible policy toward alcohol consumption.218 How do we cal-
culate the net increase in social harm? It is not simply the number
of religious marihuana users (e.g., 50,000) multiplied by an average
risk of harm (again, .01). We must estimate also the effect of inter-
action between use of marihuana for religious purposes and the use of
alcohol. To obtain the incremental harm we must first subtract
from the harm caused by 50,000 religious marihuana users at a pre-
sumed risk of .01 (500 disutility units) the disutility produced by
those who have given up: (1) the normal use of alcohol to engage in
religious marihuana use at the same risk (e.g.,' 25,000 at .01; reduction
of 250) ; (2) a dangerous use of alcohol (e.g., .05) for normal religious
use of marihuana (e.g., 3,000; net reduction is 120); and (3) the nor-
mal use of alcohol for a safer (.005) religious use of marihuana
(3,000; net reduction is 15). To the remaining incremental harm (115
disutility units) we must add the harm from the following: (1)
those who still use alcohol but also use marihuana for religious pur-
poses, thus increasing their dangerousness (e.g., 10,000 from .01 to
.02; increment is 100) ;219 and (2) those who have given up alcohol but
217 This might mean, for example, that the chances are one in 100 that
the user will cost the state $100 (a unit of disutility). As suggested earlier,
while the amount society must spend providing subsistence or medical care
to the user and his dependents might properly be considered a cognizable
evil, reduced productivity of the user should not.
218 Of course, the alternative least restrictive of first amendment and fifth
amendment freedoms would be "exemptions" under no greater restrictions
than are presently placed on the use of alcohol. Even under the broad legis-
lative standard whether prohibition is in the public interest, a legislature
might well conclude, after considering the disadvantages of the present system,
that the public good might best be served by permitting the use of marihuana
for general purposes (a) with no greater restrictions than inhibit consump-
tion of alcohol; (b) with restrictions on the quantity or frequency of mari-
huana use and/or the characteristics of the user; or (c) with restrictions on
the use of alcohol and marihuana.
219 Of course it is possible that the use of alcohol and marihuana in
quantities that would separately produce .01 risks would, when combined by
one user, produce a risk greater than the sum of their separate risks (.02).
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use marihuana more dangerously (e.g., 5,000 from .01 to .03; incre-
ment is 100).
Whether the cumulative danger from the less-restrictive alterna-
tive (10,315 disutility units) gives the government a compelling inter-
est in rejecting this alternative depends of course on a court's assess-
ment of the value of religious freedom. It seems doubtful that the
3.15 percent increase in economic costs, in our example, over what
society was willing to bear in order to preserve nonprotected ac-
tivities (activities which it could constitutionally have prohibited on
far less than a showing of compelling interest), should tip the scales
against a claim for religious exemptions.220 If the allowance of an
unconditional and general alcohol "exemption," and an unconditional
and religious marihuana exemption, exceeds the constitutionally "com-
pelling" danger level,221 another less-restrictive alternative which
might sufficiently reduce the danger would be the imposition of con-
220 Such an increase in a noneconomic quantitative evil might endanger
a compelling interest. For instance, if permitting unconditional religious use
of LSD involved such a danger of psychological ineligibility for the draft that
the total increase of ineligible registrants was over 3 percent, there might
well be a compelling reason for denying such an exemption (in estimating
the increment those religious users of LSD who would in any event be draft
exempt, e.g., conscientious objectors, should be excluded).
Should a court decline to estimate the number of religious users, and,
contrary to our recommendations, presume (from the mere theoretical po-
tential, without evidentiary basis) that a religious exemption would be uni-
versally granted (see discussion in text accompanying notes 163-80 supra), it
would be less likely to find that the grant of an unconditional exemption
from marihuana legislation, with unrestricted use of alcohol, would be an
acceptable less-restrictive alternative.
It would seem incongruous for a court to assume that all 2 million people
in the hypothetical jurisdiction would use marihuana for religious purposes
and then compare the consequent theoretical danger of religious marihuana
use with the actual danger from the present use of alcohol, since theoretically
all 2 million people could be using alcohol tomorrow. What are the implica-
tions of assuming universal religious use of marihuana and universal use
of alcohol (the latter either because (a) use is not statutorily limited, or (b)
there is some religious (presumably universal) use of alcohol)? Do we
assume that everyone will use both drugs, combining average quantities and
risks of each? (This would increase total disutility to 40,000 given the magni-
tudes employed in the text.) Or do we estimate the percentages of the 2
million actual and potential alcohol users who will switch completely or
partially to marihuana, and their average deviation from the presumed .02
dangerousness per combination user, as well as the potential marihuana
smokers who will stay with alcohol in whole or in part, and their average
deviation from the .02 combined dangerousness? This would give us the
actual incremental danger from cumulative use, but does not this violate the
universality presumptions? Is. the universality hypothesis tenable if it pro-
duces absurd results?
221 In taking into account the effects of substitution and complementari-
ness, the effect of the availability of both drugs (marihuana limited to religious
use) on the use of each is determined by a number of personal motives, only
one of which may be economic (i.e., influenced by the relative costs of the
two drugs).
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ditions on general alcohol use (limiting the quantity, frequency or
circumstances of use, or characteristics of the user), while allowing
religious use of marihuana or alcohol, with conditions if necessary. 222
It is arguable, however, that the establishment clause requires im-
position of conditions on religious marihuana use before consideration
of the necessity for placing restrictions on general alcohol con-
sumption.223
If the imposition of conditions on alcohol use and the restriction
222 The cumulation argument assumes that the dangers from the use of
alcohol and marihuana are quantitative; society's interest is more or less
compelling depending on the number of users (whereas if a drug produces a
significant risk of personal violence or genetic deformities such harm is
compelling regardless of the number of users). If imposing conditions on
nonreligious use can reduce the quantitative danger below the constitutionally
suppressible level, there is no justification for imposing any conditions on
bona fide religious use,which by hypothesis, involves neither an intrinsically
compelling danger, nor one which is any longer compelling by virtue of cumu-
lation with other permissible uses. If conditional nonreligious use plus uncon-
ditional religious use still leave a compelling danger, a less dangerous alter-
native would impose conditions on religious marihuana use (one such con-
dition, not suggested above, might prohibit the religious marihuana user from
nonreligious consumption of alcohol).
223 One contention which might be advanced is that the establishment
clause denies government the right to preserve religious freedom at the ex-
pense of other freedoms. But does this not imply, contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917), that
the draft exemption for conscientious objectors is an establishment since the
religious exemption of one man deprives another of his liberty? Indeed this
establishment argument would deny exemptions from any burdensome legis-
lation (including that which the Supreme Court would clearly regard as
permissible "accomodation," see, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1951)),
for such exemptions will always be at the expense of nonreligious interests;
a religious exemption implies that society can tolerate N exemptions, and
thus denies nonreligious violators a chance to obtain one of those N exemp-
tions under nonreligious criteria. The fact that a court may effectively tell
the legislature to impose conditions on alcohol consumption instead of deny-
ing religious exemptions for marihuana use, brings it no closer to an estab-
lishment than if there were existing limitations on general alcohol use, and
given the accompanying danger level a court held that society could afford
unconditional religious freedom to use marihuana. In the former situation
society had chosen to allow conditions of general alcohol use which were so
dangerous that religious freedom as to marihuana could not be "safely" exer-
cised. Society would have to remove those conditions in the absence of a
compelling interest in not doing so. The unregulated use of alcohol for non-
protected and nonvital purposes fails to approach such a compelling interest.
A more discriminating establishment argument would be that imposing
conditions on general alcohol consumption before imposing them on religious
marihuana use goes beyond the mere preservation of religious freedom and
seeks to maximize it. We would agree that if the restrictive conditions would
not significantly obstruct religious beliefs and practices, there would be no
justification under the free exercise clause for withholding such restrictions
on the ground that they are necessary only if restrictions on general alcohol
use could not sufficiently reduce the danger. For a court to grant an uncon-
ditional religious exemption on that basis in such a case might well violate
the establishment clause.
of marihuana use to religious purposes also under safeguards, would
not sufficiently reduce the danger-a rather improbable assumption
224 then society would be faced with a choice between permitting
either the religious use of marihuana (and alcohol) or the general use
of alcohol, but not both. The choice would have to be to forbid all
uses of alcohol that are neither religious nor otherwise vital (e.g.,
medical), unless the administrative costs of such a scheme are so con-
siderable as to constitute a compelling interest.225 Thus, the only
situation where the cumulative harm theory would justify denial of
religious exemptions for marihuana use, notwithstanding a finding
that marihuana is no more dangerous than alcohol, is where the
total' risks engendered by the conditional exemptions for religious and
other vital uses of marihuana and alcohol, with all nonvital uses of
both substances prohibited, exceeds the total present risks from un-
conditional and unrestricted use of alcohol, with all uses of marihuana
prohibited, and significantly endangers a compelling interest. The
extreme unlikelihood of this result is illustrated by the fact that a
necessary but not sufficient condition is that either the total number
of religious users exceed the number of general users of alcohol-the
risk per user remaining the same; or that the risk per user increase
so substantially (by virtue of those individuals who ingest both sub-
stances for religious purposes!) so as to offset the reduced number
of users.
Harmlessness: The Factual Determination
How does a court approach the task of determining whether the
prohibited conduct is in fact sufficiently dangerous to provide the
government with a compelling interest in preventing it; or, whether
there are less-restrictive alternatives that would reduce the danger
below constitutionally cognizable magnitude? Initially a court must
decide what allegations of harm to consider. The legislative history
(properly utilized) is obviously relevant as a source of insight into
the harms on the minds of those who enacted the statute. Also rele-
vant is the legislative history accompanying reenactments or revisions
of the statute, or passage of additional statutes dealing with the same
drug.
Suppose the legislature feared two or more compelling evils, and
not all its fears are supported by adequate evidence? Is the applica-
224 Given the fact that most of the evils of alcohol can be traced to cer-
tain abusive practices, as well as to social and psychic characteristics of
drinkers, it would seem that restrictive regulations could be rather effective.
225 In determining whether society has a paramount interest in avoiding
the administrative costs of a less-restrictive alternative, it is relevant to con-
sider the costs manifestly tolerated in enforcing the present statutory schemes
relating to marihuana and alcohol.
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tion of the statute to religious practices to be upheld as long as the
legislature had reasonable grounds to fear any one of the evils? If
the legislative history tends strongly to indicate that fear of a par-
ticular evil, found by the court to be unjustified, had a significant
influence, it may be that we cannot be confident (by virtue of legis-
lative history and/or widespread popular beliefs) that the prohibition
would have been enacted on the basis of the legislature's fear of
other evils, even if such fear is found to be justifiable (i.e., the claim
could reasonably be found to be supported by a preponderance of
evidence). Suppose further, or in the alternative, that subsequent to
any relevant legislation, allegations of new dangers achieve currency
among the general public or within certain circles. Is the allegation
"counted" in favor of the government, notwithstanding the fact that
the court cannot "know" whether these allegations and their sup-
porting evidence would have moved the legislature to enact the pro-
hibition?226
Regarding the first problem, it is suggested that a court should
find that the statute is supported by a compelling interest wherever
there is adequate evidentiary support for any paramount interest
which significantly influenced passage of the legislation under review
or related legislation. In assessing the purpose underlying legisla-
tion, a court is not limited to legislative history, but may look to
widely held beliefs and assumptions regarding the evils at the time
such legislation was enacted. Regarding new allegations of harm, or
other claims which played a minor role in the legislative history,
the evil alleged by the prosecution may nevertheless be so great (e.g.,
genetic defects), or the contemporary evidence so strong, that it would
be untenable to conclude that the legislation would not be enacted
today on the basis of such evil. In such cases the court should find
that the statute does serve a compelling interest. If the defendant
should wish to challenge the government's case that the legislature
could reasonably find compelling interest X, on the ground that X
is not within legislative intendment (the defendant need not if the
state's proof of harm or of the absence of an adequate, less-restric-
tive alternative, is insufficient), he should bear the burden of per-
suading the court that X did not significantly motivate the legisla-
ture, and that X is not such a grave evil supported by such strong
evidence as to require the conclusion that the prohibition would now
be enacted substantially on the basis of X. Whenever a sustainable
compelling interest is found under this approach, the government
need show only that the legislature could reasonably have rejected
226 We are not here speaking of new evidence in support of claimed evils
that gave rise to the legislation, reenactments, or supportive legislation, but
of newly alleged evils.
the defendant's claim that a particular less-restrictive alternative
would have avoided the significant risk to a paramount state inter-
est.227
In considering evidence of harmfulness relating to any compel-
ling evils (whether or not a significant influence on the legislation),
including the alleged evils of less-restrictive alternatives, a court
should not limit itself to evidence in existence when the legislation
was passed. While the constitutionality of a statute does not depend
on passing fancies in the world of science and medicine, over a period
of time increments to a body of knowledge may undermine or streng-
then the ground on which legislative conclusions once rested; and
it may be demonstrated that a belief which at one time may (or may
not) have reasonably been found supported by a preponderance of
evidence is now unreasonable (or reasonable). The government's
claim is that at the time the defendant exercised his religion con-
trary to statutory strictures, his conduct was not protected by the
Constitution. If the legislature could not constitutionally deny reli-
gious exemptions (conditional or unconditional) for the defendant's
conduct on the day the defendant committed the prohibited acts, his
conduct is not now subject to punishment.
Since the protection of social values through assessment and pre-
vention of social evils is ordinarily the province of the legislature,
the legislative decision is entitled to deference notwithstanding the
fact that certain statutory applications interfere with religious exer-
cise. It is given that deference by virtue of the standard of review.
The government need not persuade the court by even a preponder-
ance of evidence that there is in fact a compelling interest in enacting
the statute and denying the alternatives. The court need only be
227 The government's burden should not be increased by virtue of the
fact that a legislature may not have explicitly considered the proferred alter-
native; rejection of alternatives is implicit in the enactment. It may be
argued that where the legislature was not apprised of religious use, a court
should not assume that, had it been so apprised it would have rejected a
particular alternative, just as it should not assume that the legislature relied
on any compelling interest asserted by the government; and that in both
cases there should be either proof of actual reliance (on a claimed evil) and
rejection (of a particular alternative), or such strong proof of such a grave
evil in the prohibited conduct and less-restrictive alternatives that it would
be untenable to assume that the legislature would have failed to enact the
legislation and reject the alternatives. But we have assumed that where a
claimed harm was a significant factor underlying the legislation, and is sup-
ported by what could reasonably be considered a preponderance of evidence,
that the legislation would have been enacted in the face of the religious claim,
we should make the parallel assumption that where a legislature relied on or
presumably would have relied on a claimed evil it would have rejected both
the unconditional religious exemption and any alternative which could rea-
sonably have been rejected on the basis of evidence of harmfulness before
the court (testimonial or published).
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convinced on the basis of all the testimonial and published evi-
dence before it that the legislature would not be unreasonable in
concluding that a preponderance of evidence demonstrates such in-
terest. Where the evidence is such that a court in a civil case would
not have erred in denying the defendant a directed verdict at the
conclusion of all the evidence (in a hypothetical case where the
plaintiff had to satisfy a jury of danger to a compelling interest),
then the court cannot hold that the legislature erred. Certainly this
standard gives the legislature a broad range of discretion within
which its "mistakes" (judged by absolute standards) are not subject
to judicial review.
In the final analysis however, the constitutional judgment rests
with the courts. A court betrays its constitutional mandate when it
holds, as did the Fifth Circuit, that (1) "it is not incumbent upon the
Government to produce evidence" to contradict expert testimony and
scientific studies tending to prove that the prohibited practice is rela-
tively harmless; 228 (2) since "Congress has demonstrated beyond doubt
that it believes marihuana is an evil in American society and a seri-
ous threat to its people, '229 this congressional conclusion is beyond
review even when it infringes on religious freedom; or that (3) to
uphold such infringement a court need look no further than testi-
mony given by law enforcement officials at congressional hearings 20
years prior to the prosecution, testimony which had subsequently
been found "disproved" or "not proved" by disinterested high-level
government agencies such as the LaGuardia Commission,2 30 the 1963
White House Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse and the 1966-
1967 Presidential Crime Commission.23 1
Had the court examined the evidence, the fact that loud claims on
both sides of the harmfulness question have found their way to the
printed page would not establish that Congress could today reason-
ably decide that the use of marihuana endangers a compelling in-
terest sufficient to overcome religious freedom. While a court is not
equipped to second-guess legislative resolution of bona fide scientific
disputes, it can and should determine whether there is indeed such
honest scientific disagreement on whether use of a drug involves a
given risk of a given evil, which the court regards, respectively, as
significant and compelling. In so doing, greater weight should be
given to conclusions of uncommitted scholars, results of controlled
studies, and findings of disinterested, authoritative agencies assessing
228 383 F.2d at 860.
229 Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
230 THE MAYOR'S CoM. ON MARUANA, THE MARiaHUANA PROBLEM IN THE
CITY OF NEw YORK (1944).
231 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUsTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY (1967).
the state of evidence,2 32 than to the unscientific and often self-serving
claims of law enforcement officials, 233 obviously unscientific tracts or
articles laced with hearsay or hysterical, inflammatory language,234
materials which use ominously sounding medical terminology to de-
scribe unusual but not pernicious effects, 235 or reports and writings
which place primary reliance on these preceding sources.23 6 In other
words, a court, while applying a deferential standard of review, must
evaluate the evidence as a disinterested, sophisticated fact-finder.
An article-by-article analysis of the marihuana materials would
take us beyond the intended office of this commentary (indeed, other
psychedelics seem more likely to be involved in contemporary reli-
gious movements); we simply state our conclusion and invite others
to test it against all available evidence, virtually all of which is cited
in the Brief or in the note below.237
232 See materials cited in Brief, supra at 681-85. For recent summaries of
the evidence, see Blum, Mind-Altering Drugs and Dangerous Behavior, in
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABusE 24-25 (1967); Boyko & Rot-
berg, Constitutional Objections to California's Marijuana Possession Statute,
14 U.C.L.A.L. Ruv. 775-81 (1967).
233 "[We must] eliminate from the minds of the people and especially
from the minds of the legislators the idea that the people who arrest or pros-
ecute drug addicts have superior knowledge of drug addiction." KELB, DRUG
ADDICTION: A MEDICAL PROBLEM 172 (1962).
234 "Mr. Anslinger's conception of marihuana which has been widely
accepted because of its author's international influence is as distorted as the
conception of alcohol held by the Anti-Saloon League. It pictures a life of
delirium, wildness, gruesomeness, irresponsibility, violence and crime. It is a
scene populated with stories of horror, of girls screaming and crying, of fam-
ilies murdered, and of vicious criminals preying on the unsuspect. It ties
marihuana in with racketeers and mobsters, with depravity and sin, with evil
men and evil attitudes." Skolnick, supra note 114, at 13-14.
235 See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
236 Professor Skolnick suggests that a study of international drug agen-
cies which have made extreme claims against marihuana illustrates "how
organizations are created and used to promulgate a distorted conception of
social reality, that is, how falsehood achieves the status of authoritative truth
via organizational control." Skolnick, supra note 114, at 14. He points to the
overlapping personnel among these agencies, their refusal to consider scien-
tific evidence undermining various claims of dangerousness, the grossly dis-
proportionate influence of two or three quasi-experts (Anslinger, Dr. Pablo
Wolff) on their policies, and most interestingly, the fact that their claims of
dangerousness are either without citation, or are cited to works which are
themselves mere assertions or hearsay based on little or no experimental evi-
dence, materials that are outdated and controverted, their own earlier reports
or the findings of a small circle of cordial "authorities." "We have found a
mythology in which later writers cite the authority of earlier writers, who
also had little evidence. We have found, by and large, what can most char-
itably be described as a pyramid of prejudice, with each level of the structure
built upon the shaky foundations of earlier distortions." Id. at 16.
237 See Brief, supra at 681-85 and the following materials cited in the Brief
on Appeal for the United States in Leary v. United States: HALBACH, ISBELL &
SEEVERS, DRUG DEPENDENCE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND CHARACTEaISTICS (World
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The fears which have motivated federal legislation and heavy
penalties against the use of marihuana (i.e., that it leads to crime,
heroin and physiological addiction), cannot reasonably be thought to
be supported by the weight of existing evidence. Proof of a connec-
tion between marihuana and mental illness is also quite tenuous; the
principal support for that claim rests on studies conducted in India
with heavy and chronic users of hemp derivatives far more power-
ful than marihuana; and, as Professor Blum found: "[I]n the United
States neither cannabis psychosis nor cannabis dependency has
been described."238 There is some evidence that a psychotic episode
can occur in predisposed individuals. But the evidence is weak, the
risk is low, the case against alcohol is at least as strong, there are
less-restrictive alternatives, and it is highly doubtful that Congress or
the state legislatures, but for their misguided fears of other evils,
would have found a compelling interest in punishing possession or
allowing presumption of other crimes from the fact of possession.23 9
The remaining case against marihuana is that prolonged and exces-
sive use is associated with (but not clearly the cause of) lethargy,
social disengagement, slothfulness, loss of productivity and initiative,
and perhaps eventual dependency on private or public economic and
medical support. It is submitted that neither the risk nor the harm
is substantial enough to do violence to a paramount state interest;
certainly not to any such interest which society cannot protect by
substantially less-restrictive infringements of religious freedom.
Health Organization Bull. 1965); HODAPP, MARmuAA: A REVIEW OF THE
LrrETTuE FOR ANALYTicAL CHEMISTS (Bureau of Customs 1959); MERRILL,
MARIHuANA, TnE NEW DANGEROUS DRUG (Opium Research Comm., Foreign
Policy Ass'n 1950); WALTON, MARIHuANA: AMERICA'S NEW DRUG PROBLEM(1938); P. WOLFF, MARIHUANA IN LATIN AMERICA: THE THREAT IT CoNsTTUTEs
(1949); Creighton, Narcotics: Their Legitimate and Illicit Use, (Bureau of
Narcotic Enforcement, Cal. Dep't of Justice 1956); Marcovitz & Myers, The
Marihuana Addict in the Army, 6 WAR MEDIIE (1944); Munch, Marihuana
and Crime, 18 BuLL. ON NARconcs 15, 16 (1966); Stuart, Ganja, 12 WEST
INDIAN MEDIcAL J. 157 (1963). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1967, at 41, col.
4.
238 Blum, supra note 232.
239 A conclusion buttressed by the fact that in the face of much stronger
evidence of the psychic dangers of LSD, Congress chose not to prohibit pos-
session, several states have declined to act, and those states prohibiting pos-
session have deemed it a misdemeanor.
